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Motivation for research 
 
Alcohol has an important cultural role worldwide often being present in diffe-
rent social events. For that reason alcoholic beverages are considered to be a 
natural part of peopleʼs everyday life. Alcohol is also often considered as a 
means to improve social interaction between people or for relief in enhancing 
peopleʼs ability to cope with stress. However, alcohol as a commodity has 
deserved ubiquitous negative attention due to its damaging consequences, 
which may arise even when it is consumed in small quantities. The latter aspect 
has induced a huge number of authors to address various alcohol-related issues. 
It has been usually found that there are rationales for some kind of government 
interventions since alcohol lays a substantial social and economic burden on 
society. In monetary terms, it has often been estimated that economic costs  
of alcohol account from 1% to 2% of GDP in different countries1 (Thavorn-
charoensap et al., 2009).  
In this regard, Estonia is not an exception. Several authors have shown the 
remarkable role of alcohol in generating negative consequences. The main 
concern of Estonian researchers has been alcohol-related morbidity and morta-
lity (Lai et al., 2003, Kaasik et al., 2004) as well as the effects of excessive 
drinking on the health care sector (Reinap, 2009). However, the impacts of 
alcohol, as well as policies aimed to solve alcohol-related problems, are much 
more extensive affecting other spheres of society strongly. A huge gap in the 
corresponding literature needs to be filled, in order to reach a better under-
standing of the problem and to ascertain the appropriate solutions for Estonia.  
International literature, however, has made some general suggestions 
regarding alcohol policy. Alcohol taxation, among other policy alternatives, has 
often been advised to be one of the most effective policy measures to deal with 
alcohol-related problems. Its curbing impact on negative drinking con-
sequences, as well as cost-effectiveness, has been shown by many authors 
(Ludbrook et al., 2002). In Estonia, there was at least one study conducted 
which compared different alcohol control strategies (Lai et al., 2007). It was 
concluded that a rise in alcohol taxes would be the most cost-effective inter-
vention. However, it shares the limitation with other Estonian studies mentioned 
above – only the effect on the health care sector was analyzed. In addition, these 
kinds of studies whether conducted in Estonia or abroad, rather show the impact 
of alcohol taxation on social costs of alcohol or on prevalence of some specific 
                                                     
1 It is important to note that comparing alcohol costs with GDP, here and throughout the 
thesis, is mentioned only to reflect the extent of the monetary value of alcohol con-
sequences with the overall economy. Although a certain proportion of the costs (e.g. 
alcohol-related health care costs) are part of the GDP, there is no direct relationship 
between the value of GDP and the economic costs of alcohol. For example, a con-
siderable proportion of alcohol costs are attributed to premature mortality in terms of 
lost wages and are not included in the computation of GDP. 
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alcohol-related problem, but have little to say in regards to the socially optimal 
level of taxation. For the purpose of the latter, a solid theoretical framework 
should be developed to take into account multifarious costs and benefits of 
alcohol drinking and their interactions with other spheres of society. This kind 
of approach has had much less attention paid to it in the literature and is 
completely missing in the Estonian context.   
Of these scarce studies, most have addressed optimal alcohol taxation in a 
partial equilibrium setting to increase inefficiency by correcting negative 
externalities in alcohol markets (e.g. see Pogue and Sgontz 1989). According to 
that approach, the optimal level of taxation directly depends on the level and 
dynamics of the social costs of alcohol, or more specifically, the parts of the 
social costs that are considered either external or internal but not internalized. 
Therefore, the optimal policy would concern internalizing un-internalized 
alcohol-related costs. Even then, this approach completely ignores fiscal 
aspects. In the Estonian context, however, fiscal considerations are of high 
importance. For example, alcohol excise tax represented approximately 4% of 
the total tax revenues of the central government budget in 2009 and even 
exceeded revenues from personal income tax (Statistics Estonia, 2010a). This 
means that changes in tax rates could considerably affect the budget position. In 
fact, during the economic recession in 2009, tax rates on alcohol were raised in 
order to reduce the fiscal deficit.  
To the authorʼs knowledge, only Parry et al. (2009) have considered both 
external and fiscal rationales simultaneously for obtaining optimal levels of 
alcohol taxation in the US. The theoretical model presented in their study, 
however, fails to account for several other relevant factors. For example, they 
only consider drunk driving while alcohol-related violence is ignored. Secondly, 
in the Estonian context, the model should be extended to account somehow for 
touristsʼ alcohol purchases as the latter, consisting mainly of purchases by 
Finnish tourists, represent approximately one fourth of the total alcohol sales 
(Orro et al., 2010). Possible expansion of the black market, which is often 
considered as a relevant counterargument for raising alcohol taxes, would also 
require some kind of reckoning. 
To conclude, the discussion above refers to several challenges the field of 
alcohol research faces in the future since many relevant aspects remain un-
solved. It is also revealed, that at the present state of alcohol research in Estonia, 
it is almost impossible to say something concrete about the appropriate level of 
alcohol taxation for two reasons; first, there has not been any comprehensive 
cost study carried out; second, even if there were, theoretical framework 
research applied in the literature would require some extensions to have higher 
policy relevance in Estonia. The current thesis is going to contribute to both 




The aim and research tasks 
 
The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the optimal rate of excise tax on alcohol in 
order to accomplish two separate public goals in Estonia – correcting exter-
nalities and raising revenues for the government. Although this thesis is limited 
to addressing the average tax rate on alcohol only, while the obtaining of speci-
fic taxes on individual alcoholic beverages are left for future research, the thesis 
simulates numerical values for average tax rates and accordingly makes specific 
policy recommendations as regards to the current stance of alcohol policy in 
Estonia. Accordingly, the current thesis addresses the following research 
questions: 
 What is optimal with respect to the two goals? 
 Can the models of optimal alcohol taxation and optimal environmental 
taxation published in English literature be applied to Estonia as well? 
 How should such a model be formulated and adapted to Estonian con-
ditions? 
 What are the outcomes in general and for Estonian alcohol taxation 
policy? 
 
In order to arrive at the answers to the research questions and to achieve the aim 
of the thesis, research tasks are set up as follows. The first research task 
concerns understanding the problem, as it is a common procedure for any policy 
analysis (e.g. see Weimer and Vining, 2011). This mainly involves assessing the 
symptoms and considering alternative intervention measures. As regards to the 
latter, since the focus of this thesis is tax policy, alternative policies are 
discussed as much as necessary to determine the role and effectiveness of 
alcohol taxation.  
The second research task is to introduce the models from literature used to 
address optimal alcohol taxation in order to analyze their applicability to 
Estonia. As this thesis bases itself on and extends upon optimal taxation theory, 
only models from this strand of public finance literature are explored. Since the 
empirical part of this thesis aims to apply both partial equilibrium and general 
equilibrium models in order to obtain estimates for optimal alcohol tax in 
Estonia, both types of models are studied. The most general forms of these mo-
dels are laid out as well. This means that they are somewhat modified versions 
of those published in literature to overcome the unnecessary technicalities. 
The third research task is to examine empirically the role of alcohol in 
traffic mortality, which is expected to contribute to creating an empirical basis 
for obtaining the optimal excise tax policy. Of the many alcohol-drinking con-
sequences, traffic mortality was chosen to be studied more thoroughly for many 
convincing reasons. At first, traffic harm represents a remarkable share in social 
cost estimates worldwide affecting the health care sector, the criminal justice 
system as well as the insurance system, not to mention victimsʼ health and 
overall productivity through injuries and premature mortality  (e.g. Varney and 
Guest, 2002; Johansson et al., 2006). Second, many authors have shown that 
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alcohol taxation is an effective measure to control traffic harm (Grossman and 
Saffer, 1986; Wagenaar et al., 2010) implying that the level of optimal alcohol 
taxation is directly related to circumstances in traffic. In fact, several authors 
have considered drunk driving as the main external effect alcohol taxation 
should be designed to control (e.g. see Kenkel, 1996; Parry et al., 2009). Third, 
alcohol policies with regard to traffic accidents have usually concentrated on 
drunken driving legislation while drunken pedestrians are considered as victims. 
Empirical evidence, however, implies that alcohol is often more present among 
killed pedestrians (Peden et al., 2004). Accordingly, this thesis differentiates 
between drivers and pedestrians and thereby requires a close picture of traffic 
victims. Finally, as traffic accidents and its consequences have been one of the 
most important public concerns during the last decade in Estonia, empirical 
investigation of traffic mortality patterns was considered as a suitable starting 
point for empirical analysis in the present thesis. As concerns the study itself, 
data from post-mortem reports in 2000–2002 at the Estonian Bureau of Forensic 
Medicine are analyzed statistically to disclose the profile of victims and their 
association with alcohol intoxication.    
The fourth research task is to estimate the level and the structure of eco-
nomic costs of alcohol in Estonia. Similarly, to the third research task, it 
provides empirical basis for optimal tax estimates. Specifically, cost estimates 
are the main inputs into the alcohol taxation model in order to obtain optimal 
alcohol tax. For that purpose, cost-of-illness prevalence based approach is used 
and both direct and indirect costs attributed to alcohol are estimated for 2006.  
The fifth research task is to develop the theoretical model that would allow 
obtaining empirical estimates for the tax rate on alcohol in Estonia. For that 
purpose a static, one-period, general-equilibrium model developed by Parry et 
al. (2009) is extended upon to account also for violence and other alcohol-
related misdemeanors besides drunk driving. Additional important extensions 
concern the decomposition of touristsʼ alcohol purchases from other variables 
and accounting for administration costs of more stringent tax policy.  
Finally, the sixth research task is an empirical simulation of the theoretically 
derived optimal taxation model. For that purpose, optimal tax parameters are 
estimated empirically, mostly for 2009 and are applied to the derived model. 
The basis for parameter values regarding costs and traffic mortality is on a large 
scale provided by accomplishing the third and the fourth research tasks. In fact, 
the main function of empirical analyses concerning traffic mortality and overall 
economic costs of alcohol is to equip the theoretical model with empirical para-
meter values. Simulation results of this model lay the main basis for conclusions 







The thesis structure 
 
The thesis consists of three chapters, which are divided into several subchapters. 
Figure 1 presents the logic of composition and mutual relationships as regards 
to the core subchapters. It can be seen that the thesis is divided into three parts: 
the first part reviews previous theoretical and empirical literature related to 
optimal alcohol taxation, the second part studies empirical alcohol-related 
externalities in Estonia, the third part obtains empirical estimates for optimal 
alcohol taxation in Estonia.  
The first chapter is divided into three subchapters and details the issues that 
build the basis for optimal alcohol taxation. Alcohol-related consequences and 
their estimation issues, alternative alcohol policies and the responsiveness of 
alcohol-related harm with respect to alcohol taxation are discussed in different 
sections. The second subchapter involves the literature directly targeted at 
optimal alcohol taxation. The third subchapter discusses the most relevant 
issues in the literature in order to bring out limitations and research gaps in the 



























Figure 1. The relationships between chapters and subchapters 











2.2. The economic costs 
of alcohol 
3.3. Empirical simulation 
Conclusions 
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The second chapter presents two empirical studies. Both studies are of empirical 
examination of alcohol externalities in Estonia. The first one concentrates solely 
on traffic mortality while the other presents comprehensive estimation of econo-
mic costs of alcohol misuse in Estonia. The need for such studies arise from 
externality-correcting literature discussed in subchapter 1.2 as the results of the 
studies are the main input data for obtaining the optimal alcohol tax. A con-
nection between subchapters 1.1 and 2.2 has also been drawn to show that the 
former discusses issues related to estimation procedures of alcohol costs carried 
out in the latter.   
Finally, there is the third chapter that presents the theoretical model from 
which the optimal tax formula for Estonia is derived. The latter is simulated 
empirically in order to obtain the main results of the thesis presented in 
subchapter 3.3. Empirical evidence taken from studies presented in the second 
chapter as well as in the first chapter was used to obtain parameter values for 
optimal policy formula. There are two arrows connecting empirical studies and 
subchapter 3.2, which reflect the fact that the theoretical model developed for 
Estonia accounts for several empirical findings from the second chapter as well. 
 
 
The contributions of individual authors 
 
All parts of this thesis except one have been written solely by the author of the 
thesis. Only subchapter 2.1 is a newer version of the paper published in 2007 in 
cooperation with two co-authors Aidule-Taie Kaasik and Marika Väli. The role 
of the author in preparing this paper was mainly to conduct the statistical 
analysis, while the writing and communication with the publishing house was 
carried out by Aidule-Taie Kaasik. Marika Väli contributed mainly by obtaining 
required data and preparing it for the analysis.  
Subchapter 2.1, however, has considerably been changed by the author, 
compared with the published paper, since the focus in this thesis is somewhat 
different. The study is rewritten to support more directly the derivation of the 
theoretical model for obtaining optimal policy formula and the derivation of 
empirical estimates for parameter values to conduct the model parameterization. 
For that purpose, irrelevant statements and related references are eliminated. For 
example, approximately half of the Introduction section is rewritten to prevent 
unnecessary background information concerning epidemiological literature. 
Only a short overview of the literature concerning the role of alcohol and 
vulnerable road users in traffic accidents is discussed. In addition, related 
literature as well as background statistics presented in the Introduction section is 
updated for 2011. 
The Methodology section has been changed moderately. As the data has 
been additionally analyzed by estimating a couple of logit models, the Metho-
dology section is complemented by the short descriptions of these models. 
Although the Results section has been completely restructured, the main 
findings have not been changed but rather complemented with results from logit 
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models. However, some other modifications serve the purpose of getting a 
better picture of the role of alcohol in pedestrian fatalities and elimination of 
some unnecessary results in the context of the thesis. 
The Discussion section is complemented with a subsection on Policy im-
plications, which addresses traffic mortality issues in the context of optimal 
alcohol taxation. This section is completely written by the author of the thesis. 
The remaining part of this section, which mainly compares the results with 
previous literature concerning the main characteristics of victims and accidents 
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1. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BASIS  
FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1. Justification for alcohol taxation 
 
1.1.1. Alcohol consumption and its socio-economic impact 
 
Alcohol is often said to be an extraordinary commodity due to its remarkable socio-
economic impacts. Although these impacts may be positive to some extent, the net 
impact is usually considered negative. The latter means that alcohol is often 
associated with different illnesses, accidents, premature mortality, violence etc. (e.g. 
see Rehm et al., 2008; Easton, 2008). All these consequences have been considered 
as the most convincing arguments for governments worldwide to implement some 
kind of intervention policies, including alcohol taxation. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that for most of the drinking consequences alcohol is only one 
contributing factor among many others. Therefore, the extent of the potential gain 
from alcohol policy hinges critically on the assumptions regarding the share of 
drinking consequences that can be attributed to alcohol alone. This subchapter aims 
to qualify this issue by laying down the key patterns of alcohol consumption as well 
as the main types of drinking effects and by briefly discussing methodologies to 
disclose their association with each other. In addition, as optimal alcohol taxation 
analysis requires estimates of drinking effects in monetary terms, the most common 
approaches used to accomplish this aim, along with prior empirical estimates, are 
discussed as well. Although the main aim is to give a general overview of these 
issues, special attention is also paid to the Estonian situation and its comparison 
with other countries. 
 
General patterns of alcohol consumption 
Alcohol consumption refers to drinking beverages, which contain ethanol2. 
Although acknowledging huge differences across countries, these kinds of 
beverages have acquired a notable cultural role worldwide. Whether having a 
meal, celebrating or meeting friends, alcoholic beverages are often present. As a 
result, alcohol has become an important commodity of which the production, 
sale and advertising represent an important share of the economy and con-
sequently creates thousands of jobs. This applies especially to the European 
region where consumption of pure alcohol per capita is more than two times 
higher than in the rest of the world (Rehm et al., 2003a). Specifically, it has 
been recorded that during the last fifty years the overall level of alcohol con-
sumption in countries with advanced economies, of which most are European 
                                                     
2 In most countries, alcoholic beverages are legally defined in terms of certain alcohol 
content (see WHO, 2004). The Estonian Alcohol Act (Alkoholiseadus) defines alcoholic 
beverages as beers with alcohol content higher than 0.5 percent by volume and other 
liquids with alcohol content higher than 1.2 percent by volume. While evaluating 
optimal alcohol taxes for Estonia, this thesis applies the term “alcohol” to all beverages 
falling into one of these categories.     
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countries, has fluctuated around 10 liters of pure alcohol per capita. The per 
capita levels of recorded3 drinking by type of beverages in selected countries in 
2003–2005 are depicted in Figure 2. Considering the fact that in European 
countries people drink more than in most other countries, Estonia can be re-
garded as a country that experiences one of the highest consumption levels in 
the world. WHO (2011a) data for 2003–2005 reveals only a few countries in the 
world, such as the Czech Republic, Andorra and the British Virgin Islands, 




Figure 2. Recorded adult (15+ years) per capita consumption in liters of pure alcohol 
(average 2003–2005) 
Source: WHO (2011a), compiled by the author 
 
 
It should be stressed that the high level of alcohol consumption does not ne-
cessarily have to be damaging to public health. In many countries it is common 
that light alcoholic beverages such as beers and wines are consumed during meals 
only in small quantities which could be even beneficial to oneʼs health. It appears 
in Figure 2, however, that in former soviet countries such as Russia, Latvia, 
Lithuania as well as Estonia, the consumption of spirits represents a substantial 
share of total alcohol consumption. In some countries, including Estonia, these 
are the most common alcoholic beverages. As a result, the level of spirit con-
sumption in the first half of the 2000ʼs in Estonia was higher than the level of 
overall alcohol consumption in countries such as Sweden or Norway. This 
                                                     
3 The term “recorded” indicates that only alcoholic beverages, which are taxed by the 
government, are considered, while alcohol that had been acquired from illegal markets 
or via border trade has not been taken into account. 
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implies that Estonians drink a large part of alcohol for other purposes than just 
eating their meals. Therefore, both the level and structure of alcohol consumption 
in Estonia definitely indicates a potential problem in this field.     
In addition to the level and the structure of alcohol consumption, another 
relevant issue, which illustrates drinking patterns, concerns the distribution of 
alcohol consumption. While Figure 2 presents the consumption levels in terms 
of per capita, it does not reflect the fact that most people drink considerably less 
and some people do not drink at all. It means that a large proportion of alcohol 
is consumed by a limited number of people. Empirical evidence revealed in 
many studies shows that of all alcohol available for consumption, the share 
consumed by the top 10% of drinkers, ranges from one-third to two-thirds (e.g. 
see Kerr and Greenfield, 2007; Lemmens, 2001). In other words, the distri-
bution of alcohol consumption is positively skewed. Although this may lead to 
the belief that the most effective policy in controlling excessive drinking would 
be the one targeted at a small number of heavy drinkers, this may not be the 
case in practice. Rather convincing evidence from literature can be found 
according to which the distribution of alcohol consumption is relatively con-
sistent (Cook 2007). It means that changes in the level of consumption per 
capita actually describes pretty well the changes in drinking patterns among all 
types of drinkers. As a result, the policy should aim to reduce drinking among 
the entire population by causing a downward shift of the entire distribution.   
As regards to public concerns, alcohol consumption, as such, is not the 
problem. The main concern, which calls for public intervention, arises from the 
consequences of drinking. The public expects that these consequences be 
controlled through restricting alcohol consumption. This, however, depends 
critically on the accuracy of the assumptions regarding the relationship between 
drinking and its consequences. As follows, this relationship and its specification 
procedures applied in the literature are more closely described.  
When examining the link between alcohol and its consequences it is 
convenient to employ the model presented by Rehm et al. (2003b). This model, 
basing itself on findings from the earlier literature, lays out the main causal 
pathways from alcohol consumption to a set of health and social consequences. 
Three intermediate outcomes are identified: direct biochemical effects, intoxi-
cation, and dependence. Biochemical effects include all effects of alcohol on 
human body functions. These effects can lead to beneficial consequences, such 
as the benign effect of moderate drinking on coronary heart disease, or harmful 
consequences, such as pancreatic damage. Intoxication mediates acute con-
sequences, including traffic accidents, injuries, violence, premature mortality, 
etc. The third intermediate outcome in the Rehm et al. model is alcohol depen-
dence. Being a disorder in itself, it sustains alcohol consumption and thereby 
mediates all possible effects alcohol drinking can cause.  
It should be noticed that both biochemical and intoxication effects can arise even 
from relatively small quantities of consumed alcohol. Specifically, the human body 
can metabolize only a limited quantity of alcohol in a certain amount of time. 
Although this varies among individuals, the average amount is about 10 grams of 
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pure alcohol per hour4. The alcohol excess of that quantity increases blood alcohol 
concentration and consequently harms various organs in the human body (Zakhari, 
2006). In regards to the acute consequences from intoxication, there are relatively 
convincing evidence which confirms that even small quantities of alcohol 
consumed impairs visual performance, interpretation of complex sensory 
information, rate of information processing and the ability to steer a vehicle as well 
as divide oneʼs attention between two or more sources of visual information 
(Moskowitz and Burns, 1990). This can be explained by the fact that as initial 
alcohol concentration is high in the organs with  abundant blood supply including 
brain, the neurological effects of drinking are seen almost at once (Knight, 2001). 
Therefore, both epidemiological and medical literature, only shortly discussed here, 
offer enough evidence about how consumption of ethanol affects the human body 
and a personʼs mental state, predicting various kinds of harmful consequences.   
 
Quantification of the drinking consequences  
Acknowledging that alcohol is a risk factor for negative consequences, the 
question concerning the extent of alcohol-related harm arises. Specifically, one 
could wonder whether there is enough ground for public intervention. For that 
purpose, drinking consequences must somehow be quantified. One relatively 
primitive indicator is provided by WHO (2011b). WHO publishes regular 
alcohol-related standard death rates of which the dynamics for Estonia and the 
EU are presented in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Alcohol related mortality in Estonia and the EU (per 100 000) 
Source: WHO (2011b), compiled by the author 
                                                     
4 Alcohol metabolism is the process through which ethanol is eliminated from the 
human body. For more details, e.g. see NIAAA (2007), Zakhari (2006), Knight (2001).   
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This indicator includes selected causes of mortality, which are known from lite-
rature to be related to alcohol consumption. These are cancer of the esophagus 
and larynx, alcohol dependence syndrome, chronic liver disease, cirrhosis and 
all external causes such as injuries, falls etc. Though being a highly indirect way 
to capture the volume of alcohol-related problems, it is appropriate for compa-
rative purposes. For example, Figure 3 shows that while both Estonia and the 
EU in average have experienced a decreasing trend from the 1990ʼs, there are 
more than two times more fatalities per 100,000 in Estonia. Considering that 
this indicator reflects the level of most serious consequences, it certainly implies 
the need for some kind of intervention policy in Estonia. However, this is pretty 
much all that can be said, as this kind of rough indicator does not suffice for a 
more sophisticated analysis. For example, while this death rate includes all 
traffic fatalities, a considerable proportion of traffic accidents could be at-
tributed to several other factors such as inappropriate speed or defects of road 
design. It means that, while being useful in assessing the alcohol-related symp-
toms, this indicator fails to reflect the potential gain alcohol policy could 
achieve because deaths attributed to alcohol alone are unknown. A well-
weighed policy, however, should satisfy this requirement.   
To attain a better understanding of the burden caused by alcohol, all the 
consequences, regardless of which intermediate outcome they arise from, could 
be divided into two categories: those, which are caused solely by alcohol and 
those in the case of which alcohol is just one contributing factor among others. 
One example that could be included in the first category is alcoholic liver 
disease, as these kinds of diseases would not exist in an alcohol free society. It 
means that for such diseases there is certainty in determining the role of alcohol: 
all of them can be attributed to alcohol alone. However, there are wide ranges of 
effects that are associated with alcohol only partially, which means that the 
strength or even the existence in some cases, of this association requires pro-
found analysis.  
There is a rather well developed methodology to estimate the relationship 
between alcohol and different chronic health conditions. The most common way 
to accomplish this is to combine relative risks estimates with information about 
drinking patterns. Formally, this is carried out by using the following formula to 
derive the alcohol-attributed fraction for a specific alcohol-related health 
condition (English et al., 1995):  
 = ∑ ( − 1) ∑ ( − 1) + 1     (1.1) 
 
In (1.1)  denotes the drinking or exposure category from abstention to harmful. 
 is the prevalence rate of alcohol consumption of the certain exposure level 
and  is the relative risk of a certain exposure category compared to no 
exposure. The value of AAF derived by using formula (1.1) practically shows 
the proportion of health conditions that without alcohol would not exist. 
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Relative risks are usually obtained from international surveys5 while prevalence 
rates should reflect the drinking patterns of the nation being studied. Using this 
methodology, alcohol has been found to be a contributing factor fuelling the 
prevalence of different kinds of cancers, including breast, mouth, liver, 
esophagus and colon cancers, as well as diseases like cirrhosis of the liver, 
cerebrovascular diseases, pancreatitis, diseases of the esophagus, stomach and 
duodenum, etc.  
Methodology for obtaining reliable AAFs for acute consequences, like 
drowning and injuries for instance, is not as advanced as in the cases of chronic 
diseases. The easiest way to create a link between drinking and acute con-
sequences is to use fractions of cases where victims were found to have a blood 
alcohol concentration above a certain level. In addition, clinical methods are 
used consisting of an examination of a history of alcoholism or the finding of 
alcohol-damaged organs at post-mortem (English et al., 1995).  
Another category of drinking consequences that require estimates of AAF 
results from violent or criminal behavior. A causal link between drinking and 
crimes is ambiguous. Pernanen (1996) and Pernanen et al. (2002) have reviewed 
the literature and have discussed different theoretical models; from those which 
see direct causal relationship between drinking and crime through an alcohol-
induced so-called disinhibition process6, to those according to which the 
association is based on socially meaningful constructions7. The former types of 
models support the simplest and the most direct, but they are, probably, not the 
most reliable way to obtain AAF. More specifically, it could be assumed that 
the proportion of criminal behavior committed under the influence of alcohol or 
the proportion of victims under the influence of alcohol become approximations 
of AAF. As this method may give biased results, interviews could be conducted 
with arrested persons, offenders and victims to gather background information 
(e.g. see Harwood et al., 1998; Pernanen et al., 2002). However, the develop-
ment of more reliable methods remains for future research. 
In addition to the negative effects of alcohol there is quite extensive lite-
rature providing evidence about positive effects of alcohol consumption. 
Gutjahr et al. (2001a, 2001b) have reviewed the literature of alcohol-related 
health consequences and referred to four types of health conditions for which 
drinking in moderate quantities may offer protective effects. These are cardio-
vascular disease, cerebrovascular disease, diabetes and cholelithiasis (gall-
                                                     
5 One often cited study conducted by English et al. (1995) has reviewed international 
literature regarding relative risks, which were used by the authors to estimate the 
attributable fractions for Australia. For recent updates of global AAF as well as a review 
of relative risks, see Rehm et al. (2008). 
6 According to this process, criminal behavior is assumed to occur after drinking due to 
psycho-pharmacological effects of alcohol and probably together with the drunken 
person feeling frustrated, threatened, provoked or insulted.   
7 For example, based on these theories one could link drinking and crime by assuming 
that in order to avoid responsibility for a criminal act a person drinks alcohol before 
such behavior. 
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stones). The attributable fractions for these health conditions can be found in the 
same manner as described above. In addition to health benefits, Heather (2001) 
also describes the research about psychological and social benefits. Positive 
psychological and social effects are obvious as most people drink to get into a 
better mood or use alcohol as a means to increase the enjoyment of each other’s 
company. Nevertheless, literature also supports the role of alcohol in reducing 
tension or helping to cope with stress. Psychological types of benefits, however, 
are extremely difficult or even impossible to quantify. This is why quantitative 
studies have ignored them and mostly negative effects of alcohol are con-
sidered. One justification for excluding stress-relieving benefits of alcohol, 
however, is the assumption that a person who drinks alcohol knows about these 
benefits and pays the fair price for receiving them. Therefore, if the study aims 
to quantify only external effects or internal effects those individuals are in-
capable of internalizing8, these benefits can be ignored. Even then, there are still 
probably external benefits this person with reduced stress passes on to others, 
e.g. to her or his family. This thesis, however, is not designed to solve this 
problem and thereby follows the prior literature in concentrating more on 
alcohol-related harm, which is easier to quantify9.   
There are also certain economic benefits. For example, alcohol production 
may generate considerable amount of public as well as private revenues and in-
crease employment. However, benefits such as employment cannot be con-
sidered as social benefits in a strict sense because without the alcohol sector the 
resources would find employment in other sectors where their productivity may 
be even higher. Therefore, they can be ignored. Roughly speaking, the same 
applies to public revenues from taxing alcohol, as they are transfers within 
society, rather than social benefits10. 
 
Attaching monetary values 
Even if the reliable association between alcohol and its consequences has been 
established, all above-mentioned drinking effects are rather difficult to compare 
with each other. This also means that it is difficult to reflect the total impact of 
alcohol on society. One often-used method to achieve comparability in public 
health literature is to convert the overall burden of diseases into disability-
                                                     
8 This is actually the appropriate approach for optimal taxation analysis. See subchapter 
1.2.1 below. 
9 Obviously, there are many types of alcohol-related harm such as domestic violence, 
which is extremely difficult to quantify as well. Therefore, one strategy to overcome 
this problem could be to assume that unquantifiable benefits and harm offset each other 
and they can be ignored when net-effects of alcohol consumption are calculated.   
10 Tax revenues may generate social benefits if their collection is less costly than in the 
case of some other tax. In fact, fiscal considerations of alcohol taxation are the focus of 
this thesis (see subchapter 1.2 and chapter 3). In general terms, however, the tax pay-
ment from taxpayer to government, per se, does not directly generate any value and can 
be considered as a pure transfer.  
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adjusted life years (DALY)11. In Estonia, at least one study has been undertaken 
in which alcohol attributable fractions were calculated to obtain the burden in 
terms of DALY. It showed that almost 7% of the burden of diseases (measured 
in life years) was attributable to alcohol (Lai et al., 2003).  
Another possibility is to place monetary value on each consequence. In order 
to obtain optimal tax rates on alcohol, which are expressed in monetary terms as 
well, this is inevitable. The typology of alcohol-related monetary costs is shown 
in Figure 4. There are first-hand consequences of drinking in the middle circle 
and their monetized values in four separate boxes12. At first, it is seen that 
alcohol lays a substantial burden on the public sector, because government must 
finance treatment of alcohol-related diseases, proceedings for alcohol-related 
misdemeanors and crimes, also fire and rescue operations. For this purpose, the 
government uses tax revenue, which means that the final cost bearers are all 
taxpayers regardless of their involvement in these incidents. What it means is 
that alcohol abusers affect non-abusers through higher taxes or reduction of 
quantity or quality of public goods and services. In those countries, which rely 
more on the private sector, the burden is carried to non-abusers through the 
insurance system.  
Productivity losses arise from three main sources. At first, alcohol-related 
premature mortality may reduce the workforce and as a consequence the 
volume of production. Secondly, due to alcohol abusersʼ poorer health, their fre-
quent drinking or absenteeism, they may find it difficult to find a job, so that 
there is probably a higher unemployment rate among alcohol abusers. This also 
applies to victims of alcohol-related accidents who have become partially/ 
totally disabled. Thirdly, even for those who have found a job, their performan-
ce may still be impaired. All types of productivity losses are borne by 
employers who must deal with lower labor productivity, by employees who face 
lower wages as well as by all taxpayers since lower productivity also cuts down 
tax revenues used to provide public goods. 
There are three more cost categories pointed out. Property damage is mostly 
related to houses destroyed in fires and cars damaged in traffic accidents. In ad-
dition to tangible costs, there are also intangible effects. For example, practical-
ly every injury causes physical suffering to victims. Suffering from family vio-
lence, for instance, is one of the most important social problems in which alco-
hol plays a significant role. However, as was discussed above for benefits, these 
                                                     
11 Disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) is defined as the sum of years of potential life 
lost due to premature mortality and the years of productive life lost due to disability. A 
technically similar concept is the quality-adjusted life-year (QALY), which instead of 
health loss measures health gain from some intervention policy. These are widely used 
measures to quantify the burden of disease from mortality and morbidity in public 
health literature. 
12 Although the discussion here as follows seems to be concentrated on alcohol costs, 
these are rather net costs as at least some benefits are usually monetized as well. For 
instance, it is quite common in alcohol costs studies to include benefits of drinking in 
terms of lower prevalence of some illnesses. 
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kinds of psychological effects are difficult to convert into monetary value and 
are often left out from the analysis. Finally, the value people place on loss of 
life could also be considered. It is different from the tangible value of life in 
which case the death of an individual is valued through their productivity.  
 
 
Figure 4. Consequences of alcohol consumption 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
There has been a wide range of empirical estimates all over the world conducted 
to examine the burden alcohol lays on society. Before discussing the results, a 
couple of comments regarding methodological aspects deserve attention. At first, 
it should be noted that the different cost estimates vary considerably due to the 
cost components included. However, the most frequently used framework to 
estimate economic burden of diseases or health risks from alcohol is the cost-of-
illness (COI) approach. In case of alcohol, COI studies estimate the costs of 
alcohol compared to the hypothetical situation that there was no alcohol con-
sumption. Costs are categorized as direct and indirect. Direct includes costs like 
alcohol-related public health care expenditure, property damage etc. Indirect costs 
include productivity losses from premature mortality or illnesses, for instance.  
In addition, COI studies vary on whether they are incidence-based or 
prevalence-based, top-down or bottom-up and a prospective or retrospective 
approach (see details from Robson and Single, 1995). Different approaches may 
considerably affect the results. It is also important to note that COI studies are 
usually conducted from a social perspective. It means that the included costs 
measure the value of the forgone opportunity, used in a different way than those 
resources, which are used or lost due to alcohol. Therefore, in the COI frame-
work, although alcohol-related transfer payments lay a burden on a fiscal 
system, they are not interpreted as costs because resources are not used but 
shifted within a society. As regards to consumersʼ expenditures on alcoholic 
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beverages, these costs are excluded as well because they are offset by benefits 
from alcohol consumption13. Different use of cost terminology may also be 
confusing as some researchers use social and external costs as synonyms while 
private costs are those borne by consumers or producers. In mainstream eco-
nomics, however, social cost is the sum of private costs and external costs that 
are more prevalently interpreted in the literature. 
Although the COI study has become one of the most frequently used 
approaches estimating economic costs of alcohol, it has often been criticized by 
economists for its dubious policy relevance. A review by Tarricone (2006) pre-
sents three important limitations discussed in the literature. At first, it has been 
suggested that COI studies do not give any guidance in decision-making be-
cause any policy program is not evaluated. Secondly, COI studies are criticized 
due to their embedded circularity. The latter means that high health care costs 
attributed to a certain alcohol-related disease is the consequence of decisions 
made in the past. Therefore, the costs indicated by the COI study just show the 
actual resource allocation. Third, the human capital approach that is used to 
evaluate morbidity and mortality costs, reflecting loss of productivity through 
lost wages primarily, has little or nothing to do with the value people place on 
their lives. Therefore, results of COI studies do not indicate the benefit people 
receive when social costs would be curbed. Regardless of this critique, COI 
studies show the amount of scarce resources consumed due to alcohol and as a 
result fits into the framework of alcohol taxation after some adjustments have 
been made. The latter mainly concerns the categorization of costs into external 
and internal, as only the former is appropriately taken into account when 
optimal taxation problems are addressed. Specifically, optimal taxation litera-
ture is based strongly on mainstream economics. Standard models in econo-
mics, however, assume rational consumers, which mean that internalized costs 
of alcohol are not sufficient rationale for government policy intervention14. This 
approach is also followed in this thesis.    
Empirical estimates of the economic cost of alcohol worldwide, of which 
most have used the COI approach, certainly imply that alcohol lays substantial 
burden on societies. There have been studies undertaken in the USA, Australia, 
New Zealand, the UK, Canada and Japan in the 1980’s and 1990’s indicating 
that the social costs of alcohol misuse range from 0.4% to 1.9% of GDP 
(Richardson and Crowley, 1992; Crowley and Richardson, 1997; Robson and 
Single, 1995). Recently, a literature review conducted by Thavorncharoensap et 
al. (2009) disclosed that the economic burden of alcohol in 12 selected countries 
was estimated to range from 0.45% to 5.44% of GDP. An almost identical range 
appears in Table 1, which lists studies conducted in 1993–2010. It should be 
                                                     
13 These benefits could also include alcohol-induced relief of psychological stress, 
briefly discussed above. Therefore, both benefits and expenditures can be excluded. 
14 Un-internalized, internal costs such as some internal illnesses due to information 
failures could also be taken into account, even if the consumer is assumed to be rational. 
This is discussed in subchapter 1.2.1 in more detail. 
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noticed that the study conducted by Anderson and Baumberg (2006) presented 
in Table 1 is based on 21 surveys conducted in Europe based on which the cost 
of alcohol in the European Union has been estimated. It was found that the total 
tangible cost of alcohol in the European Union is EUR 125 billion, representing 
1.3% of GDP. 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of cost estimates 
 
Authors and year of study 
Country and year of 
data 
Result 
(% of GDP) 
Nakamura et al. (1993)2 Japan, 1987 1.9% 
Devlin et al. (1997) New Zealand, 1991 1.4%–5.4%1 
Rice et al. (1990)2 USA, 1985 1.7% 
Harwood et al. (2000) USA, 1998 2.1%1 
Single et al. (1998)3 Canada, 1992 1.1% 
Rehm et al. (2006)4 Canada, 2002 1.3%2 
Fenoglio et al. (2003) France, 1997 1.4% 
Lima and Esquerdo (2003) Portugal, 1995 0.6% 
Johansson et al. (2006) Sweden, 2002 0.8%1 
Anderson and Baumberg (2006) European Union, 2003 1.3% 
Collins and Lapsley (2008) Australia, 2004/2005 1.2%1 
Thavorncharoensap et al.,  (2010) Thailand, 2006 2.0% 
Kaasik et al. (2004) Estonia, 2001/2002 1% 
Reinap (2009) Estonia, 2006 1.1% 
Saar (2009) Estonia, 2006 1.6%–2.3% 
Source: Compiled by the author  
Notes: 1 Ratio was calculated by the author using original results and GDP value from 
OECD database (2007). 2 In Robson and Single (1995). 3 In ICAP (1999). 4 In Johans-
son et al. (2006). 
 
 
Table 1 also shows that most of the estimates range from 1% to 2% of GDP. 
Relatively low costs in Portugal are due to the purpose of estimating only costs 
to the health care system. Therefore, the Swedish study, that includes all im-
portant cost components, has disclosed the lowest estimate among studies 
presented in Table 1. There may be many reasons for this result from methodo-
logical issues to the more severe alcohol policy in Sweden. High social cost 
estimates for New Zealand that exceeds 5% of GDP assumes the prevalent rate 
of alcohol abuse of 17.6% for males and 10.8% for females. Under low esti-
mates, these figures were 6.5% and 2.2%, respectively. Similar variation was 
applied to other parameters as well.  
As regards to the Estonian studies, the earliest one conducted by Kaasik et 
al. (2004) estimated that the alcohol-related economic burden in Estonia that 
can be attributed to premature injury mortality amounted to 1% of GDP in 
2001/2002. In obtaining this result the authors included all fatalities in which 
victims were known to be intoxicated. A recent study by Reinap (2009) ac-
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counts for only health costs, both direct and indirect and reveals similar result to 
Kaasik et al. The results of the Estonian study carried out by the author of the 
present thesis in 2009, as well as its methodological details are presented in the 
empirical chapter below.  
For alcohol policy, social costs estimates alone have little to say. They can 
only illustrate the extent of the problem. The question of an acceptable level of 
economic costs of alcohol, as well as an appropriate mix of policy measures, re-
mains unanswered. For that purpose, the following subchapter discusses alterna-
tive policy measures and their implementation in practice. 
 
 
1.1.2. Alcohol policies in practice 
 
Large-scale drinking harm is usually considered sufficient justification for 
government intervention. Alcohol policy is even defined as measures imple-
mented to reduce this harm (e.g. see Monteiro, 2007; WHO, 2004). In practice, 
however, there is a wide variety of alternative instruments. It means that 
government faces the task of finding an appropriate mix of alcohol policies for 
alcohol control. This section at first briefly reckons different areas of alcohol 
policy and presents some evidence of their effectiveness. In the second half of 
the subchapter, alcohol policy implemented by the Estonian government and 
corresponding EU regulations are discussed as well. The primary focus is to 
reveal the role of alcohol taxation compared with other measures and its present 
application in practice. 
 
Areas of alcohol policy 
In addition to tax policy, mainly six different alcohol policy areas can be found 
in the literature, which are presented in Table 2. Controlling availability of alco-
holic beverages and enacting certain drunken driving legislation are probably 
the most common alcohol policy areas after taxation policy. As it is shown in 
Table 2, physical availability of alcoholic beverages can be governed by 
restricting the number of outlets and their geographical location through an 
established licensing system or state monopoly. In addition, government could 
restrict hours and days in which alcohol can be sold or places in which it can be 
consumed. Drunken driving legislation usually determines the minimum blood 
alcohol concentration under which it is allowed to drive a car, a motorcycle or 
even a bicycle. These requirements, to be effective, are usually complemented 
by breath testing that involve random stops of drivers who are required to take a 
breath test to establish their blood alcohol concentration or by testing after 
justified suspicion arising from a traffic accident, for instance. Both availability 
and drunken driving measures can be targeted to a specific subgroup by setting 
restrictions on age below which alcohol purchase and consumption is prohibited 




Table 2. The main areas of alcohol policy 
 
Policy areas Specific interventions 
Availability 
Number of outlets 
Selling places 
Time of sale 
Drunk driving 
Blood alcohol concentration level 
Random breath testing 
Testing after justified suspicion 
Advertising 
Advertising bans 
Places of advertisement 
Sponsorship 
Health warnings 
Health care interventions 
Screening 
Brief intervention 
Alcohol-free environments Consumption places 
Prevention 






Source: Nelson (2010), WHO (2009; 2004), Holder (2008), Monteiro (2007), Chisholm 
et al. (2004), Cook and Moore (2002), compiled by the author  
 
 
Although the other policy areas have received somewhat less public attention, 
they have important and indispensable roles in dealing with alcohol-related 
problems. Specifically, two related areas are advertising and different preven-
tive strategies. The former includes restrictions on alcohol advertisements and 
sponsorship by the alcohol beverage industry as well as requirements of health 
warnings for advertising or labels on bottles. The aim of the latter is to raise the 
public awareness by providing information about alcohol risks through media 
campaigns or the education system if youth is considered as the target group. 
Health care interventions such as brief interventions or screening are directed at 
individual drinkers. Specifically, brief intervention may range from 5 minutes of 
brief advice to 15–30 minutes of brief counseling in order to facilitate behavior 
change (Henry-Edwards et al., 2003). Screening for alcohol consumption also 
involves activities such as educating patients in primary care and therefore pro-
vides an opportunity to give brief intervention to those that require it (Monteiro, 
2007). Finally, alcohol policy could aim to create alcohol-free environments by 
restricting drinking in different settings such as public places in order to mini-
mize the risks arising from alcohol abuse. 
The essence of last measure listed in Table 2 – pricing policy – which is the 
concern of this thesis, arises from the law of demand. More specifically, as price 
rise is expected to decrease the quantity demanded, government may impose or 
raise the tax on alcoholic beverages in order to curtail alcohol consumption. Fines 
and non-pecuniary penalties for unlawful behavior committed under influence of 
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alcohol could also be categorized into the pricing policy area since the idea is 
similar to tax policy. For example, raising fines for drunk-driving increases the 
expected costs of a drunken driving trip for drivers, which should decrease the 
number of drunken driving trips they decide to take. This branch of alcohol policy 
has probably the most sophisticated and developed theoretical framework that has 
enabled several economists to obtain empirical estimates for optimal alcohol tax 
and penalties. This literature is discussed in detail in subchapter 1.2. 
One of the most profound surveys concerning different alcohol policy areas 
compiled by WHO (2004) revealed that the degree of which each policy area is 
covered in different countries varies considerably. It is obvious that the optimal 
mix of policies is not identical among countries and depends on economical, 
political as well as cultural context. However, research on the effectiveness of 
different measures has disclosed some general guidelines regarding the most 
effective and cost-effective policy interventions. Reviewing the literature, Lud-
brook et al. (2002) for instance, have found that there is a strong evidence base 
to show the effectiveness of taxation and brief interventions. In addition, the 
rising legal age of drinking, the lower permitted blood alcohol level when 
driving, random breath testing and lower outlet density were found to be effec-
tive. The effectiveness of the latter policy measure to curb adolescent drinking 
was recently confirmed by Truong and Sturm (2009). According to Chisholm et 
al. (2004), optimal policy mix varies with respect to the levels of hazardous15 
alcohol use. More specifically, brief interventions and taxation was shown to be 
the most cost-effective in regions with high rates of hazardous drinking. In 
regions with low levels of hazardous drinking, on the contrary, intervention 
programs targeted at special subgroups, drivers for instance, were found to be 
much more cost-effective compared with taxation.  
Holder (2008) divides policy measures into three categories each suitable for 
different countries depending on the policy already in the place. Accordingly, 
for countries with less developed alcohol policy in place the first most effective 
and the least costly choice would be taxation. For countries with appropriate tax 
policy already in practice, but who further aim to reduce alcohol-related harm, it 
is recommended to implement different sales restrictions and to reduce density 
of alcohol outlets. The final step could entail complementing the existing policy 
arsenal with more targeted measures, like lower minimum drinking and 
purchase ages, random breath testing, lower BAC limits for drivers, etc.  
Therefore, taxation is considered to have highly relevant role among alcohol 
policy instruments. It can be implemented with relatively low costs and it has 
widespread effects on alcohol consumption. Although it may create deadweight 
loss due to price distortions concerning moderate drinkers, it is important to 
note that a considerable proportion of alcohol is consumed by a small pro-
portion of abusive drinkers. This means that the alcohol tax falls most heavily 
on abusive drinkers and the effect on the welfare of moderate drinkers cannot be 
                                                     
15 Authors define hazardous alcohol use as an average rate of alcohol consumption of 
more than 20g pure alcohol daily for women and 40g daily for men. 
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too large. In addition, charging penalties for alcohol-related misdemeanors and 
crimes enable to internalize external effects without harming moderate drinkers. 
This way, the optimal level of alcohol taxation can be reduced. 
The most important concern undermining the effectiveness of tax policy is 
the possible expansion of the illegal alcohol market. This may at least, to some 
extent, offset the reduction in legal alcohol consumption.  However, Chisholm 
et al. (2004), for instance, have found that tax policy is one of the most effective 
alcohol policy measures even when 10%–15% increase in illicit production or 
smuggling is considered. Therefore, illegal production is not a sufficient argu-
ment for ruling out the tax policy per se. 
 
Alcohol policy in Estonia 
All the policy measures reckoned above are at least to some extent applied to 
the Estonian alcohol market as well. For example, there are certain restrictions 
in Advertising Act on advertising alcohol (Reklaamiseadus). In addition, ac-
cording to Alcohol Act alcohol consumption is prohibited in public places 
(Alkoholiseadus). Even media campaigns on alcohol-related harm have been 
carried out. Probably two areas utilized by the Estonian government most acti-
vely in the last decade are drunken driving legislation and physical availability. 
However, none of them has been used systematically to control the economic 
costs of alcohol. Specifically, according to the drunken driving legislation the 
legal limit for blood alcohol concentration is 0.02 mg/100ml. This is lower than 
in most of the EU countries (for international comparison, see WHO, 2004). In 
addition, pecuniary penalty rates for a drunken driving trip were doubled in 
2002 up to EUR 1200 (Liiklusseadus) and there have been random breath 
testing operations carried out as well. However, pecuniary penalty rates have 
been held constant regardless of the fact that by 2010, compared with 2002, 
nominal wages have practically doubled (Statistics Estonia, 2011a) and the 
standard of living in terms of real GDP have improved by more than one fifth 
(Statistics Estonia, 2010c).  
Physical availability of alcohol has been somewhat restricted from 2008, as 
nationwide restrictions on hours in which alcohol retail sales can be conducted 
were implemented (Alkoholiseadus). More specifically, sales of alcoholic 
beverages are only allowed from 8.00 a.m. to 8.00 p.m. Before this policy 
change retail sales of alcoholic beverages was regulated by local governments 
and there was rather different practices across different regions (Saar et al., 
2008). Regardless of the nationwide restrictions, the availability can be still 
considered relatively high. For example, the number of strong alcohol retail 
shops per 100 000 inhabitants is more than 30 times higher than in northern 
countries like Norway, Sweden or Finland (Orro et al., 2010).  
Until recently, the excise tax policy has been rather inactive and it has not 
certainly served the main purpose of alcohol policy – to reduce alcohol-related 
harm. However, several tax raises have been carried out, especially in the years 
from 2008 to 2010. As a result, compared with excise levels in 2004, by 2010 
rates were raised as follows (Ministry of Finance of Estonia, 2011):  
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 from EUR 3.5 to EUR 5.4 per 1% by volume of ethanol in 100 liters for 
beer;  
 from EUR 20.1 to EUR 31.7 per hectoliter of product for wines (degree 
of alcohol less than 6%); 
 from EUR 66.5 to EUR 73.1 for wines (degree of alcohol more than 6%); 
 from EUR 926.7 to EUR 1418.8 per hectoliter of pure alcohol.     
 
In order to get a better picture of how these rates fit into the dynamics of the 
overall economy, Figure 5 shows the changes in the ratio of the average 
nominal monthly wage rate to the prices of alcoholic beverages per liter. This 
indicator shows how many liters a person who earns an average wage is able to 
purchase when he or she is spending all their money on a respective beverage. 
For example, in 1998 this imaginary person could have purchased a little bit 
more than 200 liters of beer. By 2008, the purchasing power had been increased 




Figure 5. Economic availability of alcoholic beverages in Estonia 
Source: Orro et al. (2010), Statistics Estonia (2011a), compiled by the author 
 
 
Black signs in Figure 5 denote the years in which there was a rise in alcohol 
excise rates. In 2005, rates were raised by 5%, however, in the following years 
Estonia experienced substantial economic growth as well as an increase in the 
general price level, the effect of this policy change remained marginal. One 
obvious reason behind this sharp increase in purchasing power of alcohol arises 
from the fact that alcohol excise rates are levied on per unit of absolute alcohol 
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basis. As a result, tax rates fail to account for changes in producer prices. In 
2008, however, rates were raised by about one third. During economic depres-
sion, rates were increased by additional 10% in 2010 to reduce fiscal deficit. As 
a consequent the trend of rising economic availability was stopped. Even then, 
purchasing power is still considerably higher than in 1990ʼs.  
It should be acknowledged that for membership in the EU, Estonia must 
follow certain rules that are established for free-trade purposes due to the EU 
harmonization policy. Specifically, the minimum rates are applied to alcohol 
excise duties each member state must meet (Council Directive 92/84/EEC). 
However, this has not put a significant pressure on tax rates. Specifically, tax 
rates implemented in Estonia have exceeded required minimum levels two or 
three times during the entire last decade. The only concern has been to avoid 
discrimination between different beverages that is prohibited in the EU for the 
purpose of free trade. Accordingly, the Estonian government had to raise the tax 
rates on some alcoholic beverages. This however, has had a marginal effect on 




Figure 6. Excise duties on spirits in the EU in 2011 
Source: European Commission (2011a), compiled by the author 
 
 
This more or less applies to other EU member states as well. Specifically, the EU 
has set minimum levels of alcohol excise duties in 1992 each member country 
must meet. However, considering actual taxes implemented in most of the 
member states presented in Figure 6, minimum rates had been set at an in-
appropriately low level. Only two countries in the EU impose the minimum level 
of duties on spirits. The same also applies to beer duties – only Romania imposes 
the minimum level, which is EUR 1.87 per 1% by volume of ethanol in 100 liters. 
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As concern still wines, these beverages have maintained their special status. EU 
minimum rate for wine is zero, as almost half of the countries do not tax wines. 
Another important factor affecting tax policies in the EU member states 
should be noticed. Specifically, low minimum levels of excise rates in the EU 
mean that member states can independently implement the taxation policy 
appropriate for each individual country. As a result, alcoholic beverages are 
substantially more heavily taxed in Northern European countries such as 
Finland and Sweden, but also in the UK and Ireland (London Economics, 
2010). For example, regardless of the zero required rates for wines, Finland, 
Sweden, Ireland and the UK all impose more than EUR 200 per hectoliter of 
product. In other wine taxing countries such as the Baltic States, Denmark, Bel-
gium, Netherlands and Poland, tax rates range from EUR 40 to EUR 90, except 
France where it is EUR 3.6. However, the main point here is that price diffe-
rences, stemming from variation in excise taxes and amounting to more than 
four-fold in some cases, obviously stimulate massive border trade due to rather 
large intra-EU excise duty allowances. Specifically, within the EU one can 
transport from one member state to another beer up to 110 liters, wines up to 90 
liters and spirits up to 10 liters, without paying additional excise taxes in the 
destination country (European Commission, 2011b). For Estonia, this creates 
motivation not to raise alcohol taxes as to maintain lower price levels compared 
with Finland or Sweden in order to attract alcohol purchases by tourists.     
To conclude, although the tax policy has been actively used in recent years 
in Estonia for fiscal purposes and the EU legislation create certain motives for 
the use of alcohol taxation, there seems to be no well-weighed strategy of an 
appropriate taxation level as well as of alcohol policy in general. Considering 
the fact that there is practically no single analysis conducted that would address 
optimal alcohol taxation in Estonia, based on the present state of knowledge, it 
is almost impossible to say something convincing about the appropriateness of 
the current policy.  
 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of alcohol taxes: empirical evidence 
 
The preceding subchapter presented some results from literature concerning 
effectiveness of taxation compared with other alcohol policy instruments. 
However, to get a better understanding of the potential of tax policy to curb 
alcohol-related harm, specific empirical evidence concerning the impact of 
alcohol taxes on drinking and its consequences is required. In fact, effectiveness 
estimates presented above directly rely on how alcohol consumption responds 
to tax policy. In addition, this kind of evidence, as it appears in the subsequent 
chapters, becomes especially useful in order to obtain the optimal level of 
taxation. Accordingly, this subchapter serves the purpose of introducing the 
main relevant empirical results from the corresponding literature. 
Before presenting the results, some comments on concepts used to measure 
price responsiveness are made. Specifically, since taxes imposed on alcohol 
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raise the price level of alcoholic beverages, usually price responsiveness is of 
interest. This is usually measured by different price elasticities. Mainly two 
types of elasticities are relevant in the context of alcohol taxation. At first, 
alcohol demand own-price elasticities are computed by finding the ratio of per-
centage change in alcohol consumption to percentage change in alcohol price. 
Secondly, to express the effect of change in alcohol price on drunken driving or 
on any other alcohol-related or non-alcohol-related effects, usually cross-price 
elasticities are used. These elasticities reflect the ratio of percentage change in 
these effects to percentage change in alcohol price. Cross price elasticities show 
whether two commodities, drunk driving and alcohol, for instance, are substi-
tutes or complements. In case of the latter, tax policy, which reduces drinking, 
has the same impact on drunk driving as well. In case of the substitutes, such as 
some other drugs, adverse effects due to drinking may just be replaced with 
some other harm.  
Instead of price elasticities, some studies also report tax elasticities to 
disclose the effect of taxes directly. This may be necessary when there is reason 
to believe that taxes are not completely shifted onto consumers. As follows, 
empirical evidence about the effect of changes in alcohol taxes and prices are 
demonstrated. At first, evidence about four different types of alcohol-related 
outcomes is presented. These are aggregate alcohol drinking, youth drinking, 
heavy drinking16 and acute drinking consequences. Secondly, some evidence of 
potential substitutes of alcohol is presented as well.    
 
Aggregate drinking 
There is a vast body of literature concerning price responsiveness of alcohol 
demand. Most of them also provide estimates for elasticities whether for alcohol 
in general or for individual alcoholic beverages. In case of the latter, usually 
elasticities for three different beverages have been estimated – spirits, beer and 
wine. Selections of the studies reporting elasticities, of which most are reviews, 
are presented in Table 3. It can be seen that all studies indicate values that stay 
within a range from –0.3 to –1.5. This means that the law of demand applies to 
alcohol as well and in principle, tax policy can be used to control alcohol-
related harm as it was also discussed in previous subchapter. However, in most 
cases the elasticity coefficient is below 1.0 (in absolute terms) referring to 
relatively low responsiveness. Quantitatively, the latter means that when price is 
increased by 1%, for instance, alcohol consumption decreases less than 1%. In 
addition, beer seems to be the most inelastic while wine and spirits are more 
price responsive beverages.  
Some additional notes are relevant. Specifically, Fogarty (2004) has dis-
covered increasing elasticity as one move toward 1969 and decreasing elasticity 
post 1969. This pattern was speculated to arise due to greater availability of 
substitute products post 1969. Interestingly, changing pattern of elasticities has 
                                                     
16 While the exact definition of heavy drinking differs across studies, here it is used in ge-
neral terms to refer to the level of alcohol consumption that may harm drinkerʼs health.   
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been also confirmed by Gallet (1999) but in the opposite direction. He showed 
with US aggregate data from 1964–1992 that price elasticities of distilled spirits 
have decreased over time implying that preceding studies may have over-
estimated their price responsiveness. He estimated that pre-1966 elasticity for 
spirits was –1.35 while post-1978 it had decreased to –0.16.  
In addition, probably the most recent review has been conducted by Elder et 
al. (2010). While Table 3 presents median elasticities, which had been derived 
from studies carried out at the aggregate level, the review included 78 papers, 
which nearly all found negative relationships between price and alcohol 
consumption. In addition, considering 16 studies that have used individual level 
data, Elder et al. concluded that irrespective of methodology or type of data, the 
majority of estimates range from –0.3 to –1.0. 
 
 
Table 3. Empirical estimates of price elasticities of alcohol  
 
Authors Study design Estimates 
Leung and Phelps (1993)1 
Review of 15 studies, aggregate level 
data 
–0.3 for beer 
–1.0 for wine 
–1.5 for spirits 
Fogarty (2004) 
Review of 64 studies from 1945–
1991 
–0.4 for beer 
–0.8 for wine 
–0.7 for spirits 
Elder et al. (2010) 
Review of 38 studies prior to 2005, 
aggregate level data 
–0.5 for beer 
–0.6 for wine 
–0.8 for spirits 
Cook (2007) 
Panel data of the US states from 
1971–2000 
–0.7 for beer 
–0.5 for wine 
–1.5 for liquor 
Source: Compiled by the author 
Note: 1 In Chaloupka et al. (2002) 
 
 
Some recent studies carried out in northern countries such as Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden have disclosed results that somewhat contradict the prior literature. 
Specifically, Mäkelä et al. (2007) and Grittner et al. (2009) followed the effect 
of the reduction in alcohol taxes and increase in travelersʼ allowances for the 
import of alcohol in northern countries in 2003–2006. They used individual level 
data and on the contrary, to the expectations, they did not find any sign of 
increase in alcohol consumption. Grittner et al. explain their results by wondering 
whether a saturation level of alcohol consumption had been reached. Bloomfield 
et al. (2009) analyzed the same period from 2003 to 2005 in Denmark but used 
time-series data for acute alcohol intoxication. Estimating ARIMA models, the 
authors detected a 26% increase in the number of acute alcohol intoxication 
hospitalizations among people aged 15 years and younger after tax reduction on 
spirits by 45%. This result implies that preceding studies by Mäkelä et al. and 
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Grittner et al. just failed to capture certain effects probably due to methodo-
logical shortcomings. Therefore, the main message from the literature is still 
rather unambiguous by stating that in general aggregate level of alcohol con-
sumption is price responsive. 
Regardless of the bulk of evidence, it should be noticed that most of the 
studies presented above come from highly developed countries. One could 
question whether these results apply to less developed countries as well. How-
ever, there is no convincing reason to think that they do not. This is also 
supported by some rare empirical evidence (e.g. see Fogarty, 2004 or Room et 
al., 2002). In addition, Leppänen et al. (2001) have compared price elasticities 
across 14 European countries. Although all of them are developed countries 
there are considerable gaps in GDP levels. For example, as regards to countries 
such as Portugal and Denmark, both included in this study, GDP in the former 
represents only about 60% of the latter (Eurostat, 2010b). In fact, currently 
Estonia is in a somewhat similar position in regards to the EU average GDP 
level as Portugal was in regards to Denmark (Eurostat, 2010b). In this study, it 
was shown that alcoholic beverages are normal goods but not luxuries, which 
means that its consumption probably does not vary considerably across 
countries due to different income levels. Authors rather suggested that the abso-
lute values of elasticities are higher in countries with higher price levels. There-
fore, it is reasonable to believe that the results presented above are generalizable 
to less developed countries as well. 
 
Youth drinking 
Studies conducted at the individual level possess an important property to show 
the price responsiveness of different subgroups. For alcohol policy to be effec-
tive in curbing social harm, elasticity of young drinkers and heavy drinkers are 
especially relevant and deserves extra attention. In regards to youth dinking, 
Grossman et al. (1993) have reviewed studies conducted in the USA in 1987–
1993 utilizing data from 1974–1989. Although elasticities were not reported it 
was concluded that tax policy can effectively reduce youth drinking. In 
addition, this effect is not limited to infrequent drinkers; quite on the contrary 
frequent drinkers seemed to be more price responsive. Grossman et al. (1995) 
reached similar results by estimating an empirically rational addiction model17. 
Utilizing the US panel, whose members range in age from 17 to 27, the authors 
reported average long-run elasticity –0.65 and average short-run elasticity18  
–0.41. Elder et al. (2010), by reviewing studies carried out in 1987–1999, also 
found that majority of studies constantly reported that higher prices or taxes 
                                                     
17 According to rational addiction theory, developed by Becker and Murphy (1988), 
current consumption is affected by changes in both past and future consumption, caused 
by changes in past or future prices. 
18 In the case of the short-run elasticity, past consumption was not allowed to affect 
current consumption. 
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were associated with lower prevalence of youth drinking, elasticities ranging 
from –0.29 to –3.54. 
Dee (1999), however, has referred to limited econometric specifications in 
previous studies. More specifically, while studies reviewed by Grossman et al. 
(1993), applied cross-sectional US state data; they have failed to account for 
unobserved attributes that may be correlated with taxes. Utilizing pooled cross-
sectional data, Dee found that alcohol taxes (more specifically beer taxes) had a 
relatively small and insignificant effect on teen drinking. Regardless of these 
contradicting results, there is recent evidence in favor of the negative relation-
ship between alcohol taxes and youth drinking. Kuo et al. (2003) used data from 
2001 that included 10,000 students at 118 colleges in the US and found that the 
lower the price of beer in the surrounding community, the higher the binge 
drinking rate at the college. Bishai et al. (2005) used individual level data in a 
structural equation model that simultaneously accounts for each individualʼs 
smoking, drinking, and sexual behavior. The sample comprised of more than 
20,000 teenagers with a mean age of 16 from 20 different US states and cities. 
Authors reported that elasticity of participation in drinking with respect to beer 
tax is –0.08 that means that one percentage point increase in beer tax would be 
associated with a 0.08% decrease in probability of any alcohol use by teenagers 
 
Heavy drinking 
There is also specific evidence that tax policy may be effective to curtail heavy 
drinking. For example, Kenkel (1996) estimates frequency and intensity elasti-
cities with US data of 1985 for heavy and moderate drinkers and also considers 
drinkersʼ possession of information about health effects of drinking. Defining 
heavy drinking as drinking five or more drinks in one day, he found that for 
moderate drinkers elasticity was –0.8 while elasticity of heavy drinkersʼ who 
are well aware of potential illnesses ranged from –0.9 to –1.7. In case of least-
informed heavy drinkers, elasticities were no statistically significant that may 
arise from the fact that these drinkers are alcoholics.  
In addition, Farrell et al. (2003), using individual level data of more than 
40,000 persons in the US, have demonstrated that a rise in alcohol prices could 
reduce the prevalence of alcohol dependence, which is considered as the 
primary chronic-disease consequence of long-term, heavy alcohol consumption. 
Based on mortality data in Alaska from 1976 to 2004, Wagenaar et al. (2009) 
observed statistically significant sustained reductions in alcohol-related disease 
mortality after two separate increases in alcohol taxes occurring 19 years apart. 
As alcohol-related diseases, especially those attributed to alcohol alone, are the 
consequence of long-term excessive drinking, the results indirectly imply to a 
negative relationship between taxes and heavy drinking. More recently, a 
review conducted by Elder et al. (2010) found that at least five studies have 
confirmed the negative relationship between alcohol prices and liver cirrhosis. 




Acute drinking consequences 
Negative effects of alcohol consumption often appear in the form of acute con-
sequences, such as injuries or premature mortality. As a large share of these 
effects can be categorized as externalities, i.e. drinkers harm not only them-
selves but others also; it is often considered one of the most important goals of 
alcohol policies to control these consequences. In addition, as these acute con-
sequences may arise even from consuming small quantities of alcohol, it means 
that effective policy can reduce this harm relatively fast, compared with internal 
illnesses that develop during a longer period.  
Several papers have shown that tax policy could be used to reduce incidence 
of violence. For example, Grossman and Markowitz (1999) employed data that 
contained approximately 120,000 college students in the US and found that 
violence19 is inversely related to the price of beer. Another study conducted by 
Andreasson et al. (2006) has tried to predict future effects of tax cut on alcohol-
related harm, including assaults and homicides. Based on the historical relation-
ship between overall alcohol consumption and different drinking consequences, 
which was obtained from the time series data, authors estimated that a tax cut 
by 40 % on spirits and by 15% on wine in Sweden would increase assaults by 
2.5% (i.e. 1 617) and 4.4% (i.e. 4 289) homicides. Recently, literature review 
conducted by Wagenaar et al. (2010) suggests that doubling the alcohol tax 
would reduce violence by 2%.  
Much more attention has been paid to disclose the relationship between 
alcohol policies and traffic-related harm. Most of the papers have found the 
negative relationship between alcohol tax and traffic mortality. Grossman and 
Saffer (1986) were the first who examined the price responsiveness of youth 
traffic mortality by using time-series of state cross-sections consisting of the 
contiguous states of the US for the years 1975 through 1981. They reported that 
elasticity of the motor vehicle death rate with respect to real price of beer would 
range from –0.7 to –1.3 for youth aged 17–24. Beer tax elasticities were lower 
as (from –0.09 to –0.17) only part of the tax was assumed to pass on to con-
sumers. Chaloupka et al. (1991) utilized similar data from 1982 to 1988 for 
general population and for age group 18–20. The authors disclosed similar tax 
elasticities as –0.07 and –0.21, respectively. These estimates have been con-
firmed by Ruhm (1995) employing the same type of data for the same period 
but including some additional control variables.  
More recently Dee (1999) and Young and Likens (2000) have questioned 
these results by employing additional control variables and different methodo-
logical perspective. However, these studies have not provided conclusive 
evidence but rather have somewhat undermined previous results that suggested 
unambiguously that tax policy is very effective measure to curtail traffic morta-
                                                     
19 Violent acts in this study were divided into four categories: getting in trouble with the 
police or college authorities, damaging property or pulling a fire alarm, getting into an 
argument or fight and taking advantage of another person sexually or having been taken 
advantage of sexually. 
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lity. In fact, a recent review conducted by Wagenaar et al. (2010) which re-
viewed 21 studies concerning the effects of alcohol taxes or prices on traffic 
safety outcomes, estimated that doubling the alcohol tax would reduce traffic 
crash death by 11%.  
 
Substitutes of alcohol 
The fact that alcohol tax can be a good instrument to curb alcohol consumption 
along with its related effects may not be enough. If at the same time the 
consumption of some other problematic commodity increases, for example 
cannabis is substituted for alcohol; the alcohol policy may even reinforce 
negative externalities. However, there is not very convincing empirical evidence 
that this could happen. For example, many authors have found that alcohol and 
cigarettes are complements (Tauchmann et al., 2008; Cameron and Williams, 
2001), which means that more stringent alcohol policy would reduce the con-
sumption of both commodities. As regards to cannabis, the studies have re-
vealed ambiguous results (e.g. see Cameron and Williams, 2001) based on 
which it cannot say that reduced drinking would be followed with increased 
cannabis consumption. Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1994) have shown that this 
could happen with marijuana. However, they also find that regardless of this 
kind of substitution higher alcohol taxes lead to net reductions of at least some 
consequences of drug and alcohol abuse. This rare evidence presented here 
obviously does not prove that the problem of substitutability does not exist. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that the substitution could be weak enough 
and does not affect considerably optimal policy.   
To conclude, the review of selected papers has disclosed rather convincingly 
that higher alcohol taxes have a curbing effect on drinking as well as on several 
drinking consequences. More importantly, this effect does not seem to be 
limited to moderate drinkers alone. Although some puzzling evidence can be 
found as well, these rare papers so far rather undermine the strength of the 
relationship but not its existence per se. In addition, simulation results revealed 
by Cook et al. (2005) also rule out the possibility that rise in alcohol taxes 
would increase mortality among middle and old aged people due to the protec-
tive effect of moderate drinking on their health. Specifically, combining esti-
mates of the effect of per capita alcohol consumption on drinking patterns with 
a summary estimates from the literature of the relative risks associated with 
different levels of drinking, authors simulate one-percent reduction in drinking 
by the population aged 35–69, and find a negligible effect on the death rate.   
Regardless, the evidence presented above only reveal the effects of alcohol 
taxes on alcohol-related harm. The question regarding optimal level of taxes 
remains unanswered. As follows, the subsequent subchapter addresses this issue 





1.2. Alternative approaches to optimal alcohol taxation 
 
Taxation policy has different purposes. Its main function is to raise revenues for 
government. However, there are also other aims such as correcting market fai-
lures, increasing equity or stabilizing the macro-economy. Alcohol excise 
taxation is used to carry out both the raising of revenue and market failure-
correcting functions. To accomplish the purpose of this thesis, which concerns 
optimal alcohol taxation in Estonia from the social point of view, sophisticated 
theoretical framework must be developed. To do that, at first it is acknowledged 
that Pareto efficiency can be used as criterion for achieving both goals, i.e. to 
raise revenues and correct market failures. Specifically, in case of raising 
revenues it is common to assume in optimal taxation literature that government 
aims to raise revenues as efficiently as possible. As regards to correcting market 
failures, it is in itself an efficiency improving activity. This subchapter discusses 
both issues as well as their integration below. 
 
 
1.2.1. Externality-correcting partial equilibrium approach 
 
In widely accepted economic literature mainly three general rationales for 
government intervention can be found – efficiency, fairness and paternalism.20 
Fairness is not usually considered the most relevant issue regarding alcohol 
policy and is not discussed here. The need for alcohol policy is usually con-
sidered on efficiency or paternalistic grounds. This section discusses briefly 
both concepts. Special attention is paid to efficiency, as this is the main criteria 
for optimality of alcohol policy in this thesis. The concept of paternalism is 
discussed as much as required to differentiate it from efficiency. 
 
Inefficiency in the alcohol market 
In modern mainstream economics the main criteria for assessing the desirability 
of patterns in production and consumption is the notion of Pareto efficiency. It 
states that the use of resources is efficient if it is not possible to raise anyoneʼs 
welfare without harming the welfare of another individual. In other words, 
limited resources are used to produce goods, which are the most valued by 
consumers and the maximum amount of these goods and services is produced 
with given resources. It has also been shown by economists that in market 
economies under certain conditions the behaviors of profit-maximizing firms 
and utility-maximizing consumers actually do lead to this Pareto efficient state. 
Specifically, the economy is efficient under perfect competition. This kind of 
market structure to exist assumes the following:  
 many buyers and sellers so that no one has an influence on market prices;  
 homogenous goods that lead each firm to being price takers;  
                                                     
20 Obviously, one could suggest also other social values such as human dignity, certain 
institutional values, etc. However, this thesis has confined itself to the most traditional 
social value applied in the modern economic literature, which is Pareto efficiency.  
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 low barriers to entry and exit that prevents firms to earn more than 
normal profit in the long run;  
 perfect information about prices and products;  
 there are no externalities arising from production or consumption.  
 
Alcohol markets primarily fail to meet the last two conditions. More speci-
fically, in case of externalities, although alcohol consumers receive benefits 
from drinking, they may harm others during or after the process. This harm may 
be whether pecuniary, physical or mental, as was shown in the preceding 
subchapter. For example, others may have to finance the health care system or 
criminal justice system to deal with alcohol-related diseases or criminal activity. 
In addition, drunken people may cause physical or mental harm by aggressive 
behavior towards others or by causing traffic accidents. Assuming that con-
sumers only take into account internal effects and ignore the harm caused to 
others, a result is that alcohol consumption and production is inefficiently high. 
Besides the externality problem, drinking is also characterized with information 
failures. More specifically, consumers may inflict harm on themselves. This 
arises because consumers do not possess information that would be necessary to 
make utility maximizing decisions. For instance, they may not know that 
drinking leads to some serious health condition. Both externalities and infor-
mation failures induce people to drink too much because market prices fail to 
reflect the real cost of alcohol. 
The problem of inefficiency due to negative externalities in alcohol markets 
is easily captured in the partial equilibrium framework. This is shown in the left 
panel of Figure 7 of which kind of interpretation can be found in most econo-
mics textbooks. There is a market depicted for alcohol, comprising the demand 
that coincides with marginal private benefit of alcohol (MPB), and supply that 
coincides with marginal private cost of alcohol (MPC). The former is associated 
with the pleasure of drinking, the positive effect that alcohol may have on health 
(when consumed in moderate quantities) and other possible benefits drinkers 
may receive. The latter reflects the production costs alcohol producers must 
bear when producing alcoholic beverages. As constant returns to scale are 
assumed, the supply curve is horizontal. This just simplifies graphical analysis 
but does not affect the analytical results in essence21. Altogether, there is market 
equilibrium at point QM where the demand and supply equalize. In case of 
ordinary private goods, this would be an efficient level of production from the 
social point of view because the marginal social costs equal the marginal social 
benefit.  
In case of alcohol or any other externality-generating good, however, this is 
not the case. The main reason comes from the fact that marginal social costs 
(for now the line denoted, as MSCcn should be followed) are higher than 
marginal private costs. The difference between these costs measure the external 
                                                     
21 It makes a difference for optimal alcohol taxation, though. This is discussed in the 
following subsection. 
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costs or harm that drinkers cause to others. The total external costs are measured 
by the area A + B + C + D. The empirical value for this area can be derived 
from social cost estimates. However, while social cost estimates usually also 
comprise internal costs such as mortality, only external costs must be included 
to apply them in optimal taxation framework.  
In terms of Pareto efficiency in the presence of negative externalities, it 
follows that, without affecting the welfare of many others, it is possible to raise 
at least one individual’s welfare. For example, if it could be possible to induce 
some people to drink less, the welfare of these people may decrease less than 
increases the welfare of other people. The latter arises because the harm they 
must bear decreases. As this kind of Pareto improvement possibility exists, it is 
the main justification for government to implement alcohol policy on the 
grounds of efficiency.  
 
 
Figure 7. Inefficiency in alcohol market and Pigouvian taxation 
Source: Kenkel (1996), compiled by the author 
 
 
It is important to note that the efficiency cost in the left panel of Figure 7 is 
much smaller than total external costs and is measured only by the area D. This 
is the difference between MPB and MSCcn from QE to QM as the former denotes 
the efficient level of alcohol consumption. Below QE benefits drinkers receive 
exceed the burden or harm they are putting onto others. Therefore, although in 
this situation it would be possible to raise othersʼ welfare by inducing drinkers 
to drink less but then the welfare loss of drinkers would be higher than the 
decrease in external costs borne by others. Although this could be justifiable on 
the ground of fairness, it would not improve efficiency.  
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Externality, per se, is not a sufficient argument for government intervention 
as has been argued by Coase (1960). More specifically, according to the Coase 
theorem, under zero transaction costs, externality problems would be fully cured 
by bargains. This means that an individual who bears the externality could trade 
with an individual who causes the externality to find a better solution for both. 
However, this is unrealistic in case of alcohol externalities due to high moni-
toring costs and the number of people involved (Barker, 2002). For example, 
the bargain would need to define what kind of consumption an individual 
cannot undertake. The potential externality bearer may find it very difficult to 
monitor whether the bargain is implemented. As a result, the market is unable to 
achieve efficiency without the help of government. 
The information failure in an alcohol market is modeled in the right panel of 
Figure 7 in the spirit of Kenkel (1996). The only difference from the situation 
depicted in the left panel concerns the additional marginal private benefit curve. 
Marginal private benefit of alcohol under imperfect information MPBim is 
higher than marginal private benefit under perfect information MPBpe because 
without complete information about internal consequences of alcohol con-
sumption, consumers overestimate consumption benefits. The vertical distance 
between MPBim and MPBpe measures the value of internal costs that consumers 
fail to take into account. It means that external costs are measured by the area  
A + B + C + D, while the efficiency costs is measured by the area C + D + F. 
The efficiency costs can be divided into two separate components. Part of it is 
caused by external effects, this is represented by the area D. C + F, however, 
arises from imperfect information as this area reflects un-internalized internal 
costs, sometimes called also as intrapersonal external costs. The latter is often 
considered as additional rationale for government to intervene. 
 
Optimal alcohol taxation with homogeneous drinkers 
The subsection above has illustrated the nature of inefficiency in the alcohol 
market in a partial equilibrium setting. As follows, identical framework is used 
to model the optimal tax policy to correct this market failure. Specifically, this 
is a classical solution to an externality problem, first introduced by Arthur C. 
Pigou (1920) and widely accepted in the literature. This solution, according to 
which the only concern is to correct externalities, also creates the main basis for 
the optimality of alcohol taxation in the present thesis. Although in subsequent 
sections the general-equilibrium framework is introduced to integrate exter-
nality motives with fiscal ones, externality rationale maintains its special status 
in regard with the optimal alcohol taxation problem. In fact, in most cases, it is 
independent from the other rationales and is exclusively captured within the 
partial equilibrium model.  
In addition, the partial equilibrium framework gives specific economic 
meaning to results of COI studies and becomes independently relevant when the 
main policy goal is to control the social costs of alcohol. Therefore, before the 
general equilibrium approach is taken, it is reasonable to address externality-
correcting policy separately. At first, the problem is analyzed with homogenous 
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drinkers. This kind of approach is a highly stylized way to address the problem 
of alcohol externalities in a single market with taxing alcohol consumed by 
identical individuals. However, it is quite often used in public debates as well as 
in some less sophisticated economic analysis. In the following section, a more 
sophisticated approach with heterogeneous drinkers and information failures 
will be discussed which has been the most common approach to address optimal 
alcohol taxation in both a theoretically or empirical method. 
The so-called Pigouvian taxation suggests that external generating goods 
should be taxed with a rate equal to marginal external costs (MEC). In this way, 
externalities are internalized and as a result economic agents take into account 
both private and external costs to maximize their utility. This can be read from 
Figure 7 above. Concentrating on the left panel at first, there is an alcohol 
market with both constant marginal external costs (the difference between MPC 
and MSCcn) and increasing marginal external costs (the difference between 
MPC and MSCin). In both cases, the optimal tax is the one which raises the 
market price to Pt. Formally, under the assumption that MPB = MPC + MEC at 
the optimum, optimal ad valorem and unit tax rates would be ∗ =  and ∗ = , respectively. Under these tax rates, the consumer does not have 
incentives to increase consumption above a socially efficient level. More 
specifically, individuals increase the consumption until the marginal benefit 
received from the last unit of alcohol equals with the marginal social cost of that 
last unit. This last unit is at consumption level QE, which satisfies the efficiency 
condition. 
To set the tax to the optimal level under constant MEC with homogeneous 
drinkers and perfect competition, there is not much information needed. As in 
this case MEC is equal to the average external cost, MEC as well as optimal tax 
is easily derived by dividing total external costs by the quantity of alcohol 
consumed. As was mentioned in the preceding subchapter, total external costs 
can be obtained from COI studies by excluding internal costs. Under increasing 
MEC, however, the problem is much more complicated. In addition to the shape 
of relationship between alcohol consumption and MEC, information about price 
elasticity of alcohol demand is also required. Under these assumptions, the 
lower the price elasticity of alcohol demand, the more severe should be the tax 
policy. For example, at the consumption level QM which is chosen by the 
private market without government intervention, optimal tax does not equal to 
MEC (see left panel in Figure 7). Therefore, in practice, it may be quite hard to 
hit the socially desirable tax rate. 
One possibility to overcome this difficulty is to compare total external costs 
and tax revenues from alcohol tax. This approach is very common in public 
debates. Specifically, the question is whether tax revenues cover the social costs. 
When examining the left panel in Figure 7, it appears that under constant MEC 
this is the correct approach. More precisely, under the Pigouvian tax rate, area A 
+ B measures tax revenue from alcohol tax as well as total external costs. It 
means that it is quite simple to assess current tax policy on the optimality ground. 
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Under increasing MEC, however, tax revenue from Pigouvian tax is measured by 
area A + B, that patently exceeds external costs B by area A. In this case, the level 
of external costs compared with tax revenues show the lower boundary of the tax 
rate and this kind of comparison may be helpful only when tax rates implemented 
in practice are considerably lower when compared with the optimal level. The 
latter then indicates whether there is a need for a tax raise.  
Using this simple framework to address the externality problem means that 
following question is raised: Do alcohol consumers pay their way. To put it 
another way: Is tax on alcohol high enough to internalize negative externalities 
of alcohol? To answer this question, average external costs per unit of pure 
alcohol is used as a rough indicator for the optimal level of taxation. Another 
possibility is to compare total excise tax revenues and total external costs of 
alcohol consumption. When revenues are lower than costs, there is rationale for 
a tax raise. It should be stressed, however, that in economic terms, the purpose 
of alcohol tax is not to cover external costs as is often mistakenly interpreted. 
As it was shown above, under the Pigouvian tax, revenues exactly cover 
external costs only when MEC is constant. Otherwise, the relationship between 
external costs and tax revenue is more complicated. The main idea of Pigouvian 
tax is to achieve the situation in which the price of alcohol would reflect 
marginal social costs of alcohol. If it does not, economic agents receive price 
signals that impede the achievement of efficiency.   
This kind of simple approach has been used for example by Manning et al. 
(1989), Barker (2002), Easton (2002) and Cnossen (2007). All concluded that 
taxes on alcoholic beverages are justified or a certain rise is warranted. For the 
US, Manning et al. (1989) estimated that external cost per ounce is USD 0.48 
compared with average excise and sales tax of USD 0.23. Accordingly, in the 
authorsʼ view, a strong case can be made for an increase in alcohol taxes. 
Barker (2002) found that as external tangible costs of alcohol in New Zealand 
were quite similar to the level of collected alcohol taxes the current excise rate 
could be justified on externality grounds. Easton (2002) is even more catego-
rical by stating that excise revenue from ethanol in New Zealand appears to be 
only about a fifth and a quarter of gross fiscal costs due to alcohol misuse. 
Based on the latter, an increase in excise duty of around 28% was suggested. 
Cnossen (2007) argues that according to social cost studies for the UK, alcohol 
excise collections do not cover the tangible costs of harmful alcohol use. As this 
is also the case in many other member states of the European Union with 
similar drinking patterns, but lower alcohol excise duties, this implies that 
heavy drinkers do not pay their way. 
Partial equilibrium approach with homogeneous drinkers modeled above has 
several limitations. At first, the assumption regarding consumer homogeneity is 
probably inappropriate since most of the alcohol-related externalities are caused 
by a relatively small proportion of abusive drinkers. Secondly, the model in 
Figure 7 does not consider internal effects that consumers fail to internalize due to 
information failures. Thirdly, there are different kinds of alcoholic beverages with 
different alcohol content, price elasticities and roles in generating externalities. 
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All these shortcomings can be eliminated in a partial equilibrium setting. 
Corresponding literature is discussed in the subchapter immediately following. 
 
Optimal alcohol taxation with heterogeneous drinkers 
In reality, the optimal solution becomes much more complicated due to the 
heterogeneity of drinkers. What it means is there are many consumers who 
drink alcohol in moderate quantities. Under the Pigouvian tax they must pay 
higher price for alcohol regardless of whether they have caused externalities or 
not. As a result tax on alcohol may cause deadweight loss that exceeds benefits 
that arise from reduction in external costs. Therefore, an efficient tax policy 
must balance the deadweight loss against benefits from the reduction of external 
costs. Diamond (1973) was probably the first who stated that in the case of con-
sumption externalities, the optimal tax would be a weighted average of exter-
nalities, the weights being the responses of demand to price increases. As 
regards alcohol, this would mean that an optimal uniform tax rate is equal to the 
sum of the weighted average of marginal externalities generated by each drin-
ker, marginal externalities weighed by each drinkerʼs price elasticity of alcohol 
demand. This rule, however, has small practical value due to the unrealistic data 
requirement. Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain empirically applicable 
optimal policy rule by dividing drinkers into two categories: abusers and non-
abusers. This is shown below by obtaining, analogously to Pogue and Sgontz 
(1989), an optimal tax formula accompanied by a graphical illustration. 
The alcohol market is modeled in Figure 8. There are alcohol demands and 
marginal costs of moderate and abusive drinkers on the left and on the right 
panel, respectively. Dn denotes alcohol demand by a non-abuser and Da is 
alcohol demand by an abuser. Both types of consumers face the same market 
price set by firms. Assuming competitive markets, the market price is equal to 
marginal private costs. However, in the case of alcohol consumed by an abuser, 
the marginal social cost is higher than the marginal private cost due to negative 
externalities. Since non-abusers do not generate negative externalities, marginal 
social costs of alcohol consumed by them are equal to the marginal private cost. 
Without government intervention, non-abusers would consume the quantity of 
 that is efficient also from the social point of view because at this level MPB 
= PM = MSC.  Abusers, however, over-consume because at the consumption 
level  chosen by them, MPB = PM < MSC. 
Government has now an incentive to intervene to reduce abusersʼ drinking. 
The problem is that it is not possible to tax just abusers. Therefore, imposing a 
tax rate  on alcohol, whether bought by abusers or non-abusers, alcohol 
consumption is reduced in both markets.  and  denote post-tax alcohol 
consumption of non-abusers and abusers, respectively. As a result, deadweight 
loss arises from taxing non-abusive drinkers by area B in the left panel. The 
efficiency gain from reduction in the abuserʼs drinking is measured by the area 
E + D – F in the right panel. Assuming that there are  moderate drinkers and 
 abusive drinkers, the overall welfare change is given by · (− − ) +· .  
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Based on these assumptions, the optimal alcohol tax formula can be ob-
tained. At first, using basic triangle geometry, welfare change  can be ex-
pressed as follows: 
 
 = · ∆ − + · ∆ ·     (1.1) 
 
In (1.1),   denotes marginal external costs averaged over the relevant 
change in consumption of alcohol, ∆  and ∆  are reductions in alcohol con-
sumption of abusive and non-abusive drinkers, respectively. The next step is to 
define demand elasticities of abusers and non-abusers with respect to price, 
respectively, as follows: 
 = (∆ ⁄ ) (∆ ⁄ )⁄       (1.2) 




Figure 8. Controlling externalities with heterogeneous drinkers 
Source: Pogue and Sgontz (1989), compiled by the author 
 
 
Solving these for ∆  and ∆ , substituting in (1.1) and noting that ∆ = , 
gives:  
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= ( − ) ( · · )⁄ + ( · · · )⁄   (1.5) 
 
Equating (1.5) with zero and solving for , optimal unit tax on alcohol is 
obtained: 
 ∗ = 1 + · ·       (1.6) 
 
The optimal tax formula (1.6) suggests that the optimal tax on alcohol is in-
creased relative to  under the following terms: 
 the number of abusive drinkers is increased relative to moderate drinkers; 
 the amount of alcohol consumed by abusive drinkers is increased relative 
to moderate drinkers; 
 the price elasticity for alcohol demand of abusive drinkers is increased 
relative to moderate drinkers.   
 
Building this framework, Pogue and Sgontz (1989) also differentiated between 
abusers with and without the disease alcoholism, which means that also 
variables reflecting the fraction of abusive consumption consumed by non-
alcoholics and internal cost of alcoholic abusers enter the optimal tax formula. 
The authors assumed the former to be 26.5% and estimated that although either 
taxes near the present level or very high taxes may be optimal for the USA, 
depending on the values of parameters, the available information implies that 
the present tax rate in 1983 should probably have been doubled. More speci-
fically, while external abuse costs averaged $127 and internal abuse costs 
averaged $441 per gallon of pure alcohol consumed by abusive drinkers, the 
best guess was that the average tax rate would be $53. This result was obtained 
under a scenario, which assumed that abusive and non-abusive drinkers are 
equally responsive to price change. Assuming lower responsiveness of abusive 
drinkers obviously will reduce the optimal taxation level. For instance, the 
authors calculated that if abusers would be only one-fourth as responsive to 
price changes as non-abusers, the optimal level would be only $20 and would 
have stayed below the actual rate.  
Saffer and Chaloupka (1994) extended the model of Pogue and Sgontz 
allowing also substitutability between wine, spirits and beer and estimated opti-
mal taxes to individual beverages. They found that the optimal average tax rate, 
as well as differences between taxes on individual beverages, would be further 
increased when beverage substitutability increases. Richardson and Crowley 
(1992) and Crowley and Richardson (1997) have used a similar approach to 
estimate effects of the alcohol tax as well as its optimal level in Australia. How-
ever, they did not make a difference between abusive and non-abusive drinkers. 
Although both welfare gains from the reduction of drinking and welfare costs 
due to price distortions were taken into account, the former was derived through 
constant relationships between social costs and overall alcohol consumption. 
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Both papers suggested that the rise in current tax rates would generate 
substantial net welfare gains. In addition, in both papers the authors included 
wine, spirit and beer separately, similarly to Saffer and Chaloupka (1994) it was 
revealed that in addition to average taxation levels optimizing the structure of 
alcohol taxes might also considerably increase social welfare.    
Kenkel (1996) addressed the optimal tax problem quite similarly to Pogue 
and Sgontz. However, in addition to differentiating between abusive and mode-
rate drinkers, consumer heterogeneity was extended by differentiating between 
drinkers and drunken drivers. This is reasonable as alcohol-related traffic acci-
dents and its consequences represent a substantial proportion of the social costs 
of alcohol. In addition, preexisting drunk-driving penalties should be taken into 
account as they already have internalized at least part of the externalities. 
Kenkel also differentiated between abusive drinkers dividing them into three 
categories: informed, less informed and the least informed heavy drinkers. 
Assuming average external cost per drink to be $0.30, average external cost of a 
drunken driving incidence to be $60.20, average internal costs of uninformed 
drinkers to be $0.56 per drink, it was obtained that the best guess for optimal 
alcohol tax is 106% of the net-of-tax price or $0.38 per drink. This result was 
obtained under the assumption that moderate drinkers are less price responsive 
than informed heavy drinkers and less informed heavy drinkers but considerably 
more responsive than the least informed drinkers. In addition, ignoring both 
external costs of drunk driving that could be internalized through drunk driver 
penalties as well as internal costs, which would be appropriate when all 
consumers were perfectly informed about the consequences of drinking, the 
optimal rate would have been reduced to 41% of the net-of-tax price.  
Regardless of their influential effort, all the papers discussed above, as well 
as the partial equilibrium approach in general, share one important limitation. 
They only address the externality problem but fail to account for fiscal rationale 
as well as the interaction with the rest of the tax system. These aspects are 
considered in the following subchapter. 
 
 
1.2.2. Revenue-raising approach 
 
One of the oldest strands in public finance literature concerns optimal commo-
dity taxation. The primary focus of commodity taxation literature has been to 
find optimal structure of commodity taxes to raise a certain amount of public 
revenues with minimized deadweight loss. Therefore, in order to include fiscal 
considerations into the Pigouvian taxation framework, main lessons from this 
research deserve attention. The aim of this subchapter, however, is not to give 
an overview of optimal commodity taxation literature per se, but rather to 
explain the main findings, which are relevant in the context of alcohol taxation. 
Specifically, two separate rationales for differential commodity taxation are 
discussed. At first, the development of the idea to tax commodities, which are 
leisure complements, is followed as alcoholic beverages probably fall into this 
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category. Secondly, it is discussed whether commodity taxation literature has 
something to say about taxation of tourism. The latter is especially important to 
study in an Estonian context as alcohol is often assumed as one of the most 
popular commodities for tourists and even a pull-factor for visiting Estonia from 
neighboring countries.  
The most influential work in the field of optimal commodity taxation dates 
back to the beginning of the 20th century. Ramsey (1927) showed under certain 
simplifying assumptions that in order to collect a given amount of revenue with 
commodity taxes there are rather plain rules to follow for minimizing utility 
loss to consumers. More specifically, noting that leisure cannot be directly taxed 
and assuming zero cross-price elasticities between commodities, the optimal set 
of commodity taxes leads to an equal percentage reduction in the compensated 
demands for all goods. From this property, the well-known inverse elasticity 
rule has been obtained, which states that the rate at which a commodity is taxed 
should be inversely proportional to the absolute value of its elasticity of demand 
(e.g. see Sandmo, 1976).  
The intuition behind this result is simple: as leisure is directly un-taxable, 
uniform commodity taxation would cause distortions between commodities (or 
labor) and leisure. Therefore, imposing higher tax on commodities with lower 
elasticity decreases labor-leisure distortion compared with uniform taxation. 
Another way to interpret this result is to note that it would be optimal to impose 
higher taxes on leisure complements and lower taxes on leisure substitutes 
(Corlett and Hague, 1953). For example, if alcohol were a leisure complement, 
it would be a good idea to impose higher taxes on alcoholic beverages com-
pared with other commodities as this causes people to drink less. When drinking 
and leisure are complements, people also consume less leisure, which means 
that they will choose to supply more labor. As a result, preexisting distortions 
caused by uniform taxation are offset to some extent.   
The Ramsey rule has been often criticized because of its low policy rele-
vance. For example, the differentials in the tax rates would certainly increase 
administration costs for government and compliance costs to the taxpayer (Alm, 
1996). In addition, the commodities put forth to be taxed more heavily under an 
inverse elasticity rule, more often than not, happen to be necessities. This would 
lay a substantial burden on the poor. In order to account for this problem, 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showed that goods consumed particularly heavily 
by the poor should experience smaller percentage reductions in demands com-
pared with other goods. As a result, somewhat lower taxes could be imposed on 
such goods on the grounds of fairness.  
Probably the most influential criticism came from Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1976) who showed that whenever the individualsʼ utility function is weakly 
separable between labor and other commodities, individuals differ only in 
earning abilities and non-linear income tax is optimally employed, optimal 
commodity taxes should be uniform. The general intuition behind this result is 
that as income tax can be used for both raising revenue and redistributing 
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income, consumption distortions caused by differential commodity taxation can 
only deteriorate economic efficiency.  
Subsequent studies have examined this result in more depth to test its 
robustness. Several conditions under which Atkinson and Stiglitzʼs result breaks 
down have been revealed. At first, Naito (1999) showed that when taking into 
consideration the production side and relaxing the assumption of constant 
marginal cost of production, non-uniform commodity taxation could improve 
welfare. More specifically, differential commodity taxation enables to change 
factor prices and as a result relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraints 
associated with the optimal income tax problem22. Secondly, Cremer et al. 
(2001) has extended Atkinson and Stiglitzʼs model by assuming that individuals 
differ not only in earning abilities but also in endowments. The authors stated 
that under this assumption, optimal income tax would not suffice and there is 
rationale for non-uniform commodity taxation. In addition, Saez (2002) relaxes 
the assumption of homogeneity in individualsʼ tastes for goods and indicates 
that non-uniform commodity taxation may be justified. 
However, more recently, Saez (2004) has shown that Atkinson and Stiglitzʼs 
result is strengthened when labor supply responses are modeled through occu-
pational choices instead of choices of hours of work, which is reasonable under 
long-run considerations. In addition, Kaplow (2006a) extended the Atkinson and 
Stiglitzʼs result by stating that differential commodity taxation is not optimal 
regardless of whether non-linear income tax is optimal. This result is obtained by 
considering the reform of elimination of differential commodity taxation 
combining it with distribution-neutral adjustment in income taxation to offset any 
effect on individualsʼ utility. As this reform, by taxing away individualsʼ utility 
gains arising from elimination of consumption distortions, yields revenue surplus 
for the government, there is a possibility for Pareto improvement.    
Regardless of the debate presented above, one of the key assumptions of 
Atkinson and Stiglitzʼs results rests on its weak separability. The latter assumes 
that allocation of income among commodities is independent from labor 
decisions. This assumption rules out the possibility that a tax on a commodity 
could affect individualsʼ choices between labor and leisure (Kaplow, 2006b). 
This, however, could be desirable since income tax has distorted this choice in 
favor of leisure. To correct this distortion, in the second best setting, it would be 
therefore optimal to tax commodities that are leisure complements. This policy 
to be optimal with preexisting income taxation has been also demonstrated by 
Christiansen (1984) and more recently by Kaplow (2008). Therefore, besides 
                                                     
22 When government is using income tax to redistribute income from skilled workers to 
unskilled workers, incentive-compatibility constraint emerges as skilled workers have 
an incentive to mimic unskilled workers. To prevent mimicking while achieving re-
distribution involves imposing a positive marginal tax rate on the unskilled, decreasing 
their labor effort below the efficient level. Differential taxation can relax this constraint 
by imposing higher taxes on skilled labor intensive goods. For more details see Naito 
(1999).  
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externality rationale, alcohol taxes could be imposed on fiscal grounds as well 
since it is reasonable to assume that alcohol is a leisure complement. 
Optimal commodity taxation literature provides an additional rationale to tax 
alcohol. More specifically, one relatively new strand of this research field has 
concentrated on tourism taxation. A tax can be categorized as a tourism tax 
when it is levied on goods or services consumed by tourists. From literature, 
five business sectors can be found that are considered as sectors providing 
goods and services to tourists. These are airlines and airports, hotels and other 
accommodation, road transportation, food and beverages and providers of 
tourism services (Goorochurn and Sinclair, 2005). Taxes levied on these sectors 
can be divided into two broad categories. At first, they can be part of the general 
tax system, such as value added taxes. Secondly, they can be specific taxes 
targeted at tourists, such as taxes on hotels and restaurants, visa fees, passenger 
services, etc. More detailed lists of alternative tourism taxes can be found in 
papers written by Goorochurn and Sinclair (2003, 2005) or Barron et al. (2001).  
As regards to alcohol excise taxes, they are directly related to the food and 
beverage sector. Tourists obviously visit pubs, restaurants or nightclubs and 
naturally consume alcoholic beverages. In addition, in some cases alcohol is a 
commodity experiencing a massive border trade. This happens when there is a 
considerable gap in price levels between two countries due to differences in 
overall price levels or in the excise rates and is reinforced excise duty allowan-
ces. This kind of situation is evident for example between Sweden and Denmark 
but also between Estonia and Finland (Cnossen, 2007). In this regard, Aronsson 
and Sjögren (2010) have analyzed the effect of these allowances to tax policy 
from the perspective of the country of which citizens are importing alcoholic 
beverages from foreign countries. They argued that border trade allowances in 
the EU might result in using other than alcohol taxes to control alcohol-related 
harm because imported alcohol cannot be taxed. Therefore, under the as-
sumption that leisure and alcohol are complements, government may find it 
optimal to decrease income tax in order to induce people to consume less 
leisure, which in turn reduces drinking.  
In the Estonian context, however, the situation is reversed, as Estonia is the 
country from which foreigners are exporting alcohol and tax on alcohol can be 
considered as a tourism tax. Although there is evidence of border trade with 
Russia in the case of which Estonian citizens are importers of cheaper alcohol 
(Hein et al., 2010) this is probably not as massive as touristsʼ purchases in 
Estonia. Situations like this create specific tax policy implications. Although the 
principles of optimal taxation apply to tourism taxes as well, these types of 
taxes share one very interesting characteristic. Specifically, on the contrary to 
most of the other taxes, tourism taxes have the ability to raise tax revenues 
without causing any deadweight loss (Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2003). This 
happens because at least part of the tax burden is borne by non-residents of 
whose welfare is not the concern of the hosting government. As a result, fiscal 
revenues could be gathered and used for public purposes without laying any 
cost on people whose welfare government aims to maximize. Naturally, this 
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holds true only if the tax burden is completely borne by tourists. As the tax 
incidence depends on elasticity of tourism demand, then if it is very elastic, a 
large proportion of the burden could be shifted to the supply side of the tourism 
sector. The latter means that local producers bear the burden and deadweight 
loss would rise. In addition, commodities or services supplied by the tourism 
sector are often consumed by the local resident as well. Therefore, the optimal 
tax should balance benefits from tax revenues with welfare losses of local 
producers and consumers. Just like in the case of the standard optimal taxation 
framework, price elasticities have an important role to play here as well. As 
shown by Gooroochurn and Sinclair (2003) the welfare gain from tourism tax is 
larger, the more inelastic tourism demand is relative to domestic demand and 
the higher the share of tourism demand relative to total demand. 
Several authors have used general equilibrium models to estimate em-
pirically the effects of changes in tourism taxes. Jensen and Wanhill (2002), for 
instance, have analyzed the economy-wide effect of reduction in value added 
tax rates for hotels and holiday centers by 50% in Denmark. The authors found 
that this would have a positive effect on hotel and holiday centers overnights as 
well as on expenditures generated from tourists. The paper, however, does not 
estimate welfare effects from changes in tax revenues. According to the discus-
sion above, under inelastic tourism demand, for instance, tax revenues as well 
as the welfare of Danes would probably decrease under this kind of policy. 
Some researchers have considered the welfare effects and they have found that 
in this respect tourism taxation is justified. Specifically, Cago et al. (2009) and 
Blake (2000) showed that an increase in tourism taxes such as value added tax 
or some specific taxes have positive welfare effects in Spain. Gooroochurn and 
Sinclair (2005) confirm this in Mauritius stating that taxing tourism is relatively 
more efficient and equitable than levying other sectors. 
The discussion presented in this subchapter implies at first that regardless of 
substantial research on the field of optimal commodity taxation, the results ob-
tained more than fifty years ago by Corlett and Hague (1953) in a Ramsey 
setting has survived the active debate in literature and still provides influential 
guidance for policymaking. In regards to alcohol, this means that besides the 
externality argument there is an additional rationale to impose higher taxes on 
alcohol as it is reasonable to assume that alcohol is a rather leisure complement 
than leisure substitute. This has also been shown empirically by West and Parry 
(2009). Secondly, alcohol taxation can be considered as a specific tax on the 
tourism sector in countries where a large proportion of alcoholic beverages are 
purchased or consumed by tourists. To the authorʼs best knowledge prior 
literature has not integrated tourism taxation and externality-correcting taxation 
into the same framework. Nor there is a single paper in the field of optimal 
taxation, which would have accounted simultaneously for Ramsey, Pigouvian 
and tourism taxation principles. Therefore, as follows immediately, the prin-
ciples of Ramsey taxation are integrated with the principles of Pigouvian 
taxation to comprise them simultaneously into a single framework as it appears 
in the literature. The inclusion of tourism taxation is remained for the third 
53 
chapter where the model is specified for the Estonian context in order to obtain 
empirical estimates as well.   
 
 
1.2.3. Integration of externality-correcting and  
revenue-raising approaches 
 
Until the middle of the 20th century, revenue-raising taxation and externality-
corrective taxation had been analyzed separately in the literature. Pigouvian tax 
was designed to address only externalities. It was assumed that revenues col-
lected under these taxes were returned in a lump-sum fashion. Ramsey taxation 
had dealt with the question of how to raise public revenues with minimized 
deadweight loss of taxation. Existence of externalities was ignored. In practice, 
however, both types of taxes exist simultaneously. This raises the question of 
whether and how the Pigouvian rule, that is commonly considered, as a basis for 
taxing externality-generating goods such as alcohol, would be changed under 
preexisting taxes.   
Convergence of these two branches began with the paper by Tullock (1967). 
He was the first to notice that externality-corrective taxation could also serve 
another purpose – collect revenues for the public sector. Formally, Ramsey and 
Pigouvian taxation was integrated by Sandmo (1975) who examined in a 
general-equilibrium framework the optimal commodity taxation problem under 
the assumption that in addition to other commodities there is one externality-
generating good. By solving the model with a representative consumer, he 
showed that optimal tax on externality-generating good is the weighted average 
of two components. The first is Pigouvian tax, being equal to marginal social 
damage. Second component follows the inverse elasticity rule that is well 
known from the Ramsey taxation problem. In addition, it was shown that the 
optimal tax structure was characterized by additivity property, meaning that the 
marginal social cost of externality-generating goods enters the tax formula for 
that good additively. In other words, it is not optimal to impose a tax on 
complements or subsidize substitutes of an externality-generating good only 
because this good creates externalities.  
Until the 1980’s not much attention was paid to these papers. The rising 
importance of environmental issues regarding pollution and climate warming, 
however, gave an impulse for further development of this approach. Nichols 
(1984), Terkla (1984), Lee and Misiolek (1986) all contributed to the develop-
ment of the idea of using environmental taxes to reduce preexisting distortio-
nary taxes. Pierce (1991) was the first who started to use the concept of “double 
dividend” by stating that environmental taxes not only improve environmental 
quality but also reduce the distortionary cost of the tax system. The latter has 
been named as revenue-recycling effect in literature. These papers suggested 
that optimal environmental tax could be well above Pigouvian tax.  
In the first half of the 1990ʼs, however, several authors started to question 
the validity of the double dividend hypothesis. Modeling incremental tax re-
forms in a general equilibrium setting, Bovenberg and Mooij (1994) showed 
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that environmental taxation has an exacerbating effect on preexisting tax distor-
tions. More specifically, an environmental tax raises the prices of consumption 
goods and as a result reduces the real wage rate. This induces individuals to 
supply less labor and consume more leisure, amplifying tax distortions in the 
labor market. Due to a narrower base of environmental taxes compared with 
income taxes, a drop in the latter which is financed by revenues from environ-
mental levies, do not offset the adverse effect of environmental taxes. The latter 
means that an environmental policy, which follows the Pigouvian rule, could 
actually increase distortions in the economy and are inefficient. Previous studies, 
which were using a partial equilibrium framework, had overlooked this effect.  
It should be noted that Bovenberg and Mooji (1994) did not suggest that 
double dividend does not exist at all. Specifically, double dividend is often 
divided into two categories: strong and weak forms. The former states that the 
revenue neutral substitution of tax on externality-generated goods, for distortio-
nary taxes, involves a zero or negative gross cost. According to the latter, using 
revenues from tax on externality-generated goods to finance a reduction in 
existing distortionary taxes, the cost savings relative to the case where the tax 
revenues are returned to taxpayers in a lump-sum fashion, could be achieved 
(e.g. see Goulder, 1994). Bovenberg and Mooji acknowledged the existence of 
the latter but did not find any support for the former.  
This finding activated a vivid academic debate in the literature. One of the 
most often asked questions was whether the optimal level of taxation is below 
or above the Pigouvian rate. Double dividend proponents would say that the 
optimal tax rate exceeds the Pigouvian tax. Results from general equilibrium 
models say otherwise. While Bovenberg and Mooji had considered only in-
cremental tax reforms, Parry (1995) and Bovenberg and Ploeg (1992) were 
probably the first who derived formulas for the optimal level of taxation. They 
confirmed that the optimal tax should lie below the Pigouvian tax. A subsequent 
paper by Bovenberg and Goulder (1994) contributed previous literature in 
mainly two ways. At first, intermediate inputs were included in the model. 
Secondly, the authors complemented theoretical models with numerical simu-
lations. As a result, both extensions confirmed the failure of the double dividend 
hypothesis. They argued that the larger the preexisting tax distortions are, the 
lower is the optimal carbon tax.23  
In the context of the present thesis, it must be stressed that Parry (1995) was 
the first who decomposed the optimal tax formula into three separate effects. 
Previous literature, as stated by Parry, had combined these effects together with 
one optimization model. Parry (1995), using a diagrammatic approach, diffe-
rentiated between the Pigouvian tax, revenue-recycling effect and tax-inter-
action effect24. More specifically, while the revenue-recycling effect accounts 
                                                     
23 More detailed overview of the debate in the first half of 1990ʼs can be found in 
Goulder (1994). 
24 Originally, Parry (1995) termed revenue-recycling effect as revenue effect and tax-
interaction effect as interdependency effect.   
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for efficiency gains from a reduction in preexisting taxes, the tax-interaction-
effect reflects welfare effects arising from interaction with labor markets. This 
framework was further developed by Goulder et al. (1996) and Parry et al. 
(1997) by providing utility-maximizing basis for the results. In subsequent 
papers this has become a common way to analytically address double dividend 
hypothesis, e.g. see Goulder (1998), Goulder et al. (1998), Schwartz and Re-
petto (2000), Williams (2003), Caffet (2007), Parry et al. (2009). Since the 
current thesis applies the same framework as well, the simplest version of the 
model imaginable is laid out as follows. It is done in the spirit of the con-
sumption externalities framework ignoring intermediate inputs, as their in-
clusion is unnecessary in respect with alcohol25. More sophisticated version 
adjusted to address alcohol taxation policies in Estonia, along with its empirical 
calibration, can be found in the third chapter of the thesis. 
In this representative agent model, it is assumed that all consumers are 
identical. The representative consumer has the following utility function: 
 
 ( ( , , ), )       (1.7) 
 
In (1.7)  and  are consumption goods of which the former is considered 
alcohol that generates consumption externalities. In addition,  is leisure,  , 
exogenous to the consumer, is a variable through which the consumer bears the 
harm caused by others. In the environmental literature, it denotes environmental 
quality, in the case of alcohol it could denote health risks such as injuries or 
illnesses arising from othersʼ alcohol consumption, for instance. Consumption 
of  affects , so that < 0. It is important to note that there is weak 
separability between  and other commodities, which mean that demand for , 
 and  is independent of . Separability assumption was commonly used by all 
authors until Schwartz and Repetto (2000) raised the question about its validity. 
The effect of relaxation of this assumption is discussed below.  
The consumerʼs budget and time constraint are as follows: 
 (1 − ) = (1 + ) +       (1.8) 
 = +         (1.9) 
 
In (1.8) and (1.9)  is labor,  is wage rate equal to the value marginal product 
of labor,  is tax on labor,  is tax on externality-creating good,  is time 
endowment. Government faces the budget constraint: 
 = +        (1.10) 
 
                                                     
25 Unlike commodities generating environmental externalities, alcoholic beverages are 
usually final products. 
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Government aims to maximize the welfare of the representative consumer by 
supplying public goods  and by choosing the optimal level of  and . At the 
same time, government must keep its budget balanced. The latter is achieved by 
adjusting . It should also be noted that public goods  has no direct effect on 
consumerʼs utility. This simplification is applied as to bring out the main 
message from the literature and to ignore unnecessary technicality. In the model 
presented in the third chapter, this assumption is abandoned.  
As noted above, the purpose of the government is to maximize the utility of 
representative consumer. This way government maximizes the social welfare as 
the society in this model consists of identical consumers. Accordingly, optimal 
alcohol taxation should target the level of alcohol taxes under which consumerʼs 
utility is maximized. In order to accomplish that goal, the model is solved by 
maximizing indirect utility function, which is defined as follows26: 
 ( , , ) = ( ( , , ), ) + (1 − ) − (1 + ) − (1.11) 
 
Differentiating equation (1.11) with respect to , gives  
 = − − +       (1.12) 
 
Totally differentiating government budget constraint while assuming = 0, 
gives27: 
 − = + +      (1.13) 
 
Substituting (1.13) into (1.12), gives: 
 = + +      (1.14) 
 
Further, defining labor supply effects as follows: 
 ( ) = +       (1.15)  
 
Using (1.13) and (1.15), it is obtained: 
 = − + + +     (1.16)  
 
                                                     
26 The main steps in solving the model are similar to Parry et al. (2009). 
27 This assumption just says that the government budget is kept balanced only by 
adjusting labor tax while government expenditures are held constant. 
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Substituting (1.15) and (1.16) into (1.12), marginal welfare effects from in-
crease in  can be expressed as follows: 
 = ( − ) − + + + 1 +     
(1.17a) 
where 
 = −  , = −      (1.17b) 
 
It is seen from (1.17) that the marginal welfare effects of a tax increase can be 
divided into three categories. The first is Pigouvian component comprising 
marginal external cost , borne by the consumer due to an increase in health 
risks, less tax on alcohol and multiplied by the reduction in goods, . The 
second component, termed as revenue-recycling effect, comprises marginal tax 
revenues from an alcohol tax, multiplied by marginal efficiency gain  to 
account for reduced distortions in the labor market after tax revenues have been 
used to reduce the labor tax. Marginal efficiency gain, defined in (1.17b), 
reflects the marginal efficiency gain from reducing the labor tax divided by the 
marginal labor tax revenue. The third component, termed as the tax-interaction 
effect, captures the interactions between the alcohol tax and the labor supply. 
More specifically, a rise in the prices of taxed goods increases the labor supply 
if the taxed goods and leisure are complements. In case of substitutability 
between the taxed goods and leisure, the labor supply decreases and the tax-
interaction effect would be negative. The tax-interaction effect is multiplied by (1 + ) to account for changes in  to keep the government budget 
balanced. In this model, the optimal tax is the one, which maximizes the sum of 
all three effects. In the environmental policy literature, the tax-interaction effect 
was found to be negative and offset the revenue-recycling effect. Accordingly, 
the optimal tax would be lower than Pigouvian tax. 
In the second half of the 1990ʼs, several authors concentrated on the 
comparison of different policy measures. For that purpose large policy changes 
instead of incremental tax reforms were assessed by Goulder et al. (1996), Parry 
et al. (1997), Goulder et al. (1998). The authors extended the analytically 
tractable models by including also intermediate inputs and solved the models 
numerically. The main findings from these studies declared that policies that 
generate revenues are less costly and thereby confirmed the results from 
preceding theoretical models. The intuition behind this argument is that since 
both taxes and regulations cause a tax-interaction effect, only implementation of 
the former enables revenue recycling. It means that if a policy has small en-
vironmental effects it may actually amplify inefficiency. Policies with revenue-
raising ability could at least partly offset the tax-interaction effect and are 
certainly more cost-effective.  
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In the late 1990ʼs and in the 2000ʼs, the active debate continued and several 
authors showed that the preceding literature had ignored several aspects that 
may overrule the standard result in a general equilibrium framework as con-
cerns the failure of the double dividend hypothesis. For example, Parry and 
Bento (1999) referred to the consumption distortions due to the deductibility of 
certain types of spending from labor taxes, which substantially reduce the costs 
of environmental taxes. In addition, Schwartz and Repetto (2000) argued that 
the assumption of weak separability between environmental quality and leisure, 
used by the preceding authors, is peculiar. The authors presented empirical evi-
dence, according to which air quality has an effect on labor supply. Assumption 
of weak separability ignores this possibility. Following the Schwarz and Re-
petto proposal and relaxing this assumption, the utility function (1.7) becomes: 
 ( , , , )        (1.18) 
 
Following the same derivation steps as above, now the tax-interaction compo-
nent in the equation, reflecting the marginal welfare effects from increases in  
is expressed as follows: 
 1 + +      (1.19) 
 
It is seen from (1.19) that the tax-interaction effect is complemented by an 
additional term indicating that as an increase in  improves , the latter in turn 
affects labor supply. If  denotes environmental quality, this may have a posi-
tive effect on the labor supply which decreases leisure demand. Therefore, 
Schwartz and Repetto (2000) claimed to prove the limitations of standard 
results in previous literature. Williams (2003), on the contrary, argues that the 
same effect implied by Schwartz and Repetto (2000) actually has the opposite 
effect because it lowers the consumerʼs medical expenditure due to his or her 
better health. This causes an income effect that increases the demand for all 
goods including leisure. This debate is to be continued and can be further 
followed elsewhere (e.g. see Caffet 2007).  
An additional caveat, at which recent papers have pointed, concerns the fact 
that prior literature had concentrated on distortions caused by labor taxes. 
However, capital income taxes may, in some cases be even more distortionary. 
Takeda (2007) found in Japan for the carbon tax that while the strong double 
dividend does not arise from reduction in labor and consumption taxes, it arises 
from reduction in capital taxes. More recently, Glomm et al. (2008) confirmed 
in the US that the swap of green taxes for existing capital taxes decreases 
deadweight loss of the tax system. 
Finally, all prior studies had ignored the Corlett-Hague rule discussed in a 
previous subchapter above, according to which leisure complements should be 
taxed more heavily. In fact, although leisure had been commonly included into 
the analyses, it has been typically assumed that all goods, including externality-
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creating goods, are equal substitutes for leisure. This simplifying assumption 
has been made due to scarce empirical evidence regarding cross-price elasti-
cities with leisure. This assumption, however, rules out the rationale to tax any 
goods on the grounds of Ramsey taxation. What it means is that, when equal 
substitutability for leisure is assumed then due to the Ramsey approach, there is 
no rationale to impose differential taxes and as a result, environmental taxation 
above Pigouvian level turns out to be inefficient. Higher tax rates should be 
imposed only on goods that or weaker substitutes for leisure than other goods 
(for more detailed discussion see Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002). It means that 
whenever it is reasonable to relax the assumption of equal substitutability for 
leisure considerable changes may appear in the results. West and Williams 
(2007) have confirmed this for gas. They used the Almost Ideal Demand Sys-
tem and found that gas and leisure are actually complements, which con-
siderably raises optimal tax on gas.   
It is reasonable to assume that alcohol is this kind of commodity as well. 
There is also some recent evidence in this respect (see West and Parry, 2009). 
What it means is that the optimal taxation level of alcohol may be considerably 
higher than the Pigouvian tax. However, to the authorʼs knowledge, only Parry 
et al. (2009) have used the Pigouvian-Ramsey framework to address alcohol 
policies in the US. Compared with the model presented above, the Parry et al. 
model splits up the welfare effects arising from interaction with the labor 
market. Specifically, at first it is assumed that < 0, which in the context of 
alcohol taxation means that a higher tax on alcohol reduces health risks arising 
from drinking and drunk driving. In addition, reduced health risks are assumed 
to increase the effective labor supply, the latter is expressed as the product of 
wage rate  and labor supply . As a result, an analogous equation to (1.19) 
would be: 
 1 + + 1 + ( )     (1.20) 
 
The last component was termed as a productivity effect that reflects the efficien-
cy gain from health-induced increase in effective labor supply. The authors also 
assumed perfect competition, 100% tax shifting on to alcohol prices, rational 
addiction and a complementary between drinking and drunk driving28. Using a 
more sophisticated version of this model to derive an optimal tax formula com-
pared with one presented here, i.e. accounting also for a broader range of 
revenue uses, Parry et al. obtained an optimal tax for the US that ranges from 
$68 to $799 per gallon of pure alcohol under alternative scenarios. They 
assumed external costs of drunk driving per gallon of alcohol to be $64.1 and 
external costs of heavy drinking to be $24 per gallon. As the actual tax rate was 
estimated to be $24.20, a rise in the tax rates was suggested. Therefore, in 
                                                     
28 The limitations of these assumptions as well as this approach in general are discussed 
in more depth in the following subchapter 1.3. 
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contrast to findings in environmental literature, the fiscal component of an 
optimal alcohol tax was shown to exceed considerably the Pigouvian tax under 
several plausible combinations of parameter values. This means that in the case 
of alcohol, there is less ambiguity as regards to the question of whether the 
optimal tax is above or below the Pigouvian rate. However, it must be acknow-
ledged that future research should more convincingly confirm the weak sub-
stitutability or complementary between alcohol and leisure. 
Parry et al. (2009) also compared the alcohol tax policy with its possible 
alternatives or complementary measures, such as drunken driving penalties, 
whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary. Although non-pecuniary drunk driving 
penalties may have considerable effect on public expenditures by reducing the 
costs of health care or criminal justice, the authors found that taxation generates 
larger welfare gains due to its larger fiscal effects and high implementation 
costs of penalties. This result is similar to that found in environmental literature 
and similarly to findings in subchapter 1.1, it implies that tax policy could be 
more preferred compared with any kind of regulations. 
Thus, the model arising from environmental literature but elaborated by 
Parry et al. (2009) to address alcohol policies provides a solid general-equilib-
rium analytical framework to analyze optimal alcohol taxation. It is suitable for 
both theoretical and empirical analysis and is certainly more appropriate com-
pared with partial equilibrium approaches. Most importantly, the latter comple-
tely fails to account for one of the most important principles from optimal 
commodity taxation literature suggested by Corlett-Hague (1953). Even then, 
the Parry et al. model ignores several other aspects that are naturally related to 
alcohol taxation. These shortcomings of the model along with other key issues 






The first chapter has addressed a wide variety of alcohol-related issues, from the 
consequences of drinking to policies to control these consequences. In regards 
to the focus of the present thesis, five main points revealed in this chapter must 
be stressed: 
 while there are only a few narrowly targeted studies concerning the socio-
economic impact of alcohol in Estonia, empirical studies worldwide have 
disclosed that economic costs of alcohol are relatively high, ranging from 
1% to 2% of GDP; 
 alcohol taxation has been empirically shown to be one of the most effec-
tive as well as cost effective policy measures to control drinking con-
sequences; 
 the optimal alcohol taxation is commonly modeled in a partial equilib-
rium setting to follow Pigouvian taxation principles, according to which 
the tax rate should be equated to marginal external cost of alcohol and the 
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common result in literature has been that prevailing taxes should be 
raised; 
 during the last two decades environmental literature has stressed the 
fiscal rationale in taxing externality-generating goods, suggesting that the 
optimal tax could differ considerably from the Pigouvian tax due to 
double dividend hypothesis; 
 in regards to the optimal alcohol policy, only recently Parry et al. (2009) 
have confirmed the importance of the fiscal role in the US where the 
optimal tax was shown to exceed the Pigouvian tax as well as the 
currently implemented tax. 
 
In short, the first two points imply that alcohol taxation is a highly relevant 
policy measure to control alcohol-related problems, while remaining points 
refer to lack of papers, which would obtain the optimal level of alcohol taxation 
considering both externality as well as fiscal goals. As was discussed in the 
previous subchapter, this has been recently accomplished by Parry et al. (2009), 
using the framework actively applied in the environmental policy literature. 
Based on this approach, called also as “double dividend” theory, the answer to 
the first research question of the thesis can be formulated. The question con-
cerned the definition of the optimality in regard with the two different goals of 
alcohol taxation: externality correction and the raising of revenue. In recent 
“double dividend” literature, the optimality was defined through two well-
known taxation principles. Both principles consider efficiency as the only value 
to follow. Specifically, the optimal alcohol tax is the one, which maximizes 
representative consumerʼs utility and is the sum of the two components: Pigou-
vian and fiscal. The role of the Pigouvian component is to internalize external 
costs of alcohol consumption in order to correct the market failure in the alcohol 
market. The fiscal component arises whenever alcohol taxation causes lower 
marginal deadweight loss compared with other taxes in order to gather a certain 
amount of revenue for the government. If this is the case, consumersʼ welfare 
can be increased by (partially) replacing other taxes with alcohol taxes. 
This kind of optimality formulation, which bases itself on classical optimal 
taxation literature, delivers nicely the solution that is required to accomplish the 
aim of this thesis. As it originates from the market failure approach pursuing 
efficiency, it seems to be appropriate to Estonia as well. Specifically, Estonia is 
a market economy with relatively small government. It means that the resource 
allocation in most markets, including the alcohol market, is determined by the 
forces of demand and supply as holds true for any market-oriented economy. 
Therefore, identifying the states of the alcohol market not satisfying the 
conditions of Pareto efficiency seems to be a reasonable point of departure 
towards optimal alcohol policy. This, however, does not mean that the current 
thesis acknowledges alcohol-related problems only in market economies. In 
market economies, the market failure approach is just the easiest way to identify 
inefficiency, as there are certain patterns according to which free markets are 
assumed to behave. Even more, through price signals, free markets provide 
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information about the welfare of consumers, which turns out to be necessary 
when one formulates utility maximization as the main policy goal.  
This approach should have high policy relevance as well, given the 
efficiency-oriented taxation policies implemented by the Estonian government 
in the last decade. For example, the overall tax system in Estonia has been 
designed to be as simple as possible with minimal distortions in terms of 
different deductions or differences in tax rates. Specific examples are the uni-
form personal income tax and almost uniform value added tax with only a 
highly limited number of goods taxed with reduced rates. Therefore, while the 
optimality criterion is basing on the Pigouvian and Ramsey principles, both 
aiming to find an efficient mix of taxes, it seems an appropriate choice in regard 
with the policy implemented by the Estonian government29.  
 
Limitations in the preceding literature 
In this integrated Pigouvian-Ramsey framework, Parry et al. (2009) showed that 
compared with the partial equilibrium solution, the general equilibrium models 
may lead to substantially higher estimates regarding the level of optimal alcohol 
taxes. This mainly arises from the assumption that alcohol and leisure are 
complements reinforcing the efficiency gain from using alcohol tax revenue, 
whether for reducing preexisting taxes or increasing public spending. Regard-
less of the influential contribution by Parry et al., there are several limitations. 
As follows, a brief overview of these shortcomings is given in order to point at 
research gaps in the optimal alcohol taxation literature as well as to answer the 
second and third research questions of the thesis concerning the application and 
adaptation of the Parry et al. model to Estonia. The discussion is focused on the 
Parry et al. model, as to authorʼs best knowledge, this is the only model applied 
to address optimal alcohol taxation in the way that fits the purpose of the thesis. 
Therefore, the thesis seeks for ways this model could be extended upon or 
improved.     
At first, it is important to recognize one important caveat of the Parry et al. 
framework – the assumption of nearly the first best world with perfect 
competition. Specifically, besides distortions in the labor market caused by 
preexisting labor income taxation, the Parry et al. model considers alcohol 
externalities as the only type of market failure. In reality, this is definitely not 
the case. There are reasons to believe that even the alcohol market itself is not 
necessarily perfectly competitive whether in the US or Estonia. In the Estonian 
                                                     
29 Although Ramsey taxation suggests different rates on different commodities, which seems 
to conflict with uniform value added taxation in Estonia, it must be recalled that its main idea 
is still to minimize tax distortions in order to collect public revenues. Moreover, as it was 
discussed above, post-Ramsey literature has questioned the optimality of differential 
taxation, except if it is justified to tax leisure complements with higher rates. In addition, 
although differential taxation may be administratively infeasible, in the case of alcohol this is 
not a relevant issue as alcohol is already taxed higher than other commodities and the 
question addressed in this thesis concerns only the level of taxation.  
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alcohol market, 60–70% of the two main beverages – beer and spirits – are pro-
duced by three or four local producers (Martens et al., 2010). Therefore, at first 
view it seems nothing like perfect competition. It could be oligopoly instead. 
Thus, the theory of the second best, proposed first by Lipsey and Lancaster 
(1957) already more than fifty years ago, is relevant. It states that if there are 
some irremovable distortions existing in the same or related markets then it may 
not be optimal to fix removable market failure. What it means is that it may be 
optimal to let these distortions cancel each other out rather than correcting either 
one. One way to overcome these problems in the model is just to assume that 
government is able to remove this market failure by turning the alcohol market 
into a perfectly competitive one and that the alcohol market interacts only with 
the labor market, while interactions with other markets are insignificant. How-
ever, as this assumption is probably relatively far from the reality, it is im-
portant to tackle also the second best considerations rather than resting only on 
the first best solutions.  
Considering the possibility that alcohol markets are not perfectly competitive 
the question regarding the corresponding implications to the optimal alcohol 
taxation arises. The main thing to understand is that under imperfect compe-
tition, firms are not price takers like they are under perfect competition. 
Accordingly, firms set prices above marginal costs. Therefore, while the main 
idea of both Pigouvian and Ramsey taxation is to correct relative market prices 
by imposing additional costs to firms, market prices under imperfect compe-
tition do not reflect the private marginal cost any more. In fact, they are higher. 
As a result, imperfect competition as a market failure may at least partly offset 
inefficiency arising from externalities or preexisting labor taxes30 and the results 
obtained under a perfect competition model may mislead the optimal policy 
solution.  
Even more, under imperfect competition the impact of taxation on market 
prices stays ambiguous. Specifically, under perfect competition it is reasonable 
to assume that at least in the end, taxes are fully shifted onto market prices. This 
arises because in a competitive industry, the market price is equal to the long 
run marginal cost and the long run average cost, the latter being at its minimum 
level. In other words, the marginal cost can be assumed constant in the end. 
This means that the supply curve is horizontal and increasing tax by a certain 
amount would shift the supply curve along with equilibrium of the market price 
upward by exactly the same amount. In contrast, a tax-induced increase in 
marginal private costs need not cause identical rise in prices under imperfect 
competition. Therefore, the relaxation of the perfect competition assumption 
would most likely mean that the tax-induced rise in market price would be 
smaller or greater than the tax increase. This, as well as related issues, has been 
theoretically addressed, for example, by Seade (1985), Delipalla and OʼDonnel 
                                                     
30 While the original idea of Ramsey taxation was to correct labor-leisure distortions 
caused by uniform commodity taxation, in the Parry et al. model, the Ramsey tax 
corrects inefficiency caused by preexisting labor taxation. 
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(1998), Hamilton (1999) and others. It has been shown that the tax incidence 
under imperfect competition depends on several factors such as the relative 
curvature of industry demand, firmsʼ cost functions and the form of taxation 
(i.e. unit or ad valorem tax). Recently, Peitz and Reisinger (2009) showed that 
the over and under shifting, could be more pronounced in a two-layer industry 
with both layers being under oligopolistic competition31. In addition to these 
theoretical works there is also some empirical evidence implying particularly to 
possibility of over-shifting of alcohol taxes in the US (Young and Bielinska-
Kwapisz, 2002). 
Whether the alcohol tax is over-shifted or under-shifted under imperfect 
competition, the optimal tax obtained under the assumption of perfect com-
petition would probably overestimate the optimal level of taxation. To be more 
specific, when tax is under-shifted to consumers, at first, it may seem that the 
corresponding optimal alcohol tax must be higher under imperfect competition, 
compared with perfect competition, to compensate for this difference. However, 
it must be noted that under imperfect competition, the market price is already 
higher than the marginal private cost. It means that some inefficiency caused by 
negative alcohol externalities has been already offset by imperfect competition. 
Therefore, if any, a lower price rise is needed to correct the externality problem 
compared with perfect competition. Accordingly, it could be speculatively 
assumed that under imperfect competition these two factors together, i.e. im-
perfect competition and under-shifted alcohol tax will do the required work. More 
specifically, they would raise the price to the level where it is equal to the 
marginal social cost of alcohol. In this case, the optimal tax on alcohol would be 
on the same scale in both market structures. Under over-shifting, however, im-
perfect competition certainly would call for lower taxes than perfect competition.  
However, there are several points to bring out that would justify the perfect 
competition assumption in the Estonian context. At first, it should be noted that 
Estonia is an open economy where local producers are not necessarily free to set 
prices to earn economic profits. Specifically, approximately 20% of the total 
alcohol sold in Estonia is imported (Martens et al., 2010). Even more, imported 
beer prices, for instance, are often even lower than locally produced beer prices 
(Vähi, 2010). Therefore, although there are only a few local producers, they 
must compete with foreign producers. Secondly, as Estonia is a small country it 
is the price taker in the international market. The same could also apply to the 
Estonian producers in the Estonian market, as alcoholic beverages are easily 
tradable products. Thirdly, even if there is oligopolistic competition in the 
production side of the industry, the retailing side is certainly less concentrated. 
                                                     
31 A two-layer industry model may be appropriate for the alcoholic beverages industry 
since the latter could be roughly divided into two sectors: production and retailing. Most 
of the prior literature had assumed that the upstream sector, i.e. production, is 
competitive. However, Peitz and Reisinger (2009) showed that when imperfect 
competition prevails in both sectors, results regarding over and under shifting obtained 
in prior literature would be amplified, especially in the long run.  
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Specifically, due to low legal barriers there are relatively many alcohol sales 
points, which should make it rather difficult to set prices higher than it is 
necessary to earn a normal profit. For example, in 2009 there were almost 3000 
sales points in Estonia, which equals 4.4 sales points per 1000 inhabitants (Orro 
et al., 2010). Finally, even an oligopoly itself may experience hard competition, 
much similar to perfect competition. This has been shown in economic literature 
with classical Cournot and Bertrand models from the 19th century. Recent 
analyses of these models have been conducted, for example, by Tremblay and 
Tremblay (2011) and by Lofaro (2002). Therefore, considering all these aspects, 
perfect competition could be still a reasonable approximation of the reality, 
without losing the essence of the analysis.   
The second fundamental issue of the Parry et al. model concerns the appli-
cation of a representative agent model, which has been under serious criticism 
(e.g. see Kirman, 1992). For example, for this approach to be valid it must 
assume that the aggregate behavior coincides with representative agent. Even 
more, Kirman (1992) has argued that it can be the case that when individuals A 
and B both prefer the choice z to y, then the aggregate choice of a representative 
agent could be y instead. Therefore, ranking alternative economic situations on 
a welfare basis, this approach may lead to false conclusions. Considering that, 
there are at least three completely different types of drinkers – moderate 
drinkers, heavy drinkers, young or adolescent drinkers – the application of this 
kind of framework to alcohol policy issues may seem highly questionable. 
In spite of the critique, it has been widely used in economic literature as this 
framework allows individual optimization for use as the basis for aggregate 
behavior of economic agents. Several defensive points can be made to justify 
the use of this approach for issues addressed in this thesis as well. At first, it 
must be noted that distributional effects stay above the scope of this thesis, 
which means that it is not necessary to take into account policy effects on the 
welfare of different subgroups. In addition, in the context of optimal alcohol 
taxation, the key point is to capture the marginal welfare effects of alcohol 
taxation in terms of marginal reduction in aggregate levels of crimes, mis-
demeanors, illnesses, injuries, leisure demand, productivity losses as well as 
alcohol consumption in general. Efficiency gains arise directly from these 
effects on individualsʼ welfare and from their impact on the public budget 
through which labor market distortions are reduced. Therefore, when mone-
tizing these effects, it is relatively easy to account for heterogeneity of drinkers. 
For example, attaching values to saved lives one just has to find out the value of 
life for the saved individuals. As concerns reduced distortion in the labor market 
due to reduction in labor taxes, one can even employ labor supply elasticities 
reflecting aggregate labor supply as the reduction in labor taxes concern all 
workers.   
One additional aspect of the representative agent model must be clarified. 
Several authors have defined the optimal tax in a partial equilibrium setting as 
the one, which balances efficiency gain from reduced externalities against 
deadweight loss of alcohol taxation arising from distorted choices of moderate 
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drinkers. In this setting under the assumption of low demand elasticity of heavy 
drinkers and high elasticity of moderate drinker’s optimal alcohol tax would be 
somewhat lower compared with the model, where such heterogeneity is ignored. 
The reason is that under these assumptions the gain from the reduction in 
externalities is small due to low elasticity of heavy drinking but the deadweight 
loss of taxation would be high, due to high elasticity of moderate drinkers. In 
the representative agent framework, the heterogeneity of drinkers cannot be 
taken into account in the same manner. There is only one type of agent with 
elasticity of alcohol demand reflecting the price responsiveness of aggregate 
alcohol consumption. However, this problem can be solved through para-
meterization of the model in a similar manner as described above. For example, 
if it is known that the demand elasticity of alcohol of heavy drinkers is low, one 
should apply low demand elasticity for drunk driving, for instance. This way the 
model with representative agent can successfully take into account the fact that 
the responsiveness of harm caused by alcohol abuse with respect to alcohol 
price is low which reduces optimal taxation level as well32.  
The third important aspect of alcohol taxation is its addictive nature. While 
the model developed by Parry et al. (2009) assumed that individuals are rational 
and internalize all the future costs of addiction, it is completely static. Addiction 
issues, however, are more appropriate to address in dynamic settings. Probably 
the simplest model imaginable to deal with addiction has been applied by 
Kenkel et al. (2002) who showed in a two-period overlapping generation model 
with rational addiction, that higher taxes on addictive goods could positively 
affect a representative young personʼs lifetime utility. This fact arises as an 
addiction induces people to save less. It is further reinforced by “peer pressure”. 
As a result, it reduces productivity, which could be corrected with tax policy, 
implying that in dynamic settings the optimal level of taxation would be 
increased. However, their model is simple, does not account for preexisting 
taxation and concentrates only on distortions that arise from consumption-
savings decisions. More recently, Bossi et al. (2010) have analyzed the taxation 
of addictive goods in a dynamic rational addiction setting in the presence of 
labor income taxation. They found, surprisingly, that addiction could actually 
moderate the optimal tax rate and that taxing addictive goods becomes less 
attractive over time. More specifically, assuming that alcohol is an addictive 
good, at first, the alcohol tax would reduce “effective” alcohol consumption, i.e. 
the consumption in excess of that required to sustain addiction. In the future, 
however, due to the tolerance property of addictive goods “effective” alcohol 
consumption increases. Assuming that the latter and leisure are complements, 
demand for leisure increases and labor supply decreases. As a result, tax 
revenues decrease as well. In the current thesis, however, dynamic issues are 
ignored in order to maintain the model empirically applicable.  
                                                     
32 This approach, however, does not eliminate other fundamental limitations of re-
presentative agent models. More profound analysis of these issues as well as their 
potential implications stay above the scope of the thesis, though. 
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One strand of related literature, often called paternalism, has relaxed the 
rationality assumption. At first, it must be noticed that there is a fragile line 
between information failures and paternalistic justification for government 
intervention. Both views suggest that government should intervene because the 
consumer is not able to make the best decision in terms of maximizing utility. In 
the case of paternalistic policy, however, it is assumed that the problem 
concerns inadequate reasoning. For example, under imperfect information one 
solution would be informing while leaving the final decision to the individual 
herself or himself. The paternalistic approach, however, aims for more severe 
intervention such as making decisions on behalf of individuals. In particular, the 
paternalistic view questions the rationality of individuals.  
Recent literature, often called “new paternalism”, has addressed the irratio-
nality of individuals in terms of self-control problems (e.g. see O'Donoghue and 
Rabin, 1999, 2003; New, 1999). According to this approach, individualsʼ prefe-
rences are assumed to be present-biased in a sense that when considering trade-
offs between future moments, people give stronger relative weight to the earlier 
moment as it gets closer (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). This property takes 
into account the peopleʼs inclination to grab the immediate benefits and to avoid 
immediate costs. As a result, individuals impose external effects on their future 
selves. If there were some policy measure, which could correct this problem, 
government intervention would be justified on paternalistic grounds.  
As regards to taxation policy, O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006) have shown 
that it is optimal to tax unhealthy commodities when some consumers have self-
control problems. They argue that this kind of tax policy may even create Pareto 
improvement as such taxes restrict over-consumption by individuals with self-
control problems while they redistribute income to individuals with no self-
control problems. More recently, Aronsson and Thunström (2008) have deve-
loped this issue further by including the stock of health capital into consumerʼs 
utility function. As a result, they showed that while taxing unhealthy food could 
generate welfare gain, subsidy directed to the stock of health capital would be 
more preferable. However, as the authors conclude, in practice tax policy is 
much easier to implement due to the complications for observing health capital 
at the individual level.  
The most recent developments in paternalistic literature, briefly discussed 
above, have given an important and interesting effort into optimal taxation 
literature. Specifically, additional rationale for taxing alcohol on the grounds of 
self-control failure is advocated. Regardless, this strand of literature requires 
substantial evolvement in order to give a persuasive answer concerning appro-
priate policies implemented in practice. Accordingly, the current thesis strictly 
follows the efficiency criteria and assumes that individuals are rational. 
Finally, it should be also noticed that the framework applied in the literature 
usually assumes a balanced budget. One could wonder whether this is a realistic 
assumption, considering the fact that even highly developed countries have 
huge foreign debts. Although the balanced budget assumption is unrealistic for 
many countries, it is a reasonable and practical assumption in Estonia. Specifi-
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cally, Estonia has one of the lowest public debts in the world and even in the 
economic recession in the second half of the 2000ʼs, during the which real GDP 
decreased more than 15%, the Estonian public budget deficit stayed below 3% 
of GDP.  
 
Suggested extensions for application to Estonia 
While accepting these limitations of the model, the third research question of 
the thesis concerns the possible extensions and adaptation of the model for 
Estonia. In this regard, the shortcomings of the Parry et al. model are raised. At 
first, as was also noted by Parry et al. themselves, the model could be extended 
to consider other types of alcohol-related problems as well, like violence, for 
instance. Violence may be even more important than drunk driving as all 
corresponding health effects could be considered as external while the traffic 
fatalities or injuries are often internal. In addition, for the criminal justice 
system, offences against persons may be more expensive to proceed than traffic 
crimes or misdemeanors, as offenders are often unknown when the crime is 
registered. There are also quite harsh penalties, including jail sentences, the 
implementation of which consumes vast of public resources. As several authors 
have confirmed a negative relationship between alcohol taxes and violence, as 
was referred above in subchapter 1.1.3, ignoring these types of crimes may 
result in underestimation of welfare gains from alcohol taxes. 
In addition, Parry et al. had totally ignored the fact that imposing higher 
taxes on alcohol may also require more resources to control the possible expan-
sion of the black market. The role of the black market, more specifically illegal 
production, has been theoretically analyzed by Aronsson and Sjögren (2010). 
They showed that under illegal production, the optimal tax might fall short of 
the marginal social damage of alcohol because tax on alcohol is not a perfect 
instrument to control drinking any more. In addition, there may be rationale to 
use income tax or taxes on other commodities instead for alcohol control. The 
latter also means that the additive property introduced by Sandmo (1975) and 
further confirmed by Kopczuk (2003) may no longer apply. What it all means is 
that considering illegal alcohol considerably changes the results offered by 
standard approaches. So far, literature more or less has ignored this problem by 
concentrating mainly on externality issues.  
The limitations of the Parry et al. model concerning the administrative costs 
of black market alcohol are of high importance in Estonia. The active illegal 
market has been often considered as one of the most important obstacles in 
raising the alcohol taxes to a more appropriate level. This issue is directly 
related to the administrative burden of the tax system as the effectiveness of 
controlling the illegal market at least partly depends on administrative capabi-
lity. For these reasons, administrative aspects are incorporated into the model 
extended for Estonia in the third chapter of the thesis. 
The third issue concerns the role of touristsʼ purchases in Estonia. It has 
been estimated by the Estonian Institute of Economic Research (Orro et al., 
2010) that touristsʼ purchases represent approximately one fourth of the alcohol 
69 
market in Estonia. This arises partially due to the lower price level compared 
with neighboring northern countries, which reinforces border trade as well as 
regular tourism. This kind of large share of touristsʼ purchases means that 
optimal tax policy may be strongly affected. Although the Parry et al. model 
accounts for both principles of Pigouvian and Ramsey taxation, it does not 
differentiate between fiscal effects related to residents and non-residents. There-
fore, in this respect the model must be extended to suit better the Estonian 
context. This problem is solved in the current thesis and is carried out in the 
third chapter. 
Finally, as was shown in subchapter 1.1, the economic costs of alcohol other 
than health-related costs are practically unknown for Estonia. Besides several 
elasticities, cost parameters, however, are the main input data required for ob-
taining optimal tax estimates. Thus, before it is possible to analyze the optimal 
alcohol taxation policy, comprehensive cost studies must be carried out. This 



























2. EMPIRICAL STUDIES: ALCOHOL 
EXTERNALITIES IN ESTONIA 
 




Traffic-related mortality is a major public problem worldwide. For instance, 
according to WHO (2011c), in the injury and mortality regional estimates for 
2004, there were more than 1.2 million people killed in traffic accidents. The 
magnitude of traffic-related consequences has induced an extensive number of 
studies all over the world. Several factors contributing to traffic mortality have 
been disclosed. One of the most profound papers, which have examined traffic-
related problems, was issued jointly by WHO and the World Bank (Peden et al. 
2004). In this report, in addition to inappropriate speed, fatigue, being a young 
male, being a vulnerable road user, travelling in darkness, vehicle factors, 
defects in a road design, inadequate visibility due to environmental factors and 
poor road user eyesight, the presence of alcohol and drugs were considered as 
the main risk factors influencing crash involvement in traffic.  
The association between traffic-related problems and alcohol has also been 
confirmed in social cost studies, which show that traffic-related harm represents 
a remarkable share of the total economic costs of alcohol in many countries 
(e.g. see Varney and Guest, 2002; Johansson et al., 2006). This implies that 
traffic-related consequences deserve special attention when alcohol policies are 
designed. This remains valid for alcohol taxation policy as well. Specifically, as 
was discussed in the previous chapter, alcohol taxation appears to be an 
effective traffic policy measure as many authors have provided empirical evi-
dence that higher taxes are associated with lower traffic mortality. Accordingly, 
several researchers have included drunk driving as one of the most important 
side effects of drinking into the framework of optimal alcohol taxation (e.g. see 
Kenkel, 1996; Parry 2009). The present thesis follows a similar pattern. For that 
purpose, the consequences of drinking and its empirics on traffic mortality was 
selected and is studied more thoroughly.     
However, from epidemiologic literature another reason arises which justifies 
special interest in traffic mortality and offers the way optimal alcohol taxation 
analysis can be innovated. Specifically, policy analyses have usually overlooked 
the fact that drivers are not the only one responsible for traffic accidents. Seve-
ral papers have stressed the high prevalence of alcohol in road user fatalities 
other than car occupants, especially in pedestrian fatalities. For example, 
Östrom and Eriksson (2001) investigated autopsied fatalities in Sweden from 
1977 to 1995 and found that out of 201 killed pedestrians 22% of them had 
BAC positive. Even much higher proportions have been shown elsewhere. For 
example, Törõ et al. (2005) examined autopsy reports from 1999 to 2001 at 
Forensic Institute of Budapest and found that out of 416 vulnerable road users, 
48% of them had BAC over the legal limit. Recently, Prijon and Ermenc (2009) 
disclosed similar results in Slovenia in regard with pedestrians. They reviewed 
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the autopsy documentation from 1999 to 2006 and included 125 pedestrian 
fatalities, of which 53 were alcohol positive. 
These results strongly suggest that any alcohol policy, including taxation, 
should pay special attention not only to drivers but also to other categories of 
road users. This in turn could completely change the categorization into external 
and internal traffic mortality costs, which is highly important in regard with 
optimal alcohol taxation. For example, when a pedestrian is drunk and as a 
result is killed on the road due to her or his inability to stay in the pedestrian 
zone, the pedestrianʼs death from this accident should be categorized as internal 
costs. In literature, however, pedestrians are usually considered as vulnerable 
road users whose deaths are external for pedestrians.    
As concerns traffic safety in Estonia, traffic mortality has been one of the most 
acute public problems during the last two decades. In the beginning of the 1990ʼs 
more than 300 people were killed in one year. This makes more than 20 victims 
per 100,000 inhabitants. Traffic mortality increased rapidly along with the 
development of the free market economy in the period of “perestroika” (i.e. 
reconstruction) and “glasnost” (i.e. openness) in the late 1980s, most likely due to 
the hasty increase of old imported cars and the number of inexperienced drivers. 
It was soon discovered that fast growth in alcohol consumption, after the 
withdrawal of Gorbachev’s alcohol restriction policy in force from 1985 until 
1987, also played an important role (Leon et al., 1997; Schkolnikov et al., 1997; 





Figure 9. Traffic fatalities in Estonia, Sweden and the EU  




However, as is shown in Figure 9, where standard death rates (SDR) per 
100,000 for Estonia, Sweden and the EU are depicted, by the year 2008 traffic 
mortality in Estonia has decreased to the average level of the EU. The number 
of victims has been falling from 500 in 1991 to 100 in 2009. In terms of SDR 
this makes less than 10 fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants in a year. In 2010, the 
decreasing trend in the number of traffic fatalities has continued – there were 78 
fatalities. This is probably the result of many factors including the use of safer 
cars, changes in traffic regulations and law enforcement (random breath testing, 
installation of speed cameras), higher alcohol taxes (see Figure 5), but also the 
impact of economic recession cannot be ruled out. However, traffic mortality in 
Estonia is still approximately two times higher than in Sweden, for instance. 
Comparison with Sweden shows how far Estonia is from the safest countries in 
the world, which could be the following target to achieve. 
Regardless of relatively high rates of traffic mortality in Estonia during the 
last decade, it is surprising to find that there are virtually no studies on the 
causes and contributing factors of traffic fatalities. Studies on total injury 
mortality in Estonia have also included traffic fatalities, but not by categories of 
road users (Kaasik et al., 1998; 2004; 2006). There is also a study on the be-
havioral, biological and personality-related risk factors of drunk driving in 
Estonia (Eensoo et al., 2005), and a study on the influence of seasons on alcohol 
consumption at the same time discovering that the number of traffic accidents 
caused by drunk drivers increased significantly during summer months (June–
August) (Silm and Ahas, 2005).  
In the context of optimal alcohol taxation, however, a more comprehensive 
study is needed to disclose the presence of alcohol in a more precise manner. 
Otherwise, it would stay ambiguous whether tax policy could have significant 
welfare effect in Estonia. In order to serve this purpose, this subchapter has 
three main concerns. At first, the presence of alcohol in different fatalities is 
examined and compared with the results as disclosed in other countries. 
Secondly, special emphasis is laid on the comparison between different cate-
gories of road users. Specifically, it is analyzed whether there is enough ground 
to target pedestrians separately from drivers, when an optimal alcohol taxation 
problem is modeled, as is implied by international literature. Last but not the 
least, an attempt to divide traffic deaths into external and internal costs is made 
in order to apply this categorization in optimal tax calculations in subsequent 
chapters. The analysis presented here has been published earlier (Kaasik et al., 
2007). In this thesis, however, the analysis is somewhat modified compared 
with the published paper. More specifically, related literature is updated, the 
role of drunken pedestrians and association with alcohol taxation is more 
strongly stressed and the methodology is complemented with logit regression 
models. Neither did the published paper address the issue concerning the 




2.1.2. Data and methods 
 
The study, approved by the Ethics Review Committee on Human Research of 
the University of Tartu, involves all traffic injury victims aged 15–64 years, 
who died during 2000–2002, in Estonia, and upon whom autopsies were per-
formed by the Department of the Estonian Bureau of Forensic Medicine 
(EBFM). The age range from 15 to 64 was selected to exclude influences of 
childhood and old age physiological dispositions to injuries. The definition of 
traffic injury in our study is any condition which is coded by an International 
Classification of Diseases, 10th Edition, between V01–V79 with the exception 
of the subdivisions for injury to a person by motor-vehicles off of public roads, 
e.g. in a courtyard. According to Estonian regulations valid for the selected 
years, all cases of unnatural deaths should have undergone forensic autopsies. 
Statistics Estonia (2010b) confirms that during the above-mentioned years, 
autopsies were performed on at least 97% of all traffic victims. Therefore, only 
a few cases may be missing from our study. Unpublished data of the Estonian 
Road Administration confirmed that there were no drivers killed among 
children under age 15 years and only six drivers killed among the population 
aged over 65 years during the years under study. 
The data for the study were gathered from the autopsy protocols of the EBFM 
and the Estonian Police Records. The data were gender, age, category of victim (car 
driver, passenger, pedestrian, cyclist, motorcyclist and unspecified car occupant), 
month, day of week and time of the event, where and how the accident occurred, 
the place of death and the results of blood tests for alcohol and illegal drugs.  
BACs were available only if death occurred at the scene or a blood test was 
taken upon hospital admission before starting treatment, but not later than 
within the first five hours. The drugs were assessed only in cases of a suspicion 
of drug-impaired injury because drug testing is not part of the routine post-
mortem accident protocol in Estonia.  
Alcohol-related deaths were defined as those with BAC equal or above 0.05 
g/100 ml. This is in accordance with most studies on alcohol-related traffic 
accidents (Moskowitz and Fiorentino 2000). 
Alcohol intoxication was categorized in accordance with the above-mentioned 
Regulation into three classes, ‘i.e.’ into low, moderate and high degree of 
intoxication, respectively, 0.05–0.15, 0.151–0.25, and more than 0.25 g/100 ml.  
Several factors that may influence the likelihood and severity of traffic 
accidents, such as speed, location of passengers in the car, seatbelt usage and 
weather conditions were left outside the scope of the study. Nor did we analyze 
drivers’ fatalities in age and gender groups per kilometer driven because of the 
absence of the respective data. 
For comparison of death rates by sex and age, the victims were distributed 
by a range of 10 years into 5 age and sex groups: 15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54 
and 55–64 years. For calculation of traffic mortality rates for age and gender 
groups per 100,000 of the population in these groups, the respective population 
figures were obtained from the database of Statistics Estonia (2006).  
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The Student’s t-test was performed to assess the significance between diffe-
rences in the means of continuous variables, and a chi-square (χ2) test was used 
for testing differences in proportions of categorical variables. To disclose the 
factors that most likely predict alcohol prevalence in fatalities, binary uncondi-
tional logit models were estimated. In these models, categorical variable ref-
lecting whether the victim was sober or not, was applied as dependent variable. 
Two models were estimated, the one which comprised the data only for drivers 






Data were gathered on 512 traffic deaths. Among victims, 401 (78.3%) were 
males and 111 (21.7%) were females. Table 4 shows that males exceeded 
females in every age group (p<=0.00), with the highest predominance between 
ages 25–44 years. Males aged 25–34 years showed the highest, and females 
aged 35–44 years the lowest death rates. The total traffic death rates were higher 
in the younger age groups in comparison with the groups of middle ages. Most 
(67.7%) of the fatalities in the male group of highest death rates were car 
occupants, 47.5% were drivers and 20.2% were passengers. 
 
 




Males Females Total 
Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate 
15–24 92 29.9 31 10.5^ 123 20.4ˇ° 
25–34 99 35.9* 19 6.8 118 21.3*ʼ 
35–44 78 28.1 13 4.3^˜ 91 15.8ʼ° 
45–54 67 26.3* 22 7.4 89 16.1*ˇ 
55–64 65 33.0 26 9.9˜ 91 19.8 
Total 401 30.5 111 7.7 512 18.6 
Source: Kaasik et al. (2007) 
Notes: ^˜  p  0.01 between the indices marked with the same symbol. *ˇʼ° p < 0.05 
between the indices marked with the same symbol.   p < 0.00 between the death rates 
of all respective male and female groups. 
 
 
Table 5 demonstrates a strong majority of males among all types of road users, 
and mean age of them by categories. Car drivers and passengers were signifi-
cantly younger than pedestrians and cyclists (p<0.01). The number of drivers 
under 18 years who were killed and who had no driving licence was five, the 





Gender differences were highest among drivers in comparison with pedest-
rians. The highest number and death rate for male drivers was in the age group 
of 25–34 years (n=47, rate 17.0 per 100 000). These exceeded the analogous 
indices of females by 12 times. Among pedestrians, the number and death rate 
per 100 000 were the highest among males aged 55–64, 31.0 and 15.7, respecti-
vely, exceeding the analogous rate for women by about 3 times. Calculations 
also showed that 65% of drivers were younger than 40 years of age, while 65% 
of pedestrians were 40 years and older. Car drivers and passengers were signifi-
cantly younger than pedestrians and cyclists (p<0.01). The number of killed 
drivers under 18 years and having no driving license was five; the youngest two 
of those were 15 years old. In addition, it is seen from Table 5 that when pas-
sive road users, i.e. passengers, are excluded, the number of killed pedestrians, 
cyclists and motorcyclists patently exceeded the number of drivers. The number 
of car drivers and pedestrians was almost equal.  
More than one-third of fatal injuries occurred at weekends or public holidays. 
The safest period was from Tuesday until Thursday. Autumn months, from Octo-
ber until December, gave the largest, and March and April, the smallest number 
of deaths. At the same time, there were seasonal differences between fatalities 
among drivers and pedestrians. The peaks for driver fatalities were in June and in 
November, while for pedestrian fatalities it was the darkest period of the year, in 
November and December. Among those for whom the hour of the accident was 
registered (n=361), almost 40% occurred between 6.00 p.m. and midnight, and 
about a quarter between noon and 6 p.m. The rest was divided almost equally 
between midnight and 6 a.m., and from 6 a.m. till noon. 
 
 




Males Females Total Age 
No. % No. % No. % mean±SD 
Drivers 146 88.5 19 11.5 165 100 35.2±13.3*° 
Passengers 87 65.4 46 34.6 133 100 33.1±13.9 ′ ˇ 
Pedestrians 118 73.3 43 26.7 161 100 43.7±13.4* ′ 
Cyclists 34 91.9 3 8.1 37 100 43.9±12.9° ˇ 
Motorcyclists 8 100.0 0 0.0 8 100 27.6±7.5 
Unspecified   8 100.0 0 0.0 8 100 36.5±13.8 
Total 401 78.3 111 21.7 512 100 37.9±14.2 
Source: Kaasik et al. (2007) 
Notes:*° ′ ˇ  p<0.01 between the indices marked with the same symbol. 
 
 
Most car occupants in fatalities, 266 (86.9%), were on highways and rural roads. 
The mechanism of fatal accident was known for 126 (76.4%) drivers. Fifty 
(39.7%) of these drivers collided with another motorcar, 36 (28.6%) drove off the 
road, and 36 (28.6%) crashed into a fixed object (mostly trees) and four (3.1%) 
collided with trains. The majority of pedestrian fatalities (N=96, 59.6%) occurred 




Twenty pedestrians (12.4%) were hit by trains while crossing or walking on the 
railway. Most motorcyclists and cyclists (7 and 27) were involved in fatal 
accidents on highways or rural roads, including one cyclist who collided with a 
train on a level crossing. One motorcyclist and ten cyclists were killed on urban 
roads. Most of the fatally injured (80.1%) died at the place of the accident, and 
others in the hospital (19.1%) and on the way to the hospital (0.8%).  
 
Presence of alcohol 
BAC was assessed in 486 (94.9%) victims: in 382 (95.3%) men and 104 
(93.7%) women. The number of alcohol-related deaths was 313 (64.4%), 267 
(69.9%) among men and 46 (44.2%) among women. The highest number of 
alcohol-related cases, 50 out of 59 deaths, was registered in the age group 35–
44. The level of BAC equivalent to a low, medium and high degree of intoxi-
cation in a live person was disclosed in 55 (11.3%), 109 (22.4%), and 149 
(30.7%) of all victims, respectively. 
Among pedestrians, the percentage of alcohol-related fatalities, especially those 
having 0.251 g/100 ml and more alcohol in their blood, was higher than among 
drivers (Figure 10). The mean BAC of pedestrians (0.20±0.15) was also higher than 
that of drivers (0.14±0.13) (p<0.00). However, of those drivers who drove off the 
road or crashed into a fixed object, 73% were under influence of alcohol. No 
statistically significant relationship was disclosed between the age of dead drivers 
and their BAC as well as the age of dead pedestrians and their BAC. As regards 
pedestrians, Figure 10 also shows that among pedestrians who were hit by motor-
vehicle in the pedestrian zone there was not any victim with BAC above 
0.15 g/100 ml. At the same time, half of killed pedestrians hit by motor-vehicles on 





Figure 10. Proportions of victims by different levels of BAC 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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Among the 37 cyclist fatalities, 25 victims were intoxicated. None of the female 
cyclists had alcohol in their blood. Four of the eight motorcycle fatalities were 
under the influence of alcohol, but BAC was not measured in two of them.  
Among the 133 passenger casualties, BAC over 0.05 g/100 ml was detected 
in 72 (54%). Among the four drivers who collided with trains, three had no 
alcohol in their blood, but one had a BAC equivalent to a low degree of intoxi-
cation in a live person. Among 20 pedestrians who were killed by trains, 15 
were under the influence of alcohol. Most of those (11) had a BAC over  
0.25 g/100 ml. 
Drugs were assessed in 174 (34%) of the traffic victims, among those, in 66 
(40.0%) drivers. The results were positive for 14 fatalities: for six drivers, four 
passengers and three pedestrians, and one unspecified car occupant. Two-thirds 
of those under the influence of drugs, including five drivers, also had a BAC 
equivalent to low or medium intoxication in a live person. Two-thirds of victims 
with positive drug tests were from 15 to 26 years old. Drugs found were 
amphetamines, opiates, cocaine, benzodiazepines, Phenobarbital and caffeine. 
 
 
Table 6. Factors predicting alcohol intoxication of the killed victims  
 
 Odds Ratios (z-statistic in paranthesis) 
Drivers and pedestrians (n=304) All (n=484) 
Male 1.967**   (2.17) 3.395***   (5.35) 
Road 1.842**   (2.08) 1.591*   (1.95) 
Vulnerable user 1.794**   (2.18) 1.702**   (2.54) 
Weekend 1.223   (0.77) 1.321   (1.35) 
Log-likelihood –191.801 –303.447 
Pseudo R2 0.0273 0.0588 
Source: Authorʼs calculations  
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
The relationship of preceding characteristics with BAC indicated by victims 
was further analyzed by assessing logit model, results of which are presented in 
Table 6. In the left panel, only drivers and pedestrians were included, which 
means that vulnerable road users include only pedestrians. In the right panel, the 
latter group includes all vulnerable road users. It was revealed that when the 
victim is a male, killed in the accident that occurred on the road and is not a car-
occupant, it is more likely that she or he had positive blood alcohol con-
centration. There is also higher likelihood of intoxication in case of victims who 
had got into fatal accidents in the weekends. Latter association, however, was 








Gender and age 
The findings of present study show that males had four times in total and in 
some age groups ‘from five to six times the incidence of traffic fatality com-
pared to females. Such a great difference between the genders is typical of low- 
and middle-income countries (Peden et al., 2004). The findings of our study that 
the gender difference is smaller among pedestrians than among motor-vehicle 
drivers are in agreement with the results of the other studies (Östrom and Eriks-
son, 2001; Törõ et al., 2005). The underlying causes of high premature morta-
lity among men in eastern European countries are analysed elsewhere (Watson, 
1995; Kaasik et al., 1998; McKee and Shkolnikov, 2001; Kaasik, 2002). 
The findings concerning the mean age of drivers and pedestrians are in 
agreement with the results of the other traffic injury studies, which confirm that 
young male drivers are at higher risk for traffic accidents and fatalities than the 
middle-aged (Horwood and Fergusson, 2000; Turner and McClure, 2003; Laa-
potti and Keskinen, 2004). Older pedestrians are more prone to serious traffic 
injuries than younger ones (Harruff et al., 1998; Öström and Eriksson, 2001; 
Zajac and Ivan, 2003). The high incidence of fatal traffic accidents among 
young male motor-vehicle drivers is explained by their inexperience and prone-
ness to risk-taking and sensation-seeking behaviour, including alcohol and drug 
consumption (Turner and McClure, 2003; Møller, 2004; Schwebel et al., 2006).  
 
Time and location 
The peak period of traffic fatalities for Estonian drivers is summer, from June to 
August, but also the weekends. This was also registered by Silm and Ahas 
(2005) for alcohol-involved traffic accidents. The explanation is that public 
holidays and festivities that are connected usually with consuming a lot of 
alcohol and increase of traffic density are mostly concentrated at summer-time 
and/or weekends. Analogous results are shown in the study from Lithuania 
(Chenet et al., 2001) and by Farmer and Williams (2005) in the USA. 
The proportion of traffic victims who died at the location of the accident is 
high probably because the vast majority of accidents occur on rural roadways. 
Roadway characteristics and delayed access to emergency care is shown to 
contribute to higher fatality rates (Baker et al., 1992; Grossmann et al., 1997). 




The results of several studies have proved that pedestrians, cyclists and moped 
and motorcycle riders account for most road traffic deaths in low- and middle-
income countries, and car drivers and passengers account for the majority of 
road traffic deaths in high-income countries (Bunn et al., 2003; Peden et al. 
2004). The results of present study show that profile of people affected by road 
traffic injuries in Estonia differs from both above-mentioned patterns. More 
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than half of our traffic victims were car occupants (58%), and an overwhelming 
number of those were drivers. The number of pedestrian fatalities was almost 
equal to the number of driver fatalities. In Sweden, pedestrian fatalities 
constituted 12–20% of the total number of traffic fatalities in the late 1990s with 
a decreasing tendency (Östrom and Eriksson 2001) while the percentage in pre-
sent study group was 31. The Hungarian study (Törõ et al. 2005) registered 56% 
of pedestrian traffic deaths over three years (1999–2001), but since children and 
the elderly were involved the portion of their pedestrian victims might be 
increased. There are no studies involving the same age range as ours does.  
Concerning pedestrians, our study results are in agreement with the results of 
the study by Öström and Eriksson (2001), showing that the majority of pedest-
rians receive their fatal injury on rural roads. Their study area, Umeå in Sweden, 
was mainly rural. In Estonia, only about 30% of the population lives in the 
country. It is striking that there is a noteworthy difference between the number 
of pedestrian victims in the Swedish region studied and Estonia. The mean 
number of pedestrian fatalities, excluding those hit by trains, in the Swedish 
region under study was 15 per year per 907 000 inhabitants, but the analogous 
index was 47 per 916 217 inhabitants in the age groups studied by present 
study. Therefore, the pedestrian death rate in our study group is more than three 
times higher than for all age groups in Umeå. 
 
The role of alcohol 
The results of our study show that 69.9% of men and 44.2% of women were 
under the influence of alcohol during fatal accidents. Such high portion of into-
xicated people among traffic victims can rarely be found in studies conducted in 
the other countries. Sjögren et al. (2006) detected that the above-mentioned 
percentages were 32.8 and 9.5, respectively. The Hungarian study provides the 
data on males and females as one group, showing that BAC was over the legal 
limit (0.05 g/100ml) in 42% of fatalities (Törõ et al. 2005).  
The percentage (62.3%) of intoxicated drivers killed in traffic in Estonia is 
close to the upper index shown for middle-income countries (Peden et al. 2004). 
A Swedish study with the data of the same years as ours shows about three 
times lower percentages, 19.8–21.8% (Holmgren et al. 2005). Pedestrians killed 
in Estonia were more often under the influence of alcohol than drivers (72.7%). 
The analogous ratio was found by Törõ et al. (2005) only the percentages were 
lower, 48% for pedestrians and cyclists taken together, and 33% for motor 
vehicle occupants. The study done in Sweden detected alcohol only in 22% of 
pedestrians killed in traffic (Östrom and Eriksson 2001).  
A special feature of alcohol-involved traffic fatalities was the prevalence of a 
high degree of intoxication among pedestrians (48.7% of all pedestrian fatali-
ties) and a great proportion of drivers (24.5%) with a high degree of intoxication 
(see Figure 10). Further analysis showed that being a pedestrian was shown to 
be one of the most decisive characteristics of a victim, besides being a male or 
caught in the accident on a rural road, which predicts the presence of alcohol. 
Some comparative data can be found from the study by Törõ et al. (2005) with 
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much lower indices: the BAC levels equivalent to high degree of intoxication 
were found in 4% of car occupants and about 20% of pedestrians.  
Knowing the social and economic situation in rural areas in Estonia, we can 
speculate about some factors contributing to the high number of alcohol-related 
fatal pedestrian accidents on rural roadways. Firstly, it is known that the speed 
of motor vehicles is higher in rural areas than in urban areas and pedestrian 
accidents occurring there are more severe. Secondly, a large proportion of 
people in the Estonian countryside suffer from social and economic deprivation 
because jobs and money are concentrated in cities and towns. It is well known 
that alcohol consumption is higher among the less well off in comparison with 
relatively higher social groups (Mäkelä et al., 1997). This is just in rural areas of 
Estonia. Due to economic deprivation, these people are less likely to use a car 
for going from one place to another. They just walk or cycle, often under the 
influence of alcohol. Graham et al. (2005) found that deprivation of an area is 
itself related to an increased incidence of pedestrian casualties. Thirdly, in most 
rural areas, pedestrians have to share non-illuminated roadways with motor-
vehicle traffic because of absence of pedestrian and cyclist zones beside or near 
the roadways. The importance of environmental components in addition to 
alcohol intoxication of pedestrians who were killed on highways is shown in the 
study by Harruff et al. (1998). Most of the pedestrian fatalities occurred during 
the dark periods of the year and the day that was also found by the other authors 
(Sullivan and Flannagan, 2002; Tyrrell et al., 2004). 
 
Policy implications 
In the context of present thesis, the results of this study have certain implica-
tions for optimal alcohol taxation policy. At first, although the study was not 
designed to assess directly the association between alcohol taxes and traffic 
mortality, both high prevalence of alcohol in traffic fatalities and relatively low 
alcohol taxes in Estonia, as was shown in preceding chapter, imply that the rise 
in alcohol taxes could generate substantial benefits from lower traffic mortality. 
Therefore, it is highly likely that the effectiveness of alcohol taxation, proved 
true in the prior literature, under current circumstances holds true for Estonia as 
well. In fact, relatively sharp decrease in traffic mortally in the latter years has 
been probably at least partly induced by the rises in alcohol taxes in 2008 and 
2010. This does not necessarily mean that additional increase in alcohol taxes is 
not warranted as whether the overall decrease in traffic fatalities in the latter 
years has been temporary or permanent remains unknown. For example, econo-
mic recession, during which the real GDP decreased in 2009 more than one 
tenth, has probably played some role in reducing traffic mortality as well.  
Secondly, the high prevalence of alcohol in pedestriansʼ fatalities in Estonia 
supports even more convincingly than international literature the view that spe-
cial attention should be paid to pedestrians. More specifically, when designing 
optimal alcohol policy, drivers and pedestrians should be treated separately by 
complementing drunken driving legislation with “drunk pedestrian” legislation. 
This is not completely new view though. These kinds of proposals, such as 
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imposing a legal alcohol limit for pedestrians similar to drivers for instance, can 
be also found in the prior literature (Hutchinson et al., 2009). In fact, in Estonia 
there are specific penalties for pedestrians. Although it is not prohibited to be in 
traffic under the influence of alcohol, according to paragraph 74 of the Estonian 
Traffic Act (Liiklusseadus) drunken pedestrians who have violated traffic 
regulations are facing more stringent penalties than sober pedestrians are. This 
is probably too little to affect pedestriansʼ behavior.  
In regard with optimal alcohol taxation, pedestrian penalties make a diffe-
rence. Specifically, these penalties work analogously to Pigouvian tax by inter-
nalizing at least part of the external cost within pedestrians. The optimal level of 
taxation would be reduced and consequently must be taken into account, when 
the optimal taxation problem is addressed. Prior optimal taxation literature as 
well as alcohol policy literature in general has not addressed this and usually 
only driversʼ behavior has been the concern. Differentiation between drivers 
and pedestrians, however, leads to several specifications. It affects one of the 
most ambiguous issues in optimal alcohol taxation such as the division of 
alcohol costs into internal and external. As was discussed in the preceding 
chapter, on the efficiency grounds there is rationale to tax alcohol only when the 
costs of alcohol are external. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the pro-
portion of death considered as external. In this respect, considering pedestrians 
separately makes a difference.  
Levitt and Porter (2001) have addressed the issue of traffic externalities in 
the US. They suggested that approximately one fourth of people killed in 
alcohol-related fatal crashes should be classified as external. Using relative risk 
estimates obtained from mortality data for 1994, they estimated that the 
following proportions of deaths could be categorized as externalities. 50% of 
the deaths in two-vehicle crashes in which both drivers were drinking, 76.5% of 
the passengers of vehicles driven by a sober driver who had died in two-vehicle 
crashes with drinking drivers and 86.6% of pedestrians killed by drinking 
drivers. Although the authors noted that a substantial proportion of pedestrians 
involved in fatal crashes had been drinking, these deaths were considered as 
external. In the present study, there is evidence that suggests the opposite. For 
example, while all victims killed in pedestrian zones were sober or had a low 
BAC level; most of the victims who were killed on the road had a moderate or 
high BAC level (see Figure 10 above). This implies that alcohol plays at least 
some role in pedestriansʼ ability to stay in a pedestrian zone to avoid a crash 
with a motor vehicle. What it means is that often pedestrians themselves are the 
cause of crashes and under these circumstances, it is not reasonable to consider 
the deaths of pedestrians as external. Naturally, this applies only when pedest-
rians are perfectly informed about the risks of being in traffic under the in-
fluence of alcohol. Otherwise, these costs could be considered as un-inter-
nalized, internal costs as was discussed in the previous chapter (see Figure 7 and 
its discussion above).  
In addition to the fact that many pedestriansʼ deaths are internal, it should be 
also acknowledged that external harm arising from traffic accidents caused by 
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pedestrians is probably not as severe as in the cases of accidents caused by 
drunk drivers. Although, while the crashes in which pedestrians are responsible 
put a substantial burden on the health care system, criminal justice system and 
private auto insurance companies, external mortality costs are small. More 
specifically, since pedestrians are more vulnerable in traffic than car occupants 
are, most of the fatalities attributed to pedestriansʼ inadequate behavior are 
probably borne by pedestrians themselves. If a pedestrian is walking in the 
middle of the road, which induces the driver to drive off the road or even crash 
into a tree or some other fixed object, there is no evidence that in these kinds of 
events car-occupants were regularly killed (Estonian Road Administration, 
2011). It means that in the externality-corrective taxation framework most of 
these deaths where a motor vehicle runs over a pedestrian could be considered 
as internal since the risk of being killed had been taken into account by the 
victims.  
As follows, based on the discussion above, an attempt to categorize all 
deaths in 2000–2002 as external or internal is made. This is necessary input for 
the subsequent subchapter as well as for the third chapter of this thesis, which 
obtains optimal tax rates on alcohol. For the start, it must be stressed that data 
obtained for the current study comprises information only about individual 
victims and it is not known whether there were also other victims in the same 
accident or whether other parties were under influence of alcohol. It means that 
in order to differentiate between external and internal deaths, it is not possible to 
use the same logic for drivers and passengers as did Levitt and Porter (2001) 
described above. However, after making some simplifying assumptions, some 
inference can be drawn. 
In the present study, approximately one fourth of victims were drunken pe-
destrians. Using this as a rough estimate for determining internal effects borne 
by pedestrians themselves, a considerable proportion of deaths are eliminated 
from the Pigouvian taxation estimation. In case of passengers, it could be 
assumed that every driver death is accompanied by the same number of pas-
senger deaths. Thereby, as 60% of killed drivers had a positive BAC level, pro-
bably the same proportions of passengers died in accidents involving the 
drinking driver. In addition, assuming that half of these passengers were in a 
vehicle where the driver was drunk, this could be considered passengersʼ 
rational choice and their subsequent deaths were internal. Therefore, the 
remaining 30% of killed passengers, being in a vehicle of which the driver was 
sober, are considered as external. In 2000–2002, this makes 40 lost lives.  
As regards to drivers, it was revealed that approximately 40% of them, about 
whom the mechanism of the accident was known, had crashed with another 
motor vehicle. Of these, 30% were under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to assume that approximately 12% of drivers who had crashed 
with a drunk driver and the same proportion of deaths among drivers are 
considered as external. This makes 20 lost lives. Assuming that among drivers 
who had run over pedestrians or crashed with motor cyclists or bicyclists, the 
same proportion (i.e. 12%) was under the influence of alcohol as well, 12% of 
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the deaths of sober vulnerable road users could also be considered as external. 
This makes an additional 8 lives. Altogether, this speculative derivation finds 
that 68 deaths could be considered as alcohol externalities. This represents 
13.5% of all traffic fatalities in 2000–2002.  
 
Final comments 
It is important to note that the patterns revealed in the present study reflect the 
situation in 2000–2002 while the thesis in general is discussing the situation in 
the second half of the first decade in 2000ʼs by the time which the traffic morta-
lity has decreased approximately two times. However, according to aggregate 
data published by the Estonian Road Administration (2010) the distribution of 
road users in 2009 is rather similar to the period 2000–2002. The proportion of 
pedestrians among the killed road users have decreased from one third to one 
fourth while the proportions of the two other large groups, drivers and pas-
sengers, have somewhat increased. The proportion of intoxicated victims has 
decreased as well. In this study, it was disclosed that more than 60% of the 
victims were intoxicated, while through personal communication with the 
specialists at the Estonian Forensic Science Institute (2011), it was revealed that 
in 2009 this figure has somewhat lower but still exceeds 50%. Therefore, no 
cardinal changes have been experienced in the structure of killed traffic victims.  
In general, the results certainly imply that pedestrians as a subgroup should be 
considered as one separate target group when alcohol policy is designed. Future 
research, however, should more precisely determine the magnitude of the harm 
caused by them. For example, there is no direct evidence about the health care 
costs attributed to pedestrians.   
 
 




As was shown in chapter 1, alcohol misuse can place a substantial economic 
burden on society. In Estonia, only few studies (Kaasik et al. 2004, Reinap 
2009) have tried to convert this burden into monetary values. There are no 
studies so far, except one published by the author33 of current thesis in 2009, 
which would have tried to include other than health-related costs.  However, 
alcohol may impose major costs not only on the health care system, but also on 
other spheres of society. It causes a variety of consequences like criminal and 
aggressive behavior, property damage, etc. These effects should also be mone-
tized in order to find the appropriate level of alcohol taxation. The present 
                                                     
33 Compared with the published paper (Saar, 2009), a longer version with more specific 
descriptions of the results is presented here and one additional cost component is 
included as well. In addition, analysis is complemented with optimal tax estimates 
based on a simple partial equilibrium Pigouvian rule. Otherwise, however, only minor 
insignificant adjustments have been made. 
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subchapter aims to fill this gap. The main purpose is to show the extent of the 
consequences of alcohol misuse in society, which can then be regarded as a 
starting point in designing effective alcohol policy. Specifically, the results of 
the study create the basis for optimal taxation analysis in chapter 3, in the 
general-equilibrium framework, as the latter requires empirical estimates for 
several cost parameters. This chapter itself obtains a partial-equilibrium optimal 
alcohol tax based on the formula (1.6) derived in the previous chapter. This is 
carried out in the Discussion section. For this purpose, alcohol costs are divided 
into external and internal costs. Specific proposals for public policy, however, 
are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
In estimating the net social costs34 of alcohol misuse in Estonia, a cost-of-
illness (COI) approach was used. The main idea of a COI study is based on the 
concept of opportunity costs, meaning that only costs related to the use of 
resources due to alcohol misuse are relevant (Single et al. 2003), excluding all 
sorts of alcohol-related transfers within society. In addition, all costs of drinking 
alcohol that are not offset by benefits to consumers are included. This also 
means that some costs are borne by alcohol users themselves (e.g. premature 
mortality and several diseases) because it is usually assumed that consumers are 
not aware of the total costs that consumption imposes on them (Single et al. 
2003, Choi et al. 1997). Internal costs like consumer expenditures on alcohol 
are excluded, because they are offset by certain benefits of consuming alcohol 
(Single et al. 2003).  
In this study, the prevalence-based method was followed, estimating the 
costs that arose in 2006 from both the use and abuse of alcohol, regardless of 
when the use took place – whether in the past or in the present. As a con-
sequence, the results do not directly show the reduction of costs that could be 
attained in the future by the implementation of some type of an intervention 
program (Single et al. 2003). However – since alcohol consumption in Estonia 
has increased during the last decade (Orro et al. 2010), potential cost reductions 
could be even larger than the COI analysis indicates. In addition, because of its 
modest data requirements, this is the most frequently used approach (Choi et al. 
1997) and provides results that most clearly describe the present extent of 
consequences associated with alcohol misuse. In interpreting the results of this 
study, it also has to be kept in mind that the analysis was based on rather 
conservative assumptions and that many substantial cost components, such as 
intangible costs (pain, suffering, etc.), were excluded. 
Seven cost components were estimated in this study. These are costs to the 
health care system and to the criminal justice system, property damage, indirect 
                                                     
34 Although the “net costs” implies that an attempt was made to consider also certain 
benefits of alcohol drinking, this study is clearly cost-oriented. As was discussed in the 
first chapter, there is evidence of a considerable amount of benefits arising from alcohol 
consumption. The problem is that they are difficult to quantify. The issues regarding 
benefits and their inclusion into policy analysis deserve attention and future research 
should address this problem more carefully.  
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costs from premature mortality, incarceration, disability and lower workplace 
labor productivity. Sources of data and the exact methodology used in this study 
are presented in the following section.  
 
 
2.2.2. Data and estimation procedures 
 
Costs to the health care system  
Data about health care costs associated with alcohol-related diseases came from the 
Estonian Health Insurance Fund (2007), through which two thirds of health care 
costs are financed in Estonia (Ministry of Social Affairs of Estonia, 2004). Benefits 
derived from alcohol consumption were also considered (see Appendix 1). In case 
of diseases that are only partly caused by alcohol, no original alcohol attributable 
fractions (AAF) were calculated. More than half of these were drawn from Lai et al. 
(2003), in which fractions were estimated based on prevalence data of alcohol 
consumption in Estonia in 2002. The remainder of the fractions was drawn from 
studies undertaken in the USA (Harwood et al. 1998) and New Zealand (Devlin et 
al. 1997) (see Appendices 1 and 2). In consideration of the fact that the level of 
alcohol consumption in Estonia was higher than in both of these countries during 
the last decade (WHO 2011a) and since the burden of cancers attributable to 
alcohol (for which AAFs were mainly drawn from studies conducted outside 
Estonia), has also been estimated to be one of the highest in the region that includes 
Estonia (Boffetta et al., 2006), the analysis should produce a conservative estimate 
and consequently serves the purpose of this study. 
 
Costs to public institutions 
The cost computation pertaining to the criminal justice system and the rescue 
system are based on a calculation of the average cost of output for each insti-
tution using their operating expenses (Ministry of Finance of Estonia, 2006a, 
2006b). The output of the relevant institution was measured by a statistical 
figure that reflected the number of main activities that were carried out in 2006 
(see Table 7). The next step entailed determining  the proportion of output 
attributed to alcohol, using fractions that were mainly drawn from Harwood et 
al. (1998)  and Lai et al. (2003) (see Appendix 3). Finally, average cost was 
multiplied by alcohol attributable output in order to get the estimate of the costs 
of alcohol misuse.  
Some details require mentioning in the process of cost computation. First, in 
the case of the Prosecutor’s Office and the courts, only operating expenses 
relating specifically to misdemeanors and criminal matters were used to 
calculate the average cost of output, because the civil and administrative matters 
that are also initiated in these institutions are not generally connected to alcohol. 
Assuming that operating expenses are proportionately related to the duration of 
a court case, statistics about the duration of different court cases (Ministry of 
Justice of Estonia, 2006) made it possible to exclude expenses related to pro-
ceedings restricted to civil and administrative matters. Secondly, in the case of 
lawsuits, it was assumed that the structure of registered offences by type and the 
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structure of court cases by type coincide, which made it possible to determine 




Table 7. Public institutions and their output 
 
Institution Output Source of Data 
Police Board 
Registered criminal offences and 
misdemeanors (by type) 
Request to Estonian Police 
Board (2007) 
Courts of first 
and second 
instance 
Initiated proceedings – criminal 
offences and misdemeanors (by type, 
based on structure of registered 
offences) 
Data from Ministry of 
Justice of Estonia (2007) 
Prosecutor’s 
Office 
Initiated proceedings – criminal 
offences and misdemeanors (by type, 
based on structure of registered 
offences) 





Expert studies and autopsies (by 
cause of death or injury) 
Request to Bureau of 
Forensic Medicine of 
Estonia (2007) 
Rescue Board Calls (by type) 
Request to Estonian 
Rescue Board (2007) 
Prisons Prisoners (by criminal offences) 
Data from Ministry of 
Justice of Estonia (2006) 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
Thirdly, in computation of costs accruing to the Bureau of Forensic Medicine 
(BFM), it was assumed that the average cost of expert studies and autopsies was 
three times higher than expert examinations conducted on living persons. This 
assumption was arrived at based on a government regulation that establishes the 
price list for examinations performed at state expert institutions (Riiklikes 
ekspertiisiasutustes …, 2001) and on a personal communication with the 
Director of the BFM. In addition, since blood alcohol concentration was 
assessed in the case of every cadaver, the expenses involved in these procedures 
were calculated separately, assuming that the average cost of each performed 
test was EUR 11.80, as fixed by the government regulation. 
 
Property damage 
Alcohol-related property damage mainly involves damage caused by traffic 
accidents and fires, but the latter were not included in this study on account of 
insufficient data. Data about traffic damage was obtained from the Estonian 
Traffic Insurance Fund (2007) through personal communication. Insurance 
firms made payments of EUR 44.2 million in 2006, of which 87% included 
damage to property. The alcohol attributable fraction used here was the same as 
in the case of injuries caused by transport accidents (see Appendix 2). 
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Premature mortality 
Alcohol-related deaths in 2006 were calculated based on mortality statistics by 
cause of death (Statistics Estonia 2007a) and attributable fractions presented in 
Appendices 1 and 2. In estimating future costs, life expectancy statistics by age 
and sex group were used (Statistics Estonia 2007b). Based on this data, the years 
which would have been lived in an alcohol-free society were established, which 
enabled the making of a calculation for estimating the lost years of working-age 
persons (aged 15–74). The human capital approach was used. The value of each 
life year was assumed equal to the Estonian GDP per laborer (Statistics Estonia 
2007c) in 2006, which figure was modified to account for employment rates by 
age and sex groups (Statistics Estonia 2007d). The real growth of GDP was taken 
into account, and the value of production foregone in the future was discounted 
back to 2006. Since results may be very sensitive to the choice of real GDP 
growth rate and discount rate, both conservative (2% and 10%, respectively) and 
non-conservative (4% and 5%, respectively) rates were applied. Using GDP per 
laborer may result in a somewhat higher estimate of productivity losses, 
compared with other studies in which earnings by gender and age groups or GDP 
per capita were primarily used. However – Since the human capital approach has 
been criticized because it underestimates, the value of life compared with the 
willingness-to-pay approach (Cook and Moore 1999), and since production of the 
household sector was completely excluded in this study, the GDP per laborer 
approach is not expected to overestimate the value of lost life.  
 
Incarceration 
Although the main objective of incarceration is to isolate persons who are detri-
mental to society, it is also seen as being harmful to productivity, unless de-
tainees are employed in prison. At the beginning of 2006 – according to the 
Estonian Prison System and Probation Supervision Yearbook (Ministry of Jus-
tice of Estonia, 2006) – 48% of convicted prisoners were not employed. How-
ever, since all pre-trial prisoners are unemployed, the rate for all detainees was 
61%. Applying this rate and the overall employment rate in the economy in 
2006 (61.6%) (Statistics Estonia 2007d) to the total number of detainees, the 
number of prisoners who were lost to the labor market due to their imprison-
ment was established. The number of prisoners whose cases are related to 
alcohol use was derived by assuming that the structure of unemployed detainees 
by crime type coincided with the overall structure of detainees by crime type. 




Disability is categorized as temporary and permanent35. In case of the former, 
the number of lost workdays attributed to alcohol was calculated with data 
                                                     
35 Earlier published paper on Social Costs of Alcohol in Estonia (Saar, 2009) did not 
included permanent disability costs. 
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about the duration of illnesses (Estonian Health Insurance Fund, 2007). Only 
costs associated with patients aged 15–74 were included, which were multiplied 
by the overall employment rate in the economy. Separate records are kept by 
hospitals and family doctors of the duration of illnesses. In the former case, 
patients were assumed to be incapable of working during the whole period of 
illness, but in the latter case, only 25% of days were categorized as lost work-
days, since very often patients continue to work, even after a registered visit to 
or by a family physician.  Lost days related to alcohol were obtained by using 
the same fractions as in the calculation of direct cost for health care (see Appen-
dices 1 and 2). The productive value of one day was assumed to be equal to 
GDP per laborer in 2006, divided by the number of days in a year. 
Data about the number of permanently disabled individuals by the cause of 
disability in 2006 was obtained from the Estonian National Social Insurance Board 
(2011). As for each individual the data revealed the degree of disability as well, this 
was used as the reference value to obtain productivity losses. For instance, for a 
disabled person whose degree of disability was 20%, productivity losses related to 
this individual was obtained by taking 20% of GDP per laborer. In order to estimate 
total productivity losses of permanent disability attributed to alcohol, final value 
was also multiplied by the employment rate of 62% to take into account 
circumstances in the labor market. Analogously to temporary disability costs 
alcohol attributable fractions presented in Appendices 1 and 2 were applied to 
obtain alcohol-related number of permanently disabled individuals.    
 
Lower workplace labor productivity 
Alcohol abusers are generally less productive compared with nonabusers, because 
of their poorer state of health and more frequent absences from work. These kinds 
of costs should be included in the social cost estimation. As in the study by English 
et al. (1995), it was assumed that the harmful level of alcohol intake per day is over 
60g for males and over 40g for females. Data about prevalence of alcohol abusers 
among the workforce came from the National Institute for Health Development 
(2007), which conducts the "Health Behavior among the Estonian Adult 
Population" survey once every two years. Productivity impairment rates of 10% for 
males and 5% for females were applied, using GDP per labourer as the productivity 
level for nonabuser persons. The choice of impairment rates was supported by 
Shurcke et al. (2006), according to which male labourers in Estonia who assessed 
their health to be bad earned wages 30% lower than the average. For females, the 
respective rate was 20% (Suhrcke et al. 2006). Kaldaru et al. (2004) presented even 
larger differences – labourers who assessed their health to be very bad earned 45% 
less than the ones who thought their health was very good. Thus, the 10% and 5% 









The economic costs to society resulting from alcohol misuse in Estonia in 2006 
amounted to EUR 230–329 million, representing 1.7–2.5% of GDP (see Table 
8). The exact value would depend on the chosen discount rate and the real GDP 
growth rate. Over 75% of total costs were associated with the indirect burden of 
alcohol misuse, over 75% of which arose from premature mortality. Direct costs 
were mainly associated with the criminal justice system. 
 
 









Health care 9.85 4.24 Mortality1 142.27–246.82 8.35–14.18 
Police 14.48  Incarceration 3.13  
Courts 0.91  Disability (temp) 10.54 3.13 
Prosecution 1.70  Disability (perm) 30.26 4.76 




Prisons 5.19     
Rescue 2.27     
Property 16.14     
NET COSTS 46.63 NET COSTS 183.48–282.20 
TOTAL NET COSTS 230.11 – 328.83 (in millions of euros) 
PERCENTAGE OF GDP 1.72% – 2.46% 
Source: Authorʼs calculations 




Examining the cost structure related to the mortality issue, more than 75% of 
this was associated with males. In addition, approximately half of the costs were 
derived from external causes, despite the fact that there were substantially more 
deaths caused by diseases. By way of explanation, it must be noted that there 
were large variations in the value of lives, depending on gender and age of 
death. To be more specific, young person’s obviously have many more years to 
lose than older ones. Thus, their lives were more highly valued. Applying diffe-
rent employment rates by sex and age group also caused substantial variations. 
For example, in the case of conservative assumptions (discount rate of 10% and 
real GDP growth rate of 2%) the value of life of males aged 25–29 was 
estimated as EUR 229,000, while the value of life of females aged 70–73 was 
valued as EUR 4,000, representing the highest and the lowest value of human 
life. In the case of less conservative assumptions, the respective values were 
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EUR 589,000 and EUR 4,000. Thus – although female mortality was almost 
three times lower than that of males, this was not the only reason for the low 
proportion of costs associated with females. The lives of females as such were 
given a lower value (up to 34%, depending on age group) because of the lower 
employment rate among women (this does not apply to age group 41–50 
because shorter life-expectancy of males decreased their productive value even 
smaller than femalesʼ). In addition, since males and young people are more 
frequently associated with accidents and assaults, the proportion of costs related 
to males and external causes was relatively large.  
Most of the costs resulting from mortality were associated with persons aged 
40–59. There were 546 male and 181 female alcohol-related deaths in this age 
group (see Table 9, where the number of deaths per 100,000 is shown for pur-
poses of international comparison), representing more than 60% of the costs 
from mortality. Another 30% of deaths were caused by traffic fatalities. Other 
important cost components were medical problems that are directly caused by 
alcohol consumption, like accidental poisoning and exposure to alcohol (repre-
senting 15% of costs caused by premature mortality), alcoholic cardiomyopathy 
(11%) and alcoholic liver disease (11%). Since consumption of alcohol 
decreases the prevalence of some diseases, it was estimated that there were also 
benefits of EUR 8.4–14.2 million associated with lower mortality, of which 
85% arose from lessened incidence of ischaemic heart disease, 11% from hyper-
tensive diseases and 4% from cholelithiasis. 
 
 
Table 9. Premature mortality attributed to alcohol in Estonia in 2006 
 















Males 18 41 74 208 338 373 1052 177 
  External    
  cause 
18 39 52 90 103 62 364 61 
  Disease 0 2 22 118 235 311 688 116 
Females 7 8 18 51 130 205 421 64 
   External   
   cause 
7 6 7 19 30 26 96 15 
   Disease 0 2 11 32 100 179 325 49 
Source: Statistics Estonia (2007a; 2007e), authorʼs calculations 
 
 
In addition to premature mortality, indirect costs are comprised of four cost 
components. First, it was estimated that alcohol misuse caused a loss of EUR 
13.5 million due to lower productivity in the workplace. Since the prevalence of 
alcohol misusers (1.84% of the work force) among males was four times higher 
than among females (0.46%) and it was assumed that male productivity was 
curbed by 10%, while in the case of females the assumed rate was 5%, almost 
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90% of lower labour productivity is attributable to alcohol misuse by males. 
Secondly, net costs of temporary disability of persons who could not work 
during periods of illness amounted to EUR 7.8 million, representing 3% of 
indirect costs. The total costs of temporary disability were significantly higher – 
EUR 10.9 million. The difference between total and net costs takes into account 
benefits of EUR 3.1 million accruing from alcohol consumption that helped to 
avoid potential disability caused by cholelithiasis (39% of benefits), hyper-
tensive diseases (37%), and ischaemic heart disease (24%). The four main cost 
components of temporary disability were falls (18% of disability costs), hyper-
tensive diseases (17%), mental and behavioural disorder due to use of alcohol 
(13%) and traffic accidents (8%). Thirdly, while the net costs of permanent 
disability were estimated to be EUR 25.5 million, total costs were higher by 
EUR 4.6 million due to benefits of alcohol arising almost equally from hyper-
tensive diseases and ischaemic heart diseases. Costs of permanent disability were 
mainly caused by mental and behavioural disorder due to use of alcohol (14% of 
total costs), degeneration of nervous system due to alcohol (13%) and alcoholic 
polyneuropathy (9%). Fourthly, incarceration costs amounted to EUR 3.1 million 
and were mainly associated with prisoners who had been imprisoned for offences 
against persons (75% of incarceration costs) and traffic crimes (21%). 
 
 
Table 10. Criminal offences and misdemeanors attributed to alcohol in Estonia in 2006 
 





All criminal offences and misdemeanors  254,830 57,112 
Criminal offences against persons 4,402 1,288 
Criminal offences and misdemeanors against property 36,476 1,240 
Criminal offences and  disturbances of the peace 13,718 2,058 
Driving motor vehicle or tram under influence of 
alcohol or refusing alcohol intoxication tests 
17,109 17,109 
Misdemeanor violations of Alcohol Act 35,417 35,417 
Source: Authorʼs calculations 
 
 
Half of the direct costs were carried by the criminal justice system, including 
the police, the BFM, the courts, the Prosecutor’s Office and prisons, which bore 
costs of EUR 22.6 million due to alcohol misuse. Two thirds of these costs were 
borne by the police system. Of the more than a quarter of a million criminal 
offences and misdemeanors committed in 2006 57,112 were attributed to 
alcohol (see Table 10). Most of the cost (62%) to the police system was related 
to misdemeanor violations of the Alcohol Act (Alkoholiseadus), mainly as-
sociated with the drinking of alcohol in public places, appearance in public 
places under the influence of alcohol, and drinking by under-aged persons. 
Prosecutor and prison costs amounted to EUR 1.7 and EUR 5.2 million, respec-
tively. Both sets of costs were incurred primarily in regard to offences against 
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persons (65% of prosecutor costs and 75% of prison costs) and traffic crimes 
(16% and 21%, respectively). The two main cost components borne by courts 
were offences against the Alcohol Act (25% of court costs) and driving under 
the influence of alcohol (42%). Costs to the BFM were associated with alco-
holic liver diseases (22% of BFM costs), traffic accidents (22%), other external 
causes like homicides, suicides, falls, etc. (38%), and assessments of blood 
alcohol concentration (9%). 
Total costs to the health care system were EUR 10.1 million, but since 
benefits that arose from prevention of ischaemic heart disease (51% of benefits), 
cholelithiasis (36%) and hypertensive diseases (12%) amounted to EUR 4.2 
million, net costs to the health care system were EUR 5.9 million, amounting to 
13% of net direct costs. Most of the health care costs were caused by ischaemic 
heart diseases (22% of total health care costs), falls (15%), cancers (14%), 
mental and behavioural disorder due to use of alcohol (8%) and hypertensive 
diseases (8%). In total, 29% of health care costs related to alcohol were caused 
by external causes and 71% by diseases.  
Although only 2% of health care costs were caused by the treatment of 
consequences of smoke, fire and flames, more than 80% of the alcohol-related 
costs to the rescue system are caused by fires, since over half of all calls 
received by Rescue Board are related to fires. Most of the other costs borne by 
the rescue system are associated with traffic accidents. A substantial part of 





Comparison with prior estimates 
Estimates about the social costs of alcohol misuse in Estonia have not been 
compiled, so the results of this study were compared with COI surveys 
undertaken in other countries. There are two main aspects that are comparable 
across studies – the structure and the level (ratio to GDP) of costs. Beginning 
with the latter, variability between different studies is relatively large. This may 
result from methodological differences, where lower costs in some studies were 
caused by very conservative estimates and the exclusion of some cost compo-
nents because of lack of data, difficulties in monetizing several consequences of 
alcohol misuse, and problems finding the correct AAF. However, since a 
standard framework has been followed in most of the studies, the results can be 
compared to a certain extent. In this study, the most conservative estimate 
produced a figure of 1.6% of GDP. In the context of results presented in Table 1 
in preceding chapter Estonia can be classified as a country with relatively high 
social costs of alcohol use, especially when considering the least conservative 
estimate of over 2%. Considering the high level of alcohol consumption (WHO 
2011a) and very high rates of mortality related to alcohol use (WHO, 2011b) in 
Estonia, this was an expected outcome. 
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Although the structure of social costs of alcohol varies considerably, there is 
one similarity that is apparent across the studies – the large share of indirect 
costs. Even then, the share of indirect costs in Estonia was estimated to be 
higher than in most of the other studies presented in Table 1, reaching over 75% 
of total costs. In addition to methodological differences like using GDP per 
labourer as a value for lost life years instead of earnings by gender and age 
groups or GDP per capita, one obvious explanation for the very large share of 
indirect costs in Estonia may lie in the relatively low direct costs that arise from 
the small public sector. General government output accounted for only 17.1% of 
GDP in 2006, which is low compared to most of the developed countries, and 
also to the EU average of 19.1% in 2005 (Eurostat, 2007). A low level of total 
expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP (e.g., 5.3% compared with 15.4% 
in the USA and 9.8% in Portugal in 2004) also helps to explain the results 
(WHO, 2007). Another reason may lie in a very high mortality rate that has 
lessened costs for the health care system, but also has increased indirect costs.  
 
Tax policy implications 
Cost levels have often been compared with the level of tax receipts (Cook and 
Moore 1999, Cook and Moore 2002). In efficient economies, tax receipts from 
taxes on alcohol should be at least as large as external costs associated with 
alcohol consumption (Barker 2002). If marginal external costs are increasing, 
tax receipts should even exceed total external costs (Barker 2002, Ironfield et al. 
1999). Assuming that consumers do not have complete information about the 
consequences of alcohol misuse such as premature mortality or health effects, 
and ignoring the share of direct cost that is borne by alcohol misusers them-
selves, total social costs may be interpreted as external costs. Considering that 
in Estonia tax receipts on alcohol amounted to EUR 134 million in 2006 
(Statistics Estonia 2007f), economic inefficiency definitely exists with respect 
to the alcohol market, since social costs exceeded tax receipts by EUR 70 
million. This implies a need for public intervention, especially when con-
sidering that there were several cost components that were excluded. For 
instance, although direct costs from criminal offences against persons accounted 
to only 2% of total alcohol-attributed costs to the police system, the influence of 
such crime on society was substantial, because of the suffering, fear and pain 
that were experienced by victims and their close relatives and friends.  
There is an important caveat concerning comparison between costs and reve-
nues. Specifically, there is no consensus as to whether all productivity losses 
may be regarded as external costs. The argument of efficiency dictates that 
nothing justifies public intervention if costs are internal and consumers are 
rational. As regards traffic costs, that is representing 30% of mortality costs and 
8% of disability costs, preceding subchapter about traffic mortality suggested 
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that 32.1% of these costs can be considered as external36. This represents only 
8% of total productivity costs. Remaining indirect costs like mortality or 
disability from alcohol-related internal diseases, lost time due to incarceration 
or lower on-job-productivity due to alcohol abuse, are probably mainly borne by 
drinkers themselves and their families through foregone earnings. 
Another rationale to tax alcohol arises due to un-internalized, internal costs. 
In the COI framework, it is assumed that consumers are not capable of taking 
into account any consequences of alcohol misuse except for the price they pay 
when buying alcohol. Under this assumption, a tax raise in Estonia would be 
warranted as was discussed above. However, this may be a too extreme 
approach and is probably an inappropriate assumption when designing taxation 
policy. Therefore, due to information failures, i.e. drinkersʼ inability to take into 
account all the risks drinking poses on them, it is reasonable to consider a 
certain proportion of indirect costs as un-internalized, internal costs. Obviously, 
the choice of this proportion considerably affects the optimal level of taxation. 
For example, according to the conservative estimate of this study, the 
proportion of external costs of losses applying to total productivity should be 
over 50% in order to outweigh tax receipts, which would then indicate a need 
for public intervention in Estonia. 
In addition to some ambiguity of cost division into internal and external, 
comparison of tax revenues and alcohol costs fails to take into account drinkersʼ 
heterogeneity. To overcome this problem, formula (1.6) that was derived in the 
previous chapter could be used to carry out an exercise in order to obtain an 
optimal tax rate for Estonia. Nine alternative estimates are obtained to deal with 
the uncertainty of parameter values. At first, there are middle, low and high 
estimates. Under the middle estimates it is assumed that abusive drinkers drink 
50% of the total alcohol (i.e. parameter in the optimal tax formula takes the 
value of · = 1), and the price responsiveness of abusive drinkers is 
somewhat lower than moderate drinkers ( = .. = 1.75). As regards to the 
first parameter, under low and high estimates abusive drinkers were assumed to 
drink one third and two thirds of the total alcohol, respectively (i.e. · = 2 
and · = 0.5). Price responsiveness was assumed to lie in the range from  
–0.4 to –1.0. Specifically, under low estimates = −1.0 and = −0.4 while 
under high estimates elasticities were assumed to be vice versa. In addition, 
variation in cost estimates is also allowed in order to show results under 
different assumptions regarding the division of indirect costs into internal and 
external. 
                                                     
36 It was suggested that 13.5% of all traffic fatalities are alcohol externalities. As in the 
current subchapter it was assumed that 42% of traffic accidents are attributed to alcohol, 
accordingly 32.1% of these are considered as external (i.e. 0.420/0.135 = 0.321). 
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The results are presented in Table 11. At first, it is seen that the optimal level 
of alcohol taxation ranges under alternative scenarios from EUR 1.6 to EUR 9.9 
per unit of pure alcohol. While the prevailing average tax rate in 2006 was EUR 
7.0, it means that it lies in the upper range of optimal levels revealed here37. It 
appears that the division of costs into external and internal becomes extremely 
important. For example, all three estimates obtained under the assumption that 
individuals fail to internalize only one third of traffic-related productivity 
losses, are substantially lower than prevailing rate. Being little bit less conser-
vative in this respect gives considerably higher estimates under all scenarios.  
 
 
Table 11. Partial equilibrium Pigouvian tax estimates 
 
The share of indirect costs 
considered as un-internalized 
Average external 
cost per liter of 
pure alcohol 
Pigouvian tax 
(EUR per liter of pure alcohol) 
Low Mid High 
32.1% of traffic costs 
0% of other than traffic costs 
3.2 1.6 2.3 4.0 
50% of traffic costs 
25% of other than traffic costs 
5.4 2.7 3.9 6.8 
75% of traffic costs 
50% of other than traffic costs 
7.9 4.0 5.7 9.9 
Prevailing rate in 2006 7.0 
Source: Authorʼs calculations 
 
 
Differences between low, mid and high estimates arise mainly due to different 
sensitivity of the optimal tax towards changes in price elasticities among 
moderate and abusive drinkers. As long as price elasticities are identical, 
meaning that = 1, optimal tax rate would exactly equal to average external 
costs presented in the left column and the optimal level of taxation can easily be 
obtained by dividing the total external costs by total consumption. When there 
is reason to believe that abusive drinkers are not as responsive as moderate 
drinkers are, the optimal level of average alcohol tax stays lower than the 
prevailing rate even under non-conservative assumptions regarding the cost 
division between internal and external. The results of this exercise suggest that 
the raise in prevailing taxes in 2006 is warranted only under the assumptions 
that moderate drinkers are less responsive to price than abusive drinkers and 
more than half of indirect costs are external.  
   
                                                     
37 To obtain prevailing average tax rate, alcohol excise revenues (Statistics Estonia, 
2010b) were divided by total amount of alcohol (in liters of pure alcohol) purchased in 
2006 (Orro et al., 2010).    
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Final comments 
This subchapter has contributed to alcohol taxation research by disclosing the 
economic cost of alcohol in Estonia. This enables the ability to derive empirical 
values for several cost parameters required in order to estimate the optimal level 
of alcohol taxation. A simple exercise was carried out to apply the results to the 
optimal tax formula derived in a partial equilibrium framework. Somewhat 
surprisingly, it appeared that in 2006, the prevailing tax on alcohol was rather too 
high. However, it should be noticed that while this study has followed a 
conservative approach and gives the lower bound to most of the cost parameters, 
it has also excluded some important alcohol consequences due to lack of data.  
As regards to the optimal tax rates obtained here, a partial equilibrium 
solution completely ignores fiscal rationale of alcohol taxation as was discussed 





















3. OPTIMAL ALCOHOL TAXATION  
IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK:  
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR ESTONIA 
 
From the first two chapters, the following points have arisen. At first, as regards 
to the Estonian context, while there have been several changes in alcohol taxes 
during the last years, there is no a single study that would have addressed the 
issue regarding optimal tax policy in Estonia. Secondly, although international 
literature has recognized alcohol taxation as one of the most effective policy 
tools for controlling alcohol-related harm, only a few studies have addressed the 
optimal alcohol taxation problem and even less can be found in which other 
than externality rationale has been the concern. As the Estonian government has 
recently used alcohol taxes for fiscal purposes mainly, the latter is of high 
importance.  
Of these scarce studies, it was shown that the main empirics needed for esti-
mation of optimal alcohol taxes concern external costs of alcohol as well as 
several elasticities. While the present thesis obtains elasticities from inter-
national literature, the second chapter was designed to provide external cost 
estimates. Specifically, while consisting of two separate empirical studies, 
mainly two findings deserve special attention. The first study confirmed the 
presence of alcohol in traffic-related harm as well as its high prevalence in 
accidents in which pedestrians have been killed. The second study, which 
presented the social costs estimate for Estonia, revealed that productivity losses 
due to premature mortality represent the largest share of economic costs of 
alcohol. While the division of productivity losses into internal and external 
costs remains somewhat ambiguous, direct costs, which can all be categorized 
as external, were estimated to arise through the criminal justice system and the 
health care system as well from traffic-related property damage.  
The aim of this chapter is to go further and say something more concrete 
about taxation policy currently implemented in Estonia, by using the result 
revealed in previous chapters. To accomplish that goal, following the brief 
introduction below, a theoretical model is developed, which is parameterized in 
the following section. More specifically, the chapter is structured as follows: 
section 3.2 presents the model and derives an optimal alcohol policy formula, 
while section 3.3 estimates parameter values and simulates the formula. Section 
3.4 discusses the results and draws conclusions. Both the theoretical model and 
simulation results presented in this chapter have been published previously 
(Saar, 2011) meaning that on a large scale the reasoning and the structure of 
these two papers are identical. However, compared with the published paper, 
this thesis applies a somewhat different parameterization strategy and several 
parameter values have been re-estimated, which produces somewhat different 
results. In addition, this thesis has used much more space for describing the 
model as well as discussing the overall results and their policy implications.   




This chapter is the first attempt to arrive at empirical estimates for an optimal 
level of alcohol taxation in Estonia. For this purpose, the Parry et al. (2009) 
general-equilibrium model is used. As was discussed in the first chapter, the 
model integrates the principles of externality-correcting Pigouvian taxation and 
revenue-raising Ramsey taxation. This kind of approach has been widely used 
in the environmental taxation literature. The essential idea is to use revenues 
from externality-correcting taxation to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes. 
This approach suggests that under certain conditions, the optimal tax rate may 
differ considerably from the Pigouvian tax on fiscal grounds. In specific regard 
to alcohol, Parry et al. (2009) used this framework to obtain optimal alcohol 
policies for the United States. The simplified version of this model was also laid 
out in the first chapter. This chapter, however, while following closely more 
sophisticated version presented by Parry et al., also expands the model upon to 
adjust it for Estonian context. 
Compared with analysis conducted by Parry et al. (2009), while specific 
taxes on individual beverages nor optimal levels of drunk driving penalties are 
not estimated, there are primarily four extensions. Firstly, alcohol purchases by 
tourists represent a considerable proportion of total alcohol sales in Estonia. 
Unlike tax revenues from local taxpayers, which are simply transfers within a 
society, tax revenues from tourists could be treated as benefits, because they 
reflect an additional “windfall” contribution to the welfare of the community. 
These revenues can be used to provide public goods without the locals having to 
incur any costs. Consequently, it is reasonable to decompose this effect in the 
optimal tax formula as well. Although – in addition to the alcohol market – 
tourists could also have a considerable effect on other sectors like food services, 
accommodation, and transportation, this paper only considers excise tax reve-
nue from alcohol purchases made by tourists. 
Secondly, it is assumed that raising tax on alcohol increases resource costs to 
government. Parry et al. (2009) only considered this kind of cost when a penalty 
rate is charged. Tax raises may however require even greater increases in admi-
nistrative costs, since the black market tends to expand as price levels go up on 
the legal market. Therefore, deriving the optimal tax on alcohol, it is assumed 
that government can use more resources to deal with the possible expansion of 
the illegal alcohol market. 
Thirdly, the model applied here allows public spending to interact with labor 
supply38. For example, using alcohol tax revenue to increase public medical 
expenditures may raise the quality of health care services and as a result, labor 
supply incentives for individuals could go up. For this reason, an efficiency gain 
under the described scenario may be derived from two sources. First is the 
                                                     
38 Although this aspect was not raised in subchapter 1.3 as the key point to solve for 
Estonia, this assumption is expected to provide some interesting insights to the optimal 
taxation problem.  
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potential efficiency gain that comes from the public spending itself. This arises 
when households place more value on public good than on the money used to 
provide it. Secondly, if the supply of labor increases, deadweight loss in the 
labor market caused by labor taxes is reduced. This thesis takes into account 
both of these effects. To consider tax policy involving the adjustment of public 
spending could also have higher policy relevance, because reduction in labor 
taxes may be politically unfeasible. In Estonia, for instance, this would mean a 
change in the overall system of social security funding, since part of the revenue 
from labor taxes is earmarked for social security expenditures. 
The fourth expansion arises from estimates presented in the second chapter 
of this thesis, where it was indicated that public drinking misdemeanors and 
criminal offenses against persons account for more than half of the alcohol-
related costs borne by the criminal justice system in Estonia. Consequently, in 
addition to drunk driving also public drinking and offenses against persons are 
incorporated into the model as externalities. As regards public drinking, this 
paper considers three different kinds of activity penalized in Estonia. Firstly, the 
Alcohol Act (Alkoholiseadus) allows drinking alcohol in public only if per-
mitted by the local government, or in places where retail sale for public con-
sumption takes place. Secondly, the same law prohibits being under the influen-
ce of alcohol in a public place if this offends human dignity or the sense of 
morality. Thirdly, the Traffic Act (Liiklusseadus) applies more stringent penalty 
for the breaking of traffic regulations by pedestrians who are under the influen-
ce of alcohol, compared with sober pedestrians. In this paper, the public 
drinking variable that involves all of these acts is included for two reasons. To 
begin with, prosecuting public drinking misdemeanors or treating non-fatal 
traffic injuries caused by pedestrians places a substantial economic burden on 
the criminal justice system as well as on the health care system. In addition, 
although health effects caused by pedestrians are usually borne pedestrians 
themselves, different kinds of spillover effects may arise affecting also other 
parties. Injured pedestrians may be less productive at workplace, for instance. 
Although Estonian laws don’t prohibit drunken pedestrians being in traffic 
(Liiklusseadus), this paper assumes that the risk of causing traffic accidents is 
the main negative externality of public drinking.   
 
 
3.2. Derivation of optimal policy formula 
 
3.2.1. The model 
 
In this section, a static one-period general-equilibrium model with a representa-
tive consumer is laid out. The structure of the model and variable notations 
closely follow Parry et al. (2009). However – since there are several important 
extensions, some new variables are included that are more specifically dis-
cussed below. The basic assumptions in the model are listed as follows: 
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 the representative consumer represents an aggregation of all households 
which means that the behavior of different types of alcohol drinkers are 
all represented in the behavior of represented consumer39;   
 the representative consumer is rational, meaning that she or he is able to 
internalize all drinking consequences such as alcohol-related illnesses and 
injuries, including the future costs of addiction; 
 in addition to consumption of alcohol, leisure and other commodities, the 
agent receives utility also from committing different unlawful acts, and 
disutility from bearing non-pecuniary penalties and facing health risks;     
 there is perfect competition in the production side of the economy which 
means that firms earn only normal profits and alcohol tax is totally shifted on 
to consumer, by raising the market price by exactly the amount of the tax; 
 the fiscal system is financed only through labor tax, alcohol tax and 
pecuniary penalties that are used to finance health care system, criminal 
justice system and government transfers; 
 efficiency alone determines the optimality of policy, meaning that this is 
the only concern of government and no attention is paid to distributional 
effects of alcohol taxation; 
 by maximizing agentʼs utility, government takes into account only the 
utility of local agents and ignores citizens of other countries40. 
 
Based on these assumptions, continuous and quasi-concave utility function, for 
representative consumer is defined:  
 = ( , , , , , , , , )     (3.1a) 
 = ( , , , , , , , )      (3.1b) 
 
In utility function (3.1), all variables are expressed as per capita, and a bar 
denotes variables exogenous to the agent. The agent's utility is an increasing 
function in all variables except ,  and . The latter is an increasing 
function in all its arguments except .  
The agent can freely choose the level of legal alcohol consumption , 
consumption of non-alcoholic goods , leisure , drunk driving , public 
drinking  and offenses . Alcohol consumption here denotes drinking pure 
alcohol contained in any alcoholic beverages. It means that alcohol consumed 
for some other purposes, such as medicine in health care sector, is not included. 
In addition, alcohol consumption is assumed to be complementary commodity 
to all three unlawful acts as well as to leisure. In the context of alcohol taxation 
                                                     
39 This may seem a highly troubling assumption at first sight, but as was discussed in 
the first chapter, the heterogeneity of consumers can be at least partly taken into account 
during the parameterization. 
40 This assumption means that the Estonian government, being the member of the EU, 
does not care about citizens in other member states.  
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this means that taxing alcohol does not reduce only drinking but it also curbs 
the demand for leisure, misdemeanors and crimes. The agent's choice to take a 
number of drunk driving trips or commit offenses against persons entails 
expected penalties equal to  and , respectively. Both,  and  denote 
non-pecuniary penalties per unlawful act. These penalties can be interpreted as 
the product of probability of being convicted per act and penalty per act. 
Health risks  capture the risk of taking ill, as well as the risk of getting 
injured, disabled or killed. It is a quasi-concave function of crimes and mis-
demeanors committed by agents themselves and by others (variables with bar). 
Health risks are also affected by alcohol drinking directly, by causing internal 
illnesses. Although it is known that in moderate quantities alcohol consumption 
could also have positive impact on peopleʼs health, here this possibility is 
ignored. This basically means that when alcohol taxation reduces alcohol 
consumption, reduction in the prevalence of alcohol-related illnesses occurs as 
well. Considering one of the world highest drinking level in Estonia this seems 
reasonable assumption. It should be also noted that in this model there is no 
need to consider how different alcoholic beverages have different roles in 
causing negative effects because the aim of the thesis is to evaluate average 
level of optimal alcohol taxation. In practice, obviously, some beverages 
probably have more important role and even the alcohol content is not always 
decisive. Therefore, although finding optimal level of tax rate for each beverage 
separately is certainly an important issue it stays above the scope of the thesis.  
Finally, health risks depends on the level of government expenditure per one 
medical case, denoted as . The latter is assumed to determine the quality of me-
dical services, which are assumed to be free for individuals. Therefore the higher 
quality of medical services improves chances for recovery and alleviates health 
risks41. 
                                                     
41 One probably notices that the level of medical expenditure is the only type of public 
spending that directly (through health risks) affects the utility of representative 
consumer. As is shown below, the government is assumed to finance spending on safety 
through the criminal justice system and public transfers. Thus, at first sight it may seem 
peculiar that consumerʼs utility is unaffected by these expenditures. However, it should 
be noticed that public transfers affect consumerʼs utility through the consumerʼs budget. 
As concerns public spending on safety, it is assumed that the level of this spending is 
held constant. Therefore, even if spending on safety would be included in the utility 
function, their role for optimal alcohol taxation policy would be null. However, relaxing 
this constancy assumption would probably produce similar effects as changes in 
medical expenditures. Specifically, the higher level of spending on safety would 
probably raise the safety in a country just as if higher medical spending would raise the 
quality of public medical services. Latter can be interpreted as some type of safety as 
well – more safe to get injured for instance. However, changes in medical expenditure 
probably have stronger effect on consumerʼs behavior (current thesis assumes that 
medical spending also affects consumerʼs labor supply decisions through raising the 
quality of medical services) than changes in spending on safety. For that reason, only 
the former is an allowed changed by the government. However, to authorʼs knowledge 
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There are no pure profits in the production side of the economy. Producer 
prices are fixed and firms pay a gross wage of  that is equal to the value 
marginal product of labor. The effective labor supply  is the product of labor 
supply  and . Changes in  are assumed to affect labor productivity so that < 0. In addition, auto insurance companies charge households the lump-sum 
premium  to cover the costs of auto repair  and . The auto repair costs are 
expressed per one drunk driving trip and per one public drinking incident, 
respectively. To earn zero profit, companies adjust  so that = + . 
Maximizing the utility agent faces the following budget and time constraints: 
 (1 − ) + = ( + ) + + + +   (3.2) 
 ( ) = +         (3.3) 
 
In (2)  is tax rate on alcohol,  is tax rate on labor,  and  are pecuniary 
penalties on drunk driving and public drinking, while  is a producer price of 
alcohol and  is government transfer payment. It should be noted that as 
producer price  is assumed to be fixed, this automatically means that alcohol 
tax  is completely shifted on to consumers in terms of higher tax-inclusive 
market price + . This assumption is related to the perfect competition 
assumption in general, as under this kind of market form long run supply is 
completely elastic with respect to price (i.e. supply curve is horizontal) and the 
burden of taxation is borne by consumers42. In addition,  in (3.3) is time 
endowment, divided between labor and leisure, and is a decreasing function in 
health risks. The latter means that as alcohol-related health risks are higher, the 
time available to agents shortens due to being disabled or dying prematurely. 
As it is see from (3.2), the model does not incorporate value added tax 
(VAT). This certainly requires some clarification. At first sight it could be said 
that the inclusion of value added tax is not essentially necessary as by designing 
optimal level of alcohol taxation the key issue concerns relative prices of 
alcohol. VAT in Estonia imposes uniform ad valorem rate 20% on most goods, 
including alcoholic beverages, which means that identical tax wedges are 
created for most commodities. No distortions arises across most of the com-
modities and value added tax can be ignored in this respect. However, there is 
one important issue that must be dealt with. Specifically, since according to the 
Value Added Tax Act (Käibemaksuseadus) in Estonia the tax base for VAT 
includes excise tax, it follows that VAT basically taxes excise tax43. What it 
                                                                                                                                  
there is no reliable evidence on how public spending interacts with labor supply. 
Therefore, the main idea is just to capture these interactions in this model and the type 
of spending is not the most important issue here. 
42 This assumption was discussed in the subchapter 1.2. 
43 For example, if the producer price without taxes is 10 EUR and excise tax is 2 EUR, 
which raises the price to 12 EUR, then VAT according to rate prevailing in Estonia 
(20%) will be 2.4 EUR. The final price therefore would be 14.4 EUR. VAT for the same 
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means is that when excise tax increases, the final price increases even more, 
given the assumption of 100% tax shifting on to prices. Specifically, raising 
excise rate by 5 EUR per liter of pure alcohol, for instance, alcohol prices in 
Estonia will rise by 6.0 EUR. This 6.0 EUR is divided between excise tax 
(5.0 EUR) and VAT (1.0 EUR). Therefore, variable  rather reflects the latter 
than the former. Specifically,  consists of excise tax and the proportion of 
VAT arising from taxing the excise tax. Although in the theoretical model there 
is no variable reflecting the VAT, it can and is taken into account when policy 
implications from the empirical simulations are drawn.  
The consumer's maximization problem yields the following first-order 
conditions:  
 = + + ·  ,  = + + ·    (3.4a) 
 = + · ,  = · + ,  = (1 − )     
 = − + (1 − )( + )      (3.4b) 
 
In (4) it is normalized, so that − = − = 1. In addition, λ is marginal 
utility of income and  denotes the marginal private cost of health risks. The 
latter consists of direct disutility from suffering , the value of reduced life 
expectancy (1 − ) , and lost wages from lower productivity (1 − t )W . 
It is seen from (3.4) that the agent increases alcohol consumption to the point 
where the marginal benefit received from the last drinking unit is equal to the 
tax-inclusive alcohol price and marginal private health cost. Similarly, 
misdemeanors and criminal offenses are committed until expected marginal 
benefit equals expected government penalties and marginal private health cost. 
Individuals also equate marginal benefit from leisure with net wage. (3.4a) and 
(3.4b) practically show that agent is assumed to be rational and possesses 
perfect information regarding drinking consequences. It means that in addition 
to tax-inclusive market price she or he pays for alcohol, agent also internalizes 
expected penalties as well as internal morbidity and mortality costs arising from 
alcohol consumption, drunk driving, public drinking and offences. As a result 
these variables do not appear in the optimal tax formula below that includes 
only external effects borne by agent.  
The government faces the following budget constraint:  
 
                                                                                                                                  
commodity without excise taxation would be 2.0 EUR and the final price would be 12.0 
EUR. Therefore, additional tax burden arises equal to 20% of excise tax (in this 
example 0.40 EUR).  
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+ ( − ) + ( − ) + + = ( − )( + ) +  
         (3.5a) 
 = ( , , , )                                                                                (3.5b) 
 
The right side of the equation (3.5) indicates that government receives revenues 
from two different sources. The government first gets revenues from alcohol 
taxation, less administrative cost per liter of pure alcohol. Legal alcohol 
purchases are divided between consumption by local drinkers  and purchases 
by tourists . The government also collects labor taxes. In addition to transfer 
payments, total revenue is used for three purposes. First, government finances 
public medical expenditures , where  is the number of medical cases, i.e. 
it is the number of medical conditions that an agent has, including only such 
conditions that government finances treatment of. Medical cases are defined by 
the function that increases in all its arguments. Secondly, government finances 
the criminal justice system, which includes costs of proceedings in cases of 
drunk driving  and public drinking , less pecuniary penalties, as well as 
proceeding costs in cases involving offenses against persons . It means that 
all costs in government budget except transfers are expressed as the product of 
average cost per incident and the number of incidents. In optimizing alcohol 
policy, externalities borne by foreign agents are ignored, while possible losses 
or gains to local agents arising from public use of tax revenues derived from 
alcohol purchases by tourists is taken into account. 
In the model described above, increasing the alcohol tax brings several 
welfare effects. Before the optimal level of alcohol tax is obtained formally, the 
effects of alcohol taxation are followed intuitively in Figure 11. It is shown that 
increasing the tax reduces alcohol consumption, which in turn curbs drunk 
driving, public drinking, and offenses against persons. Accordingly, these 
effects improve the health of individuals by preventing a number of injuries and 
fatalities. A decrease in excessive alcohol consumption also has a direct effect 
on the health of individuals by lessening the incidence of internal illnesses. 
Negative health effects which would have been caused to other people by 
drinkers and are prevented due to increased taxes, termed as reduced health 
externalities in Figure 11, are regarded as the efficiency gain from reduced 
external costs. It must be also noted that resulting cost savings to the fiscal and 
auto insurance systems are included into the total efficiency gain, denoted as 
reduced fiscal and insurance externalities in Figure 11.    
A second type of welfare gain arises from reduced preexisting tax distortions 
in the labor market. Specifically, reduction in drinking is expected to decrease 
leisure demand and consequently increase labor supply. In addition, preexisting 
tax distortions in the labor market are also reduced through the fiscal system. 
This arises due to the assumption that the government keeps its budget balanced 
by adjusting either labor taxes or public spending. Specifically, an increase in 
tax revenues from alcohol tax and cost savings to the health care and criminal 
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justice systems allows reduction of labor taxes, increasing labor supply even 
more. The arrow running from the labor market to the fiscal system reflects the 
fact that any change in labor supply affects revenues from labor taxes and also 
affects the public budget. 
Alternatively, if – instead of cutting labor taxes – the improved budget 
position is used to increase public spending, efficiency gains may arise from 
such spending. This efficiency gain could be amplified if public spending 
interacts with labor supply choices by increasing labor supply. There is of 
course the possibility that these revenues might be used in a wasteful way, in 
which case efficiency gain would fail to arise from this channel.   




Figure 11. Welfare effects of alcohol taxation 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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Finally, there is an arrow running from “better health” to “labor market”. This 
denotes the fact that peopleʼs better health increases their productivity. As a 
consequence, their wage as well as the time they are available for work increases, 
resulting in an additional efficiency gain, identified as on-the-job-productivity.   
   
 
3.2.2. Optimal tax policy 
 
This section derives optimal alcohol policy formulas. Throughout the 
optimization, it is assumed that government aims to maximize the utility of the 
agent by finding the optimal level of , given the level of , ,  and . At 
the same time, the government must keep its budget balanced. To do that, it can 
change the tax rate on labor  or resource cost per medical case . Optimal 
policy formulas for both alternatives are derived. 
Differentiating the indirect utility function with respect to , allowing 
changes in  or  to keep the government budget balanced, equating the 
resulting equation with zero and solving for , gives the following optimal tax 
formula (see derivation in Appendix 7):    
    ∗ = + + − +        (3.6a) 
 
where 
 = + ( + · ) +  ( + · ) + ·+ ,        (3.6b) 
  = (1 + μ )(μ + ) − μ 1 − ( ) − + ,  
 = (1 + μ )(1 + ) 1 − ( ) − ( − ) ,  
 = (1 + μ )(1 + ) ( )( )( )  , 
 = (1 + μ )(1 + ) − ,  ( = , )  
 
It is seen from (3.6a) that the optimal tax on alcohol contains five components. 
 is the Pigouvian tax that captures the externalities that alcohol abusers 
impose on others, less marginal resource costs required to administer alcohol 
taxes. More specifically, there are marginal external costs  borne by third 
parties through the fiscal system. These costs are divided into three different 
categories. First are costs to the health care system due to alcohol consumption, 
drunk driving and public drinking, expressed as resource cost per medical case 
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, multiplied by marginal medical case of alcohol consumption, marginal case 
of drunk driving or marginal case of public drinking, respectively. Second are 
costs to the criminal justice system expressed as resource cost per incident of 
drunk driving , public drinking  and offense , less pecuniary penalty. 
Third are costs that have to be borne by the government in order to collect 
alcohol tax , expressed per liter of pure alcohol.  
The Pigouvian component also includes the marginal private health cost · ,  ·  and · , that individuals must face due to others' 
drunk driving, others' offenses and others' public drinking, respectively. 
Property damage due to traffic accidents  and  are expressed per drunk 
driving trip and per public drinking incident, respectively. This shows up in the 
agent's budget in terms of higher insurance premiums, charged by auto 
insurance companies.  
Almost each term in  is multiplied by either ,  or  in order to 
express them in terms of per unit reduction in alcohol consumption. Only 
marginal medical cost of alcohol consumption and administrative costs per liter 
of pure alcohol are expressed simply as  and , since both are already in 
the appropriate form. On the other hand, this kind of representation reflects that 
the responsiveness of alcohol-related harm with respect to alcohol price is 
expressed as relative responsiveness compared to responsiveness of alcohol 
consumption. As was discussed in subchapter 1.3, regardless of the employment 
of representative agent model, heterogeneity of drinkers can be taken into 
account. For instance, assuming that only moderate drinkers are responsive to 
price, meaning that = = = 0, corresponding terms in the 
Pigouvian component turn out to be zero. As a result, the rationale to tax 
alcohol on externality basis almost disappears because the taxation would only 
cause deadweight loss without correcting external costs of alcohol. 
It should be also noticed that < 0, otherwise optimal policy formula 
would not make a sense as the denominator of any fraction cannot have the 
value zero. This is only natural assumption because when ≥ 0 then 
intuitively it follows that optimal alcohol tax would be practically infinity since 
tax revenues could be increased without any limit.  
Quantities of drinking, drunk driving and public drinking in optimal tax 
formula are given as follows: 
 =        (3.7) 
 
where = , , , , . It means that constant elasticity with respect to 
alcohol price is assumed. The superscript zero denotes the initial quantities for 
 and initial tax rate for . 
There is one very important issue concerning Pigouvian component in (3.6). 
It is well known that in partial equilibrium approach this is usually the only 
rationale to tax alcohol. So, all terms of Pigouvian tax in (3.6), except the last 
108 
one, are the components of the classical Pigouvian tax, reflecting marginal 
external costs of alcohol, and could have been captured also by traditional 
partial equilibrium model. The last term , however, extends the concept 
of Pigouvian tax in this thesis. It captures the increase in resources required by 
government for administering the raise in excise rates. The additional 
administrative burden is expected to arise mainly due to monitoring and 
hindering activities undertaken by taxpayers to reduce illegally the tax burden. 
It is easy to see that this term is negative as it is assumed that < 0. It means 
that under very high marginal administrative costs of alcohol tax Pigouvian 
component could also become negative because this last term may exceed rest 
of the terms in Pigouvian tax.  
The second component of optimal tax is the revenue-recycling effect, 
denoted as . It captures changes in both tax revenues and alcohol-related 
public expenditures, induced by alcohol tax. To be more specific, the first two 
terms of this component reflect marginal tax revenue, net of marginal 
administrative costs, and expressed per unit reduction in alcohol consumption 
(by domestic agents). The third term reflects savings in expenditures by the 
criminal justice system and health care system. As regards the role of price 
responsiveness of locals' alcohol consumption: the lower it is, the greater the tax 
revenue from alcohol taxation as well as overall revenue-recycling effects. 
The third component  is the tax-interaction effect that – together with 
revenue-recycling effect – forms the fiscal component44. It arises from change 
in the labor supply, induced by raising the alcohol price relative to leisure. It is 
important to understand here that this change in labor supply due to higher 
alcohol prices can arise only among drinkers. The strongest effect could be 
expected to occur among frequent drinkers. While rare drinkers are not strongly 
affected, abstainers do not buy alcohol at all and are not therefore affected. 
When alcohol and leisure are complements or weak substitutes for drinkers, the 
alcohol tax increases the labor supply, and the tax-interaction effect is positive. 
Under weak substitutability, labor supply increases, because the income effect 
that is also caused by the rise in alcohol tax more than offsets the substitution 
effect. Income effect increases labor supply as leisure is assumed to be a normal 
good, which means that < 0. Formally, labor supply increases as long as < 0 or 0 < < | |. If alcohol and leisure were strong substitutes, 
raising the alcohol tax would decrease alcohol consumption as well labor supply 
and labor tax revenue. In this case, the tax interaction component would 
obviously be negative. 
                                                     
44 It should be noted that the foreign benefit component, described below, arises purely 
through fiscal system as well. Therefore it basically provides an additional fiscal 
rationale to tax alcohol. However, to bring out the role of tourists more clearly, this 
thesis defines the fiscal component as the sum of revenue-recycling and tax-interaction 
components. 
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Fourth is the productivity effect , expressed  per unit reduction in alcohol 
consumption. This arises since taxing alcohol reduces drinking overall, to 
include public drinking, drunk driving and alcohol-related crimes. As a result, 
consequences of these activities such as internal diseases and external harm 
inflicted on others are also decreased. This means that individuals have better 
health and longer life spans. Both have a positive effect on effective labor 
supply.  
Finally, there is the additional component reflecting changes in tax revenues 
from alcohol purchases by tourists, termed as foreign benefit effect . It is 
expressed per unit change in alcohol consumption by local drinkers, net of 
administrative costs. Although the foreign benefit effect has characteristics 
similar to the revenue-recycling effect, since in both cases revenues are recycled 
either to reduce labor tax or increase public spending, there is one important 
difference. While marginal tax revenue from drinking by locals does not 
improve efficiency per se, marginal tax revenue from tourists does. More 
specifically, the former simply shifts resources within society from households 
to government, while the latter directly reflects an addition to the community's 
welfare that is complemented by a possible efficiency gain from the use of these 
revenues.  
Multipliers in front of each component except Pigouvian tax account for 
efficiency gain achieved either by reducing labor taxes or increasing medical 
expenditures. It should be noted that µ  in (3.6) is the dummy variable that 
integrates tax policies with labor tax and public spending adjustments into one 
equation. For this purpose, µ = 1 and µ = 0. In case of =  the multi-
plier in front of the revenue-recycling component simplifies to . The 
multipliers of the following components simplify to 1 + .  is 
marginal efficiency gain from reducing labor tax, defined as the marginal 
deadweight loss of labor tax per marginal tax revenue (defined formally in 
Appendix 7). Deadweight loss is expressed as the product of the wedge between 
the gross wage and net wage  and reduction in labor supply . Therefore: 
when alcohol policy enables a reduction of labor tax, efficiency gain can be 
achieved in terms of reduced deadweight loss.  
In the case of = , tax policy with a public spending adjustment is 
implemented, meaning that marginal tax revenue and savings in alcohol-related 
public expenditures are used to increase . As a result, the revenue-recycling 
effect comprises the multiplier (1 + ) 1 + − 1 , and tax-inter-
action, productivity and foreign benefit components comprise (1 + ) 1 +).  is the marginal efficiency gain from marginal medical 
expenditures, and  is the multiplier effect of government medical expenditures 
(both defined formally in Appendix 7). The former reflects the value of one 
additional euro to the agent, spent on medical services, per medical case, minus 
one euro. This effect arises from changes in the labor supply caused by change 
in medical expenditures. As regards the latter, the numerator of the first term in 
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 expresses increase in government medical expenditure due to marginal 
increase in . This is obtained by differentiating  with respect to . The 
same term is included into the denominator, except that an additional term, 
denoted by  is added. The latter, while reflecting marginal labor tax 
revenue, arises from change in labor supply as labor supply decisions are 
affected by changes in the level of . Therefore,  basically indicates that 
raising  by one euro requires resources of less than one euro. The reason is 
that this kind of spending policy returns part of the resources through an 
increase in labor tax revenue after it has increased labor supply. It should be 
also noted that as it is reasonable to assume that > > 0, it is also 
obtained that  0 < < 1. 
Following the optimal policy formula derived above guarantees that the 
utility of representative agent is maximized. However, another related question 
concerns changes in overall welfare if current tax were adjusted to attain 
optimal level. The formula for overall welfare gain was obtained by combining 
optimal tax formula and marginal welfare effects of alcohol tax, and integrating 
over the entire tax increase (see Appendix 7): 
 = (1 + μ )(1 + ) ( − ∗)    (3.8) 
 
In (3.8) it is seen that welfare gain consists of the difference between optimal 
and prevailing tax rate, multiplied by tax induced change in alcohol. 
 
 
3.3. Empirical simulation 
 
3.3.1. Parameterization of the model 
 
Baseline principles and procedures 
In this section, parameter values and their derivation is described. All values 
were estimated for 2009 if not stated otherwise. At first, the most plausible 
numerical values were assigned to all parameters in order to obtain mid-range 
estimates for optimal tax. Acknowledging uncertainty in several parameter 
values both extreme case and variable-by-variable sensitivity analysis was 
carried out. In case of variable-by-variable sensitivity analysis, the effect of 
change in a certain parameter was separately examined. This concerns variables 
such as price elasticity of alcohol demand, marginal administrative cost of 
alcohol tax, efficiency gain from public spending and a parameter reflecting 
interaction between public spending and the labor market. Although difficult to 
quantify, all these parameters are of special interest in this thesis. While 
estimates obtained under the most plausible parameter values were labeled as 
the mid estimates, in the extreme case sensitivity analysis also low and high 
values were applied to obtain a lower and upper bound on optimal policy. Low 
parameter values are interpreted here as parameter values that – compared with 
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the mid value – decrease optimal tax. In contrast, computations based on high 
values reflect the upper limit of tax rates. To find upper and lower limit, a ±30% 
variation is allowed for the majority of variables, so that parameters values 
under mid-range estimates were multiplied by 1.3 and 0.7, respectively (precise 
values under all three scenarios can be found in Appendices 4 and 5). 
As regards to all price elasticities other than the elasticity of touristsʼ 
demand (see Appendix 6), a somewhat different logic was followed. Speci-
fically, while the range was chosen based on evidence in the literature, high 
price responsiveness was assumed in order to obtain low estimates for optimal 
policy and vice versa, regardless of their influence on optimal level of taxation. 
Although higher price responsiveness of violence, for instance, contrary to 
higher alcohol demand elasticity suggests higher tax on alcohol, it is reasonable 
to assume that under high alcohol demand responsiveness, the same applies to 
crime and misdemeanors as well. Therefore, under low optimal tax estimates 
elasticities are assumed to be at the upper bound. In case of tourists, however, 
under the low estimates scenario low elasticity and under high estimates 
scenario high elasticity was applied. This is reasonable as due to a high level of 
optimal taxation obtained under high parameter values, tourists are obviously 
more responsive to prices compared with optimal policy obtained under low 
parameter values. 
In addition to the mid, low and high estimates, one additional scenario was 
applied, labeled as the black market, border trade and home production scenario 
or the BH scenario. Specifically, although allowing administrative costs per liter 
of pure alcohol to increase, improves the ability of the government to deal with 
the potential expansion of the illegal alcohol market, in practice the latter cannot 
be eradicated completely. Secondly, just like Finns purchasing alcohol in 
Estonia, Estonians may buy more alcohol abroad. This applies especially to 
people living in the northeastern and southern region, bordered by Russia and 
Latvia, respectively. And thirdly, there is a great chance that the tax increase 
induces people to produce alcohol beverages in their own households. For 
example, according to Hein et al. (2010), 6–12% of drinkers in Estonia produce 
alcoholic beverages such as wine and beer at home. All these potential 
occurrences pose a question of whether and how the results would change under 
these circumstances.  
In principle, a few adjustments must be made for the BH scenario compared 
with parameter values applied to the mid scenario. First, as there would be a good 
substitute commodity available in terms of tax-free illegal alcohol, cheaper 
foreign alcohol or own-produced alcohol, price elasticity of legal alcohol demand 
on the part of locals would be higher. Second, under this kind of substitution, 
there would be no decrease in total alcohol consumption as we observe in the 
local legal alcohol market. Therefore, the government could find it difficult to 
achieve savings in respect to alcohol-related costs (denoted by  in optimal tax 
formula) because misdemeanors, felonies and health effects would now partially 
be caused by consumption of alcohol acquired from other sources. The same 
applies to the on-the-job-productivity, cost savings in the auto insurance system 
112 
and external private health costs included in Pigouvian component. Therefore, 
under the BH scenario lower values for corresponding parameters should be 
applied. Third, if reduction in total alcohol consumption were hindered, it would 
probably have the same effect on labor supply incentives. This means that the tax-
interaction effect would be smaller. This can be captured by employing lower 
value for alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity .  
All these adjustment are made in order to obtain estimates for optimal level 
of alcohol taxation under the BH scenario. Specifically, regardless of great 
reduction in alcohol consumption it is designed to indicate that approximately 
half of reduced consumption comes back in terms of illegal, imported or home-
produced alcohol (for specific parameter values see Appendices 4, 5 and 6). It 
should be noticed that the low estimate accounts for these possibilities as well – 
compared with the mid scenario, the low scenario applies higher alcohol 
demand elasticities of locals, 30% lower values for cost parameters and 
marginal effects of alcohol consumption, and assumes that alcohol and leisure 
are substitutes. The main difference, however, compared with the BH scenario 
concerns lower touristsʼ alcohol elasticity and non-zero marginal administrative 
cost of alcohol tax45. Therefore, while the low estimates simply give the lower 
boundary for optimal taxation level, which could arise also from illegal and 
border trade or from home production, the BH scenario is specifically designed 
to illustrate the sensitivity of optimal taxation level to considerable expansion in 
these activities. 
All the calculations were carried out in a computer spreadsheet program. As 
it appears in (3.6), the optimal tax formula is an implicit equation, which means 
that the optimal tax rate is affected by its own value. In other words, alcohol tax 
is also in the right hand of the optimal tax formula. Therefore, it was not 
possible to solve the model by just inserting estimated parameter values into the 
formula. In general, the estimation procedures consisted of three steps. At first, 
the formula (3.6) was inserted in the spreadsheet. Secondly, parameter values, 
including a randomly chosen value for alcohol tax, were inserted into the 
respective cells. In order to obtain the desired value for alcohol tax, the 
randomly chosen parameter value of alcohol tax was changed until its value was 
equal to the value of the right hand side of the optimal tax formula. As follows, 
the derivation method and sources of each parameter value is described.  
 
The alcohol market and labor tax 
The current tax rate = 9.4 EUR was estimated by dividing revenue from the 
alcohol tax (Statistics Estonia, 2010a) by the quantity of alcohol sales 
(measured in liters of pure alcohol). Producer price of alcohol = 24.5 EUR 
is the tax-exclusive market price per one liter of pure alcohol. The tax-inclusive 
market price is the weighted average price of beer, wine and spirit, the weights 
being the quantities of different alcoholic beverages sold in liters of 
                                                     
45 Specifically, the BH scenario assumes that government does not employ additional 
resources to deal with the illegal trade, i.e. = 0. 
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corresponding beverage46. Initial alcohol consumption = 9.6 measures total 
consumption of pure alcohol (excluding illegal alcohol) expressed in liters of 
pure alcohol per Estonian. Data pertaining to the alcohol market were obtained 
from the Estonian Institute of Economic Research (Orro et al., 2010) which 
compiles regular alcohol market overviews in Estonia.  
In 2008, the implicit tax rate on labor was 33.7% in Estonia (Eurostat 
2010a). During the recession in 2009, when real GDP decreased by more than 
one tenth, the government carried out some policy changes concerning income 
tax and employment insurance tax to achieve its fiscal goals. As a result, the tax 
rate on labor was probably somewhat higher than in the preceding year. 
Therefore, in this paper = 0.35 is applied. This is still highly conservative, as 
VAT, which can also be considered a tax on labor47, is not taken into account in 
order to follow conservative strategy. Therefore, the efficiency gain obtained 
from reducing labor tax is rather underestimated than overestimated. 
 
Tourism sector 
During the last decade, the Estonian Institute of Economic Research has 
regularly estimated quantities of alcohol bought or consumed by tourists in 
Estonia, using mainly methods such as observations of alcohol shops and 
questioning managers of these shops. Accordingly, it has been estimated that 
tourists have bought 4.4 million liters of pure alcohol in 2009, of which 3.52 
liters was exported and 0.85 liters were consumed in Estonia (Orro et al., 2010). 
This value was also given to parameter that reflects tourists alcohol purchases in 
Estonia – = 4.4. This represents approximately one fourth of total sales in 
Estonian alcohol markets. As regards to price elasticity of alcohol demand by 
tourists, the range from –0.4 to –1.0 was applied. However, in sensitivity 
analysis the range from –0.4 to –2 was examined.     
There is considerable degree of uncertainty in regard with to the price 
responsiveness of tourists. In fact, there is no single empirical estimation conducted 
in order to provide some empirical basis. Therefore, some reasoning follows in 
regard with the choice of relatively low elasticity under alternative estimates. At 
first, it must be noted that in 2009 there were more than 4 million border crossings 
in Estonia performed by foreigners, of whom almost 60% were Finnish. This means 
                                                     
46 Compared with the published paper where = 7.8 was assumed (Saar, 2011), the 
resulting value of producer price here is more than three times higher. This difference 
arises from different estimation methods. Specifically, in order to obtain the value of 
producer price in the published paper, the retail turnover of the alcohol market was 
divided by the total quantity of pure alcohol sold in Estonia, from which = 9.4 was 
subtracted. The level of turnover, however, was most likely underestimated by Statistics 
Estonia. Therefore, this thesis uses an alternative strategy. As a result, the optimal 
taxation level is considerably higher when compared to the results presented in the 
preceding paper. However, this difference in price levels only affects the optimal level 
of taxation but does not change the overall patterns of the results.  
47 Similarly, to labor tax, VAT reduces the price of leisure relative to other commodities 
since it reduces the real wage.   
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that Finnish responsiveness towards alcohol prices is the most relevant to 
understand. Other active visitors were Latvians, Lithuanians, Swedes and Russians, 
representing approximately 30% of the border crossings. Visitors from the Baltic 
States and from Russia, however, are not relevant as in these countries alcohol 
prices are even lower than in Estonia. In Finland, on the other hand, prices of 




Figure 12. Prices of alcoholic beverages in Tallinn and Helsinki 
Source: Orro et al. (2010), compiled by the author 
 
 
In addition, since Estonia’s accession to the EU in 2004, people in northern 
countries face an opportunity to bring relatively large quantities of alcoholic 
beverages to their home country without paying additional excise taxes. Due to 
great differences in price levels, this new opportunity is rather attractive. This is 
also supported by empirics. Specifically, although in 2004 the Finnish government 
reduced tax rates on alcohol approximately by one third, touristsʼ alcohol purchases 
in Estonia grew considerably. According to estimates by the Estonian Institute of 
Economic Research (Orro et al., 2010), compared with 2003, quantities of alcohol 
exported by tourists increased by two times from 1.9 to 4.0 million liters of pure 
alcohol. In subsequent years this figure has somewhat decreased, being at minimum 
level in 2008 when 3.1 million liters were sold to tourists. There may be several 
reasons for this trend including the rise in general price level in Estonia due to the 
economic boom experienced in these years, but also more expensive transport can 
play some role due to the rise in the price of ferry tickets.  
Although in 2008 and 2010 alcohol taxes were raised in Estonia, similar policy 
changes were carried out in Finland in 2008 and 2009 (Hämäläinen et al., 2010). As 
a result, regardless of tax changes in both countries during the last five years, price 
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differences have not decreased as is shown in Figure 12. In fact, alcohol export by 
tourists increased in 2009 compared with the preceding year by more than one 
tenth. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that unless alcohol prices rise 
considerably more than 50%, in which case the price difference would decrease to 
less than 50%, touristsʼ price responsiveness remains low. However, the critical 
level of this difference is unknown. It is also important to notice that price 
difference depends not only on policy implemented in Estonia. Even if the Estonian 
government would increase taxes appreciably, as long as the price difference 
remains large due to tax policy carried out by the Finnish government, tourists 
probably find their way to Estonia. Surely, there are many other factors, such as 
transportation issues, that may affect touristsʼ intentions as well, these 
considerations, however, stay beyond the scope of this thesis. Even then, future 
research should definitely pay more attention to revealing clearly touristsʼ behavior 
in order to provide more arguments concerning fiscal revenues from alcohol 
purchases as well as from other spending made by tourists.  
 
Misdemeanors and serious crimes 
Data about registered misdemeanors were drawn from the Estonian Police and 
Border Guard Board (2010), and data about registered crimes were drawn from 
the Ministry of Justice of Estonia (2010) through personal communication. 
Deriving empirical estimates about the total number of alcohol-related 
misdemeanors, it was assumed that 5% of all misdemeanors are registered. In 
the case of crime, a detection rate of 90% was applied. This means that =191,520 and that  = 306,460 was obtained by multiplying the registered 
number of drunk driving and public drinking incidents by 20, and = 1,856 
was obtained by multiplying the registered number of crimes by 1.11.  
It was estimated that = 28.8 EUR and = 9.6 EUR. Both represent half 
of the maximum penalty rate that can be charged in Estonia on the basis of the 
Traffic Act (Liiklusseadus) and Alcohol Act (Alkoholiseadus), adjusted to 
reflect penalty per committed act. To be more specific,  is the penalty rate per 
drunk driving trip and  is the penalty rate per public drinking incident. 
Cost parameters regarding auto repair due to drunk driving = 47.1 EUR 
and public drinking = 23.6 EUR were estimated based on data from 
Statistics Estonia (2011b). More specifically, alcohol-related motor third party 
liability insurance gross claims, attributed equally to drunk drivers and public 
drinkers, were divided by the number of drunk driving trips and public drinking 
incidents, respectively. Association with alcohol was created through an alcohol 
attributed fraction that is equal to 0.42, the same that was used in chapter 2 for 
social cost estimates.  
 
Marginal effects 
Appendix 4 comprises values for parameters that reflect marginal effects of 
drinking, drunk driving, public drinking and offenses. To obtain figures for 
marginal medical cases, medical cases attributed to alcohol were first found, 
using the total number of medical cases registered by the Estonian Health 
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Insurance Fund (2010) and attributable fractions in Appendices 1 and 2. 
Secondly, alcohol-related medical cases were divided into four categories – 
traffic injuries caused by drunk drivers, traffic injuries caused by pedestrians, 
injuries related to offenses, and by diseases. In the case of traffic accidents, it 
was assumed that three fourth of alcohol-related traffic injuries were caused by 
drunk drivers and one fourth by pedestrians. Medical cases in the fourth 
category were considered to be the consequence of drinking of alcohol. The 
third step was to subtract the number of medical cases that will be canceled out 
due to premature mortality. Data obtained from Estonian Health Insurance Fund 
(2011) showed that in 2009 there were 2.6 medical cases per inhabitant in 
Estonia. Therefore, each death practically reduces the burden to health care 
sector by saving costs of treating these 2.6 medical cases. It means that the final 
number of medical cases in each category is expected to reflect the number of 
medical cases attributed to alcohol, net of medical cases prevented by alcohol. 
The fourth step was to divide the number of alcohol related medical cases in 
each category by the total number of respective alcohol-related acts. For 
example, in case of  the number of medical cases in the fourth category was 
divided by the amount of alcohol consumed by Estonians in 2009, including 
alcohol bought from the black market (0.6 liters of pure alcohol per capita). 
Therefore, the estimated value for = 0.0066 applies to both legal and illegal 
alcohol, as it is assumed that there is no difference between legal and illegal 
alcohol regarding the generation of externalities. To estimate , , , the 
number of alcohol-related medical cases of drunk driving, public drinking and 
offenses were divided by the total number of drunk driving trips, incidents of 
public drinking, and offenses, respectively. 
In essence, this kind of derivation method to derive marginal medical cases 
means that marginal and average values are assumed to be equal. However: it is 
reasonable to assume in practice that as alcohol consumption, drunk driving or the 
number of crimes committed increase, marginal alcohol-related externality also 
increases. In such a case, this assumption underestimates marginal effects and 
yields conservative estimates for Pigouvian as well revenue-recycling components. 
There is another block of parameters in Appendix 4 comprising marginal on-
the-job-productivity costs and marginal private costs, both borne by individuals 
through marginal health risks. Based on 2006 data, in chapter 2 productivity 
costs due to the lower state of health of alcohol abusers were estimated to be 
EUR 13.52 million, and productivity costs due to disability costs that arise from 
both permanent and temporary disability attributed to alcohol to be EUR 32.91 
million. Accordingly, total workplace productivity cost is estimated as EUR 
46.43 million and productivity costs per liter of pure alcohol = 3.61 EUR.  
As defined hereinbefore, marginal private costs  that enter the Pigouvian 
component comprise direct disutility from suffering, the value of reduced life-
expectancy and lost wages from lower productivity. All three components must 
be estimated in order to obtain · , ·  and · , and 
separately for all three parameters. Starting with the latter component, it was 
estimated in chapter 2 that offenses against persons and traffic accidents 
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account for 4.6% and 7.4% of disability costs48, respectively. According to these 
proportions, total workplace productivity costs due to the agent's drunk driving 
is estimated to be EUR 2.44 million and EUR 1.51 million due to offenses. In 
case of the latter, all costs were considered as external. In case of the former, 
however, applying the same proportions as was derived for traffic fatalities in 
the chapter 2, it was assumed that three fourth of traffic-related external health 
costs attributed to alcohol have been caused by motor-vehicle drivers of which 
43% are assumed to be external49. Although one fourth of traffic-related health 
costs were assumed to be caused by pedestrians, all of them were considered as 
internal (meaning that = 0). Dividing total productivity costs by the 
number of drunk driving trips and offenses committed, values for  and 
, respectively, were obtained.  
While disutility from suffering was excluded, the monetary value of reduced 
life expectancy was obtained from Saar (2009). He has estimated that 
productivity losses due to alcohol-related premature mortality ranged from EUR 
142 million to EUR 247 million in 2006. Dividing the lower value by alcohol-
related deaths in the same year produces a figure of EUR 0.56 million. This was 
chosen to reflect the value of life. To find the reduced value of life expectancy 
due to offenses, the value of lost life was multiplied by the number of alcohol-
related homicides, and the resulting value was divided by the total number of 
alcohol-related assaults. Finally, to obtain  · = 1 872 EUR, the sum of 
monetary values of reduced life expectancy and lost wages per alcohol-related 
assault was multiplied by (1 − ). ·  was derived analogously, with the caveat that just as in case of on-
job-productivity only 43% of fatalities were considered as externalities. This 
means that 57% of alcohol-related traffic accidents caused by drivers were 
assumed to have been caused by the victims themselves. For example, a drunk 
driver may have driven off the road or crashed into a tree. It is assumed that all 
accidents caused by pedestrians only pedestrians themselves are injured or 
killed, so that · = 0. 
 
Government resource costs 
Appendix 5 is comprised of variables indicating resource costs to government. 
As regards to costs to the criminal justice and health care systems, estimates 
were derived analogously to estimates presented in chapter two, applying the 
same alcohol-attributable fractions by updating the results for 2009. Only those 
costs, which were needed for optimal policy formula application, have been 
updated. Total costs attributed to alcohol by different categories are presented in 
                                                     
48 These proportions are derived based on temporary disability costs but are applied also 
to permanent disability costs here. No data was available about permanent disability by 
type of external causes. 
49 The value of 43% is obtained by combining the following figures: 32.1% of fatalities 
attributed to alcohol are external (see note 34), three fourth of alcohol-related deaths 
caused by drivers (i.e. 0.32/0.75 = 0.43). 
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Table 12. In order to obtain values for parameters in Appendix 5, total costs 
were divided by the total number of respective cases. In the case of the criminal 
justice system, costs to the Police and Border Guard Board, the Courts of the 
first and second instance and the Prosecutor's Office and Prisons were included. 
In short, operating costs per alcohol-related activity (expressed as initiated 
proceedings or registered crime etc.) engaged in by these institutions was 
computed in order to estimate resource costs attributed to alcohol. It was also 
assumed that in Police and Border Guard Board proceedings, one misdemeanor 
requires 20% more resources than processing a criminal offense. 
To obtain court costs, initiated proceedings were weighted by the duration of 
different types of proceedings to differentiate between misdemeanors and 
criminal offenses. Otherwise, it was assumed that all activities entail proportio-
nally equal costs within an institution. The data for the year 2009 was obtained 
from the Ministry of Justice of Estonia (2010) and from the Estonian Police and 
Border Guard Board (2010). Average cost to the health care system per medical 
case was estimated based on data about total costs by different alcohol-related 
diseases. Data was obtained from the Estonian Health Insurance Fund (2010) 
through personal communication.  
 
 
Table 12. Alcohol-related fiscal costs updated for 2009 
 
Drinking consequences Costs (mln EUR) 
Health care system    
   Offence injuries 
   Transport injuries 
   Other diseases                     
   
    0.41 
    0.69 
 10.10 
Criminal justice system 
   Proceeded offences against persons 
  
   7.71 
   Proceeded drunk driving incidences     4.91 
   Proceeded public drinking incidences    5.90 
Source: Authorʼs calculations 
 
 
Resource costs for the Tax and Customs Board in respect to alcohol taxation 
were found by taking the share of total operating costs of the Tax Board 
proportional to the ratio of alcohol tax revenues to total tax revenue, and 
dividing this by alcohol sales in liters of pure alcohol. In the last row, marginal 
costs due to the increase in tax rate are presented. Although administrative costs 
of alcohol taxation were estimated to represent only 0.9% of alcohol tax 
revenue, a marginal cost figure ten times higher = 0.1 was applied as the 
mid estimate. This means that by increasing the tax rate by one euro, the Tax 
Board increases its expenditures by 10 cents per each liter of pure alcohol sold 
on the market. This highly conservative value was applied to take into account 
the possible expansion of the black market, because as the tax rate goes up, the 
more resources the government may require for monitoring. 
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Elasticities 
Elasticities used to derive the optimal tax level are presented in Appendix 6. 
Although there are no studies conducted in Estonia in order to estimate  alcohol 
demand elasticities, there are rather convincing evidence from international 
literature  implying that alcohol consumption elasticity with respect to alcohol 
price lies between –0.4 and –1.0 (see chapter 1). This range was also chosen for 
the present study, and was applied to drinking by locals as well as to alcohol 
purchases by tourists.  Only for black market and border trade scenario demand 
elasticities of both tourists and local drinkers was assumed to be –1.5. Based on 
evidence in literature50 there is no reason to believe that price responsiveness 
would vary considerably across nations. Obviously, cultural, social and econo-
mical factors affect peopleʼs responsiveness to price but it is assumed here that 
this variance stays within the chosen range. For tourists the main issue concerns 
the difference between prices in Estonia and their home country. This point will 
be paid special attention in sensitivity analysis as well as in the discussion section. 
There is empirical evidence that the quantity of criminal offenses or mis-
demeanors committed is responsive to higher alcohol price (Elder et al. 2010, 
Wagenaar et al., 2010). In this paper, the elasticity of both misdemeanors and 
criminal offenses is suggested to lie within the same range as alcohol con-
sumption. Elasticity of drinking with respect to price of leisure was drawn from 
West and Parry (2009) who indicated an interval from –0.12 to 0.08. In this study, 
the interval is widened somewhat and = −0.1 is used as the mid estimate.  
There is a vast body of literature estimating labor supply elasticity. The 
majority of these reports have found it to be inelastic (Evers, et al. 2008). 
Recently, Staehr (2008) applied Estonian data to estimate labor participation 
elasticity and arrives at 0.6. In addition, Staehrʼs (2008) estimates did not reveal 
any significant effect of after-tax wage on working hours of individuals already 
working. As stated by Evers et al. (2008) it has been a typical finding in the 
literature that participating elasticity is higher than elasticity of hours worked. 
Considering this evidence, the present study applies 0.2 to get conservative 
estimates for optimal alcohol tax. The latter gives an outcome of =0.12. There is no scientific evidence that would help to estimate α and . 
0.1 was suggested as the mid estimate. However, a wider range is examined 
under sensitivity analysis.  
The value of income elasticity of labor supply = −0.1 is applied for 
three grounds. At first, leisure is assumed as a normal good meaning that 
elasticity coefficient must be negative. Secondly, while it is a quite frequent 
result in literature that labor supply is inelastic with respect to wage rate, there 
is much more ambiguity as to whether this is due to low or high substitution and 
income effects51 (e.g. see Kimball and Shapiro, 2008). In order to take a neutral 
                                                     
50 See subchapter 1.1.3. 
51 Specifically, with an inelastic labor supply, substitution and income effects must 
completely or almost, cancel each other out. Therefore, they can both be very low or 
even zero, but also very high.  
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view, it is reasonable to assume = −0.1 which means that the income effect 
is assumed to be neither zero or very large. It should be noticed that in regard 
with optimal taxation, this is a conservative choice because the larger the 
absolute value of this elasticity becomes, the higher will be the optimal level of 
taxation due to a greater increase in the labor supply induced by the increase in 
alcohol tax. Third reason to apply this value stems from the fact that the income 
elasticity of the labor supply in this study must reflect labor supply responses of 
drinkers among whom the proportion of women is probably lower than among 
the entire population. This, however, makes a difference due to the well-known 
results from literature that compared with males, the labor supply of females is 
more elastic (Evers, 2008; Kimmel and Kniesner, 1998; Rizzo and Blumenthal, 
1994; Renaud and Siegers, 1984). Relatively high elasticity of women has been 
confirmed with Estonian data as well (Alloja, 2005; Siliverstovs and Koulikov, 
2002). Therefore, the application of a rather low value of income elasticity in 
this model is justified. Finally, one should notice that although the value of this 
elasticity is held constant under all alternative scenarios,  is varied which has 
the same effect as varying 52.  
 
 
3.3.2. Simulation results 
 
Optimal tax policy  
Table 13 presents simulation results. As shown, the mid estimate suggests that 
the optimal tax rate per liter of pure alcohol is EUR 27.9 with a labor tax 
adjustment and EUR 35.2 with the public spending adjustment. Both patently 
exceed the current tax rate. However, the optimal policy is rather sensitive to 
changes in parameter values. Low estimates represent more than 150% and high 
estimates more than 700% of the current tax rate. Nevertheless, even under 
border trade, black market and home production scenario optimal level is more 
than 50% higher than actual rate.  
It may be surprising to find that the Pigouvian component is negative under 
all estimates. The reason is that under all scenarios, a relatively low elasticity of 
alcohol demand was applied that considerably increased the marginal 
administrative cost, with the latter expressed per unit of decreased consumption 
of alcohol. In other words, at the same time that the amount of traffic in alcohol 
monitored by the Tax and Customs Board, doesn't change appreciably, 
administrative costs per liter of pure alcohol increase. The consequence is that 
the marginal increase in administrative costs exceeds marginal external costs, 
producing a negative Pigouvian effect. Examining the structure of the Pigouvian 
component, it appears that regardless of the scenario, more than half of it is 
attributable to property damage due to traffic accidents and external costs borne 
by the fiscal system. 
 
                                                     
52 This can be easily traced from tax-interaction component of the optimal tax in (3.6b). 
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With labor tax adjustment 
With public spending 
adjustment 
BH Low Mid High BH Low Mid High 
PV 2.5  –1.2 –2.6 –11.3 2.7  –1.8  –3.7 –16.9 
RR 1.5 2.6 5.0 14.3 2.2 4.4 9.1 30.7 
TI 1.6 0.0 9.0 32.9 3.9 0.0 11.1 46.5 
PR 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.8 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.0 
FB 8.2 12.2 15.1 10.5 10.4 14.9 17.1 8.4 
Total 14.6 14.5 27.9 48.2 20.0 18.5 35.2 70.7 
Actual in 2009 
Actual in 2010 
9.36 
9.73 
Source: Authorʼs calculations 
 
 
It is easy to see that the great variability in the optimal tax under the alternative 
scenarios is mostly caused by the high level of sensitivity of fiscal and foreign 
components. The variability is caused mainly by differences in price elasticities 
of alcohol demand on the part of locals (from –0.4 to –1) applied to derive low, 
mid and high estimates. This causes tax revenues from alcohol purchases by 
locals to vary, also causing variation in the revenue-recycling component. It 
should be noted here that alcohol-related cost savings represent only 2% to 10% 
of the revenue-recycling component under alternative scenarios, while the 
remaining part is formed by alcohol tax revenues. 
As regards to the tax-interaction component, it disappears completely under 
the low estimate. The reason for this is that under the given parameter values, 
the substitution effect between alcohol and leisure that decreases the labor 
supply is offset by the income effect from the higher alcohol price that, to the 
contrary, increases labor supply. Under high estimates, the tax-interaction effect 
is inflated, so that it alone represents more than half of the total optimal tax rate, 
and together with the revenue-recycling effect, they represent more than 75% of 
it. Tax revenues from alcohol purchases by tourists captured by the foreign 
benefit component play an important role under all three scenarios. Although 
variation in the price responsiveness of the locals and in the overall level of the 
tax rate causes the level of foreign benefit component to vary as well, it is rather 
stable ranging from EUR 8.2 to EUR 17.1 under low, mid and high estimates. 
This stability arises from applying high demand elasticity of tourists under high 
estimates and low elasticity under low estimates.  
Whether an improved budget position is used to reduce labor tax or to 
increase public spending makes a substantial difference only for high estimates 
(see Table 13). As the only difference between these two policies concerns 
marginal efficiency gain parameters, this result was expected. In this paper, 
marginal efficiency gain was suggested to be higher with labor supply 
adjustment (0.12), and a marginal efficiency gain from public spending (0.1) 
was assumed amplified by interactions with labor supply. As a result, a higher 
optimal tax was obtained under this policy. This multiplier effect was especially 
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large under high parameter values, resulting in an optimal tax approximately 
50% higher than would have been the case under labor tax adjustments (EUR 
48.2 and EUR 70.7, respectively).  
 
Effects of optimal tax policy  
Following tax policy proposals presented above, the welfare of people is 
expected to improve. Although this improvement can be expressed in monetary 
terms, which have been quantified below, there are many other related effects. 
As follows, these effects, which arise from moving current tax to its socially 
optimal level, are more closely examined. More specifically, five different tax 
rates were chosen to cover the whole range presented in Table 14. There is no 
rationale to differentiate here between labor tax and public spending adjust-
ments as this make a difference only as regards the welfare gain. 
 
 
Table 14. Non-monetary effects from changes in alcohol tax 
 















Alcohol cons.      
  Locals (th.) –2,473.6 –1,679.4 –3,376.3 –4,203.1 –4,349.8 
  Tourists (th.) –414.8 –237.9 –1,146.6 –1,427.4 –2,810.0 
Cr. and misd. 











  Off. ag. per. –176 –242 –487 –606 –628 
  Dr. driv. (th.) –18.2 –25.0 –50.3 –62.6 –64.7 
Med. cas. (th.) –9.4 –13.0 –26.0 –32.4 –33.6 
Deaths 
  Ext. cs. 
















Source: Authorʼs calculations 
Notes: Alcohol cons. is Alohol consumption, th. is thousands, Cr. and misd. is Crimes 
and misdemeanors, Pub. dr. is Public drinking, Off. ag. per. is Offenses against person, 
Dr. driv. is Drunk driving, Med. cas. is Medical cases, Ext. cs. is External causes, Int. 
cs, is Internal causes.  
 
 
From Table 14 it is shown that following the optimal tax policy under the mid 
estimates, legal alcohol consumption (excluding alcohol acquired via border 
trade or home production) is expected to decrease by approximately 3300–4200 
thousands liters of pure alcohol, that is 2.5–3.1 liters of pure alcohol per capita. 
Raising tax to 70.7 that turned out to be optimal under high estimate with public 
spending adjustment, alcohol consumption would decrease by the same magni-
tude due to lower elasticity applied under this scenario. Touristsʼ alcohol 
purchases are expected to decrease by somewhat more than one fourth under the 
mid estimate and by almost three fourth under the high estimate. As concerns 
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alcohol-related deaths, increasing tax to EUR 70.7 saves only 17 lives that 
otherwise would have been lost due to external effects borne by victims. 
However, this result reflects the highly conservative approach as less than one 
fifth of traffic fatalities and all the deaths related to internal illnesses were 
considered internal. The effect on total mortality is much wider – even a tax 
increase from the current EUR 9.4 to EUR 14.5 would save 136 lives. 
Table 15 presents simulations of the fiscal effects from changes in alcohol 
taxation. It should be noted that only alcohol-related revenues and costs are 
observed. Any improvement or deterioration in the budget position is offset by 
simultaneous change in labor taxes or public spending to keep the budget balanced. 
The effects of the latter have not been considered in Table 15. As it is seen, while a 
rise in the alcohol tax increases tax revenues and administrative costs it also reduces 
revenues from pecuniary penalties and costs to health care and criminal justice. 
Specifically, increasing the current tax to EUR 14.5 under the low parameter values, 
the budget is mainly affected by changes in tax revenues.  
 
 




















  Locals 





















Pec. pen.      
  Dr. driv. –0.5 –0.7 –0.9 –1.8 –1.9 
  Pub. dr. –0.3 –0.5 –0.6 –1.2 –1.2 
COSTS  5.5 14.8 19.1 45.9 
  Crim. justice –1.9 –1.4 –5.4 –6.7 –9.0 
  Med. costs –1.0 –0.7 –2.9 –3.6 –6.2 
  Tax administ. 0 7.6 23.1 29.4 61.1 
NET REVEN. 43.7 53.3 176.2 224.1 500.8 
WELF. GAIN 7.8 5.2 45.3 91.9 290.7 
Source: Authorʼs calculations 
Notes: Pec. pen. is Pecuniary penalties, Dr. driv. is Drunk driving, Pub. dr. is Public 
drinking, Crim. justice is Criminal justice, Tax administ. is Tax administration, Net 
reven. is Net revenues, Med. costs is Medical costs, Welf. gain is Welfare gain; the 
welfare gain arising from the tax increase to EUR 27.9 was estimated under the labor 
tax adjustment and the welfare gain arising from the tax increase above EUR 27.9 was 
estimated under the public spending adjustment. 
 
 
When tax rate is increased further, however, changes in administrative costs 
become larger and larger due to an assumption that tax administration becomes 
more and more complex and more expensive per liter of pure alcohol. 
Complexity is assumed to arise mainly from possible expansion of the black 
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market. Therefore, while under high parameter values the optimal tax on 
alcohol were estimated to be EUR 70.7, this result was obtained by allowing 
government to increase its spending on enforcement activities by EUR 61.1 
million. This means that based on the budget size in 2009, the Tax and Customs 
Board could more than double its budget to deal with illegal alcohol. 
The BH scenario deserves a special attention in order to understand expected 
effects of illegal or border trade as well as home production. It shows that legal 
alcohol consumption, consisting of alcohol acquired only legally from the local 
market, decreases by 2,473.6 thousands of liters of pure alcohol (see Table 14), 
representing 20% of total consumption before the tax increase. However, under 
this scenario alcohol acquired from non-taxable sources partially offsets the 
positive effect arising from reduction in the consumption of taxable alcohol. For 
example, if the tax under the mid scenario were raised to EUR 14.6 per liter of 
pure alcohol, as suggested by the BH estimate, locals would reduce their alcohol 
purchases at the local legal market by 1,221.3 thousands of liters, which is 
roughly two times lower figure than proposed by the BH estimate. As a result, 
instead of collecting tax revenues as much as EUR 30.7 million, this figure 
under the mid scenario with tax increase to EUR 14.6 would be EUR 49.0 
million. Accordingly, the reduction in drinking consequences under the BH 
scenario is roughly two times smaller as well. This is why the optimal taxation 
level is EUR 27.9 per liter of pure alcohol under the mid estimate, instead of 
being EUR 14.6, which turned out to be optimal under the BH scenario. 
Regardless of the scenario, an increase in alcohol taxes is expected to 
improve the fiscal budget. Although it could be questioned whether it is realistic 
to gather additional  EUR 500 million revenues from alcohol taxation as is 
suggested by the high estimates, it should be noted that this result was obtained 
under low price elasticity. Whether this could be a realistic assumption in the 
Estonian context should be addressed in future research. In addition, it is 
interesting to note that while net revenues from an increase in alcohol tax differs 
about ten times under alternative scenarios (i.e. EUR 53.3 and EUR 500.8), 
corresponding variation of welfare gain is more than fifty times (i.e. EUR 5.2 
and EUR 290.7). However, it is only natural that the larger the difference 
between actual and optimal taxation level, relatively more welfare gain there is 
to achieve. These figures also clearly point out that total fiscal effect is much 
larger than welfare gain. This is due to the fact that, tax revenues or cost savings 
becoming efficiency gain assumes their efficient employment.  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
In Figure 13, changes in the optimal tax under mid estimates with respect to 
different elasticities are more closely observed. In the panel on the left, optimal 
tax is decomposed into two parts. The first is the Pigouvian tax and the second 
is the sum of revenue recycling, tax-interaction, foreign benefit and productivity 
effects. As was already inferred above, under inelastic demand, Pigouvian tax 
represents only a marginal part of the tax rate. Similarly to the estimates 
presented in Table 13, it is negative when price elasticity is lower than –1.0. 
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However, the remaining part more than offsets this negativity and almost 
sextuples the tax, compared with the current tax rate. Although the role of other 
than Pigouvian rationale for alcohol taxation is sharply diminished under elastic 
alcohol demand, it still stays greater than the Pigouvian tax. 
The range from –0.5 to –2.0 was chosen to illustrate the sensitivity of 
alcohol tax with respect to changes in the price elasticity of touristsʼ alcohol 
demand (see the right panel of Figure 13). Under inelastic demand, the foreign 
benefit rationale for alcohol taxes alone, amount to the current rate and 
represent more than half of the simulated optimal tax rate. It is also interesting 
to note that under the mid estimate, tourist price elasticity must be more than –
2.0 for the foreign benefit component to become negative. Cancelling out the 
foreign benefit effect, however, would bring the optimal level below the 




Figure 13. Sensitivity with respect to elasticities 
Source: Compiled by the author 
Notes: PV is Pigouvian component, Remaining is optimal tax less Pigouvian compo-
nent, Current is prevailing average tax rate in 2009, FBE is foreign benefit component, 
and Total denotes optimal tax including all components. 
 
One additional test was conducted in order to explore the sensitivity of optimal 
tax with respect to other elasticities, which show the responsiveness of unlawful 
acts with respect to the alcohol price. It appeared that variation in their values 
does not have very large impact. For example, under mid estimations, where all 
elasticities were assumed to take the value of –0.7, increasing the drunken 
driving, offense and public drinking elasticities with respect to alcohol price all 
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to –0.4, optimal taxation level would be reduced less than 10%. Similarly, under 
low estimates, in case of which all elasticities except touristsʼ alcohol demand 
elasticity were assumed –1.0, increasing the same elasticities to –0.4 reduces 
optimal tax only by less than 15%. It means that under the assumption of 
unresponsive harmful and illegal activity the results are not overruled.  
Sensitivity of the optimal tax rate with respect to marginal administrative 
cost can be followed in the left-hand panel of Figure 14. It illustrates that just as 
was described above; the optimal tax rate is especially sensitive under low 
elasticity of alcohol demand. More precisely, it becomes more than ten times 
higher when the increase in the tax rate does not require additional resources for 
tax administration, compared with the case when a one unit increase in the tax 
rate requires an additional 40 cents per one liter of pure alcohol (i.e. = 0.4). 
As regards to the optimal tax rate under higher demand elasticity, the variation 
is much smaller. The overall level of optimal tax, however, tends to be lower 
than the current rate from the point where a one-unit increase in the tax rate 





Figure 14. Sensitivity with respect to cost parameters 
Source: Compiled by the author 
Notes: Elast is price elasticity of localsʼ alcohol demand, Current is prevailing average 
tax rate in 2009, alpha denotes multiplier effect arising from interaction of public 




Finally, it appears that the role of elasticity disappears under high marginal 
administrative cost, as in this case, simulated optimal taxes are almost equal 
under all three elasticities. In any event, the main point here is that the optimal 
policy is strongly affected by government capability to operate the tax system 
effectively when the tax rate is raised. As Figure 14 suggests, with zero costs, 
optimal policy would involve raising the current tax rate even under unit-elastic 
alcohol demand. In contrast, with high costs, this is not true even under inelastic 
demand. 
A solid basis of information was not available for estimating the values of 
 and α. They do however play a decisive role in inflating the tax rate to 
an extremely high level under high parameter values. As is shown in the right-
hand panel of Figure 14, if public medical spending affects the labor supply 
incentive so that α = 0.1, efficiency gains from alcohol tax are substantially 
amplified and as a consequence, the optimal tax rate rises above EUR 60. Even 
without experiencing the multiplier effect (α = 0), an increase in  may 
cause a considerable increase in the optimal level. It was also revealed that 
under high and mid parameter values, even an inefficient spending program 
under which households obtain less utility than the program costs them 
( < 0), does not eliminate the rationale to increase the current tax rate. 
Further analysis showed that this does not apply under low estimates. For 
example, if  = −0.05 (meaning that the revenue-recycling effect is 
negative) and α = 0, optimal tax is estimated to equal EUR 7.3.   
 
 











BH    
   Public drinking 27.7 14.1 19.5 
   Drive drinking 140.1 13.1 18.4 
   Both – 12.6 17.9 
Low    
   Public drinking 23.9 13.9 17.7 
   Drive drinking 97.6 13.0 16.7 
   Both – 12.3 15.9 
Mid    
   Public drinking 27.7 27.2 34.4 
   Drive drinking 140.1 25.6 32.6 
   Both – 24.9 31.8 
High    
   Public drinking 36.1 47.1 69.1 
   Drive drinking 183.1 44.9 66.1 
   Both – 43.8 64.6 
Source: Authorʼs calculations 
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Alcohol externalities are partially internalized through drunk driving and public 
drinking penalties, which were estimated in this thesis as EUR 28.8 and EUR 
9.6 per incident, respectively. In Table 16, the average external cost per incident 
has been presented for both types of incidents. These costs denote optimal level 
of penalties (i.e. Pigouvian penalties) in a partial equilibrium framework 
according to which the optimal penalty is equal to the marginal external cost of 
the corresponding unlawful act. It shows that there is much room for a penalty 
rise – even under the low average external cost estimates. Current rates 
represent less than half of the Pigouvian level. 
In addition, it is shown how the optimal level of alcohol taxation is affected 
when penalties were raised to the Pigouvian level. It can be seen that raising 
both penalties to the Pigouvian level, the optimal tax rate is reduced 
approximately by 10–15% under all scenarios. For example, under mid estimate 
with labor tax adjustment, optimal alcohol tax is EUR 24.9 compared with EUR 
27.9 under current prevailing penalty rates as was reported in Table 13 above. 
Raising only one penalty, keeping other one at its current level, entails 
somewhat smaller effects on optimal tax policy. However, even then, optimal 





Comparison with prior estimates 
To authorʼs best knowledge there are no empirical studies carried out previously 
concerning optimal alcohol taxation in general equilibrium framework except 
the one conducted in the US that was extended upon in this thesis. Therefore, 
the results of both studies regarding optimal taxation with labor tax adjustment 
are compared in Figure 15. Although acknowledging enormous differences 
between these two countries regarding social, cultural and economic 
circumstances as well as population size, comparing the results somewhat 
complements the sensitivity analysis giving a better picture of how the model 
behaves under different conditions and empirics  
Regardless of fluctuations in the exchange rate between the euro and the 
dollar, it can be said that the overall optimal tax in the US has been estimated to 
be higher than in Estonia. In reality, however, the Estonian tax rate is more than 
twice as high as the rate implemented in the US (EUR 9.4 and EUR 4.5, 
respectively). More specifically, Parry et al. (2009) have estimated that the 
optimal tax on alcohol with labor tax adjustment ranges from EUR 18 to EUR 
161 per liter of alcohol under alternative scenarios (using an exchange rate of 
1 USD = 0.76 EUR, i.e. from USD 88 to USD 803 per gallon of alcohol), while 
the prevailing rate in practice is EUR 4.5. The US estimates depicted in Figure 
15 – named here arbitrarily as mid-range – assume that the own-price elasticity 
of alcohol demand is –0.7, alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity is zero, and 
productivity effect is calculated on the basis of the most conservative estimates. 
For Estonia, optimal tax is estimated to range from 15 EUR to EUR 71 under 
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low and high parameter values, while the mid estimate is depicted in Figure 15. 
It is important to note, however, that in order to make both estimates more 
comparable, compared with the mid estimates presented in Table 13 above 
alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity is similarly to the US case assumed to be 
zero. This is the reason why it is lower than standard result of the thesis under 
mid estimates. Specifically, although fiscal, foreign benefit and productivity 






Figure 15. Estimated optimal alcohol taxes in Estonia and the USA 
Source: Parry et al. (2009), compiled by the author  
 
 
As concerns the structures of optimal tax rates under mid-range simulation 
results in both countries, it appears that in contrast to the Estonian case, the total 
tax rate in the US is formed almost equally by Pigouvian and fiscal components. 
Although, unlike the model used for the USA, the Pigouvian component in the 
Estonian case also includes effects from public drinking and offenses against 
persons, it is still negative due to administrative costs that were ignored by 
Parry et al. (2009). In addition to differences in core data that is determined by 
the extent of alcohol externalities in both countries, as well as by methods used 
to monetize these externalities, one obvious reason behind this result arises 
from the considerable gap between income levels in the two countries. Estonian 
GDP per capita represents less than half of US GDP per capita (Eurostat 
2010b). This means that in absolute terms, the cost of alcohol-related public 
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spending apportioned to the criminal justice system, for instance, is substan-
tially higher in the US. The same applies to most of the other monetary variab-
les. For instance, value of life – an input-providing Pigouvian component – was 
assumed to be EUR 0.56 million in this paper. Parry et al. (2009) used a much 
higher value of EUR 3.04 million (or USD 4 million).  
Productivity effects that are probably underestimated in both cases only play 
a marginal role in affecting the overall level of alcohol tax. For example, Parry 
et al. (2009) also obtained a considerably higher value for this component, 
amounting to EUR 16. In the Estonian case, estimates regarding productivity 
losses due to alcohol misuse presented by Saar (2009) were used as input data. 
This, however, only includes the decrease in the wage rate of alcoholics and the 
monetary value of lost workdays due to alcohol-related illnesses, and not some 
other factors. For instance, due to a lack of data, unemployment caused by 
alcohol misuse was not included.    
Both papers have shown that the fiscal component exceeds Pigouvian rates 
under a number of plausible parameter combinations. This holds true under 
mid-range estimates as well. Figure 15 also demonstrates the substantial 
difference in absolute levels of fiscal components between the two countries. 
Obviously, with the higher Pigouvian tax, there are more revenues that can be 
used to reduce labor taxes. In addition, the higher tax rate affects labor supply 
more intensely, increasing the tax-interaction component in the US, when 
compared with Estonia. In other words, due to interdependencies between 
different components in optimal tax formula, higher Pigouvian tax practically 
amplifies the other effects as well. One additional reason why the fiscal effect is 
much greater in the US arises due to lower alcohol prices in Estonia. More 
specifically, under different price levels, while assuming identical price 
elasticities of demand, a one-unit increase in alcohol price reduces alcohol 
consumption more in the country with lower prices. Therefore, as the fiscal 
component of optimal alcohol tax is expressed as per unit reduction in alcohol 
consumption, the tax rate proves to be lower in the country with low prices.  
Another reason for the difference concerns the level of pre-existing labor taxes. 
The higher these are, the more welfare gain there is to receive when taxes are 
reduced. In this paper, the pre-existing tax rate on labor was assumed to be 0.35 
compared with 0.4 applied by Parry et al. (2009), which causes an additional 
divergence between the results.  
 
Implications 
This study has revealed a set of empirical estimates for alcohol policy in 
Estonia, considering both externalities as well as fiscal aspects. Simulation 
results convincingly support the view that policy as currently implemented is 
not restrictive enough. Specifically, under several alternative combinations of 
parameter values, the socially optimal tax rate on alcohol patently exceeds the 
rate implemented in practice. Following the mid estimates at least 200% 
increase in alcohol taxes are suggested. In addition, under tax policy with 
adjustments for public spending, the optimal alcohol tax could be substantially 
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inflated, due to the amplifying effect of interaction between public spending and 
labor supply, amounting to more than 1000% of currently prevailing rate. 
In interpreting the numerical results, it must be kept in mind that the 
suggested increase in alcohol taxes includes both, excise tax and the proportion 
of VAT arising from taxing excise tax. Therefore, somewhat lower increase in 
excise rates is warranted compared with the result shown in Table 13. 
Specifically, in order to achieve an increase in alcohol taxes by 27.9 EUR and 
35.2 EUR, as proposed under the mid estimates, average excise rates on alcohol 
must be raised by 23.3 EUR and 29.3 EUR, respectively. This is because in 
Estonia, VAT taxes excise tax as well and adds to the final market price an 
additional 20% of excise tax. Therefore, excise rates should be raised by 
approximately 150%. Naturally, this train of thoughts is true only under the 
assumption of 100% tax shifting and given 20% of VAT rate. 
Similarly, to Parry et al. (2009), the simulations results showed that 
accounting for fiscal considerations strongly affects the optimal level of alcohol 
taxation. Compared with earlier papers, which applied partial equilibrium 
approach and captured only the Pigouvian component, the range within which 
optimal tax could lie becomes much wider. For instance, Pogue and Sgontzʼs 
(1989) partial equilibrium estimates regarding average optimal tax rate ranged 
from USD 20 to USD 314 per gallon of pure alcohol. In their analysis, arriving 
at the precise value of the tax depended on the making of an assumption 
concerning the share of internal cost that drinkers fail to internalize. Parry et al., 
while holding the Pigouvian component constant at USD 72 per gallon of 
alcohol, disclosed the range from USD 90 to USD 799, regardless of the fact 
that actual average tax on alcohol was estimated to remain below USD 25 in 
both papers. The strength of the fiscal rationale over Pigouvian one just implies 
that it would be more efficient to gather somewhat more revenue from alcohol 
taxation and less revenue from labor taxation, given the revenue neutral 
scenario under which the main result were obtained53. 
Compared with Parry et al., this paper has extended the role of fiscal 
consideration mainly in two ways. At first, it was demonstrated that considering 
alcohol as a commodity heavily consumed by tourists further strengthens 
revenue-raising rationale for an excise tax on alcohol. Secondly, optimal 
taxation level could also be reduced if tax increases require more administrative 
costs. In fact, given the assumptions in regard with marginal administration 
costs of alcohol tax made in this thesis, Pigouvian component was completely 
washed out. Fiscal effects can therefore move the optimal tax in both directions, 
resulting in additional uncertainty regarding appropriate alcohol policy. This 
also means that under high marginal administration costs, social benefits from 
following only Pigouvian rule may stay below the additional resources required 
to administer this policy. However, accounting also fiscal rationales, the 
                                                     
53 Although the taxation policy with public spending adjustment was also simulated, due 
to a relatively weak empirical ground the value of the results obtained under this 
scenario is rather theoretical than empirical.  
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simulation results confirmed that rise in prevailing tax rates is warranted even 
when it is complemented with increase in tax administrative costs. This increase 
could be required due to potential expansion of the black market that is often 
considered as the main credible counterargument for tax raises in any country. 
Therefore, following the mid estimate with labor tax adjustment, under which 
200% increase in current taxation level is proposed, the Tax and Customs Board 
is allowed to increase its budget approximately by 50% or more than 20 million 
EUR. Although the most effective utilization of these additional resources 
requires further analysis, it is reasonable to assume that resources of this 
magnitude should be enough in order to prevent the large-scale increase in 
prevalence of illegal alcohol. 
In addition, an optimal policy was shown to be rather sensitive towards 
demand elasticity of touristsʼ alcohol demand. As under low elasticity, the 
optimal level of taxation was considerably higher than under elastic demand, 
when planning a tax raise, government should account for differences in alcohol 
prices in Estonia and Finland. At the current state, the difference is more than 
twofold which means that a considerable raise can be carried out without 
changing incentives for touristsʼ to purchase alcoholic beverages from Estonia. 
For example, raising the tax rate by 200%, suggested by mid estimates with 
labor tax adjustment, brings along approximately 50%–55% rise in average 
alcohol prices, assuming that taxes are completely shifted onto consumers. As a 
result, alcohol prices in Estonia could still represent only approximately four 
fifth of price level in Finland. Therefore, this thesis proposes to take advantage 
of current situation to improve the welfare of Estonian citizens. It should be 
stressed, though, that optimal policy solution critically depends on tax policy 
implemented by Finnish government and other factors affecting touristsʼ 
incentives to visit Estonia. Changes in these factors should be examined before 
the policy is put into practice. Therefore, a considerable rise in excise taxes 
should be carried out in a longer period as to observe how markets or neigh-
boring countries react. 
In case of the BH scenario, under which administrative burden of alcohol tax 
was held constant and both illegal and border trade as well as home production, 
are assumed to become more massive, approximately 50% increase in the level 
of alcohol taxation gathers additional revenue somewhat more than EUR 40–50 
million. The short-term effects of recent tax changes imply that this is highly 
realistic scenario. Specifically, during 2008–2010 the taxation level was in-
creased more than 40% and as a result government managed to collect excise 
tax revenues EUR 165.2 million in 2010, compared with EUR 147.9 million in 
2007. Considering also the value added tax, this tax increase has gathered 
additional EUR 21 million. It is noteworthy that this occurred during the world-
wide economic recession when there was a sharp reduction in total consumption 
expenditures. Moreover, alcohol excise revenues in the first three month in 
2011 exceeded the revenue collected in the same period in 2010 by more than 
EUR 6 million, implying that the effects of the recent tax increase are much 
greater than experienced in 2010.  
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There is no particular reason to believe that the rest of the scenarios 
predicting even greater revenue growth could be unrealistic. It must be noticed 
that these scenarios assume positive marginal administrative burden of alcohol 
taxation due to the employment of additional measures to deal with the potential 
expansion of illegal market. One can only speculate how the introduction of 
such measures could work in practice. Obviously, the outcome depends heavily 
on their quality. However, it would be extremely pessimistic to assume that 
nothing can be done to prevent  massive illegal trade. Probably much more 
important concerns are border trade and home production. However, as 
concerns the border trade, it is important to note that the corresponding 
regulations in the EU allowing duty-free importation of alcohol in relatively 
large quantities was shown to create the main rationale to tax alcohol. This 
rationale to apply assumes that Finns still find the way to Estonia to purchase 
alcohol and Estonians only moderately replace the alcohol sold in the local 
market with alcohol imported via border trade. Considering huge differences in 
alcohol prices between Finland and Estonia, and the fact that during the last 
decade the relative purchasing power of alcoholic beverages has risen about two 
times in Estonia (see Figure 5 in chapter 1), this assumption should be 
reasonable at least under the tax increase to a certain level. Whether that level 
exceeds prevailing average tax rate more than 50%, 100% or 200%, must be 
confirmed in the future empirical research. 
Nevertheless, following the policy recommendation under the mid estimates 
to raise excise taxes, given the assumed demand elasticity, considerable 
reduction in alcohol consumption is expected, amounting to 3 liters of pure 
alcohol per capita. This would mean that Estonia could lose its almost “leading” 
position in world drinking ranking and the level of alcohol consumption would 
decrease to the level of approximately 7 liters of pure alcohol per capita. This 
level can be probably considered as socially desirable as well. For example, 
people in countries such as Sweden, Norway and Japan consume nearly the 
same amount of alcohol. These countries also experience much lower rates of 
alcohol-related injuries, mortality and illnesses (WHO, 2011a). The current 
thesis suggests that considerable reduction in alcohol-related mortality, medical 
cases, crimes and misdemeanors could also follow the tax raise. As it can be 
seen from Table 14, under the mid estimate more than 250 lives would be saved 
and nearly 500 people less would experience an offense from another person in 
one year. Obviously, these effects would not follow the tax raise immediately. 
For example, most alcohol-related illnesses will develop after long-term abuse 
of alcohol. Therefore, benefits from preventing these illnesses will arise in the 
future as well. By the same token, even sharp reduction in heavy drinking 
cannot promptly eliminate the harm it has already caused. The same applies to 
the fiscal burden associated with these effects. Therefore, it must be realized 
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that the optimal level of alcohol taxation obtained in this thesis accounts for 
both immediate and future effects54.  
It would be naïve to expect solving all the problems with taxation policy. It 
must be noticed that these results are obtained under certain assumptions 
regarding price elasticities and the dynamics of associations between drinking 
and its consequences. However, given the high level of alcohol consumption in 
Estonia it is reasonable to assume that well prepared taxation policy accom-
panied by more intense monitoring activities of corresponding public institu-
tions could have substantial benefits, maybe even greater than these figures 
show.   
It must be acknowledged that policy proposals in this thesis are rather 
intriguing in the context of EU harmonization policy. It is suggested that 
citizens in one EU member state should try to attract citizens from other 
member states to visit their country for alcohol purchasing purposes. Moreover, 
the damaging effects of alcohol consumption on citizens from other states are 
completely ignored. Therefore, the welfare maximizing alcohol policy 
implemented by one individual member state may actually deteriorate the 
welfare of other countries or the welfare of the EU as a whole. For example, in 
the model applied in this thesis, the optimal taxation level is considerably 
reduced under high elasticity of touristsʼ alcohol demand. From the perspective 
of Finland, however, this reduction in the level of taxation could cause 
substantial social harm, as the Finn’s would have access to cheap alcohol. 
However, this is the current EU legislation, which allows border trade in 
relatively large quantities of alcohol. As shown by the analysis in this chapter, 
this kind of policy creates strong incentives for governments to raise tax 
revenues from border trade. Therefore, the results are directly related to the 
policy implemented in the EU.  
The same applies to minimum excise rates all member states must follow. 
Although these rates are currently very low, their rise may strongly affect 
optimal level of taxation. Considering the results of the study here, for Estonia a 
certain rise in minimum rates would certainly be beneficial. This would make it 
much easier to carry out welfare increasing changes in excise rates as proposed 
by this thesis without worrying much about countries with extremely low levels 
of taxation. Otherwise, Estonians could find a way for these countries to 
purchase alcohol from there. On the other hand, too sharp increase in minimum 
rates could eliminate the price differences between Estonia and Finland, 
abolishing also the rationale to tax alcohol for tourism purposes. The latter 
could mean substantially lower optimal level of taxation as well.         
Finally yet importantly, government should seriously consider raising 
penalties on drunk driving and public drinking as in the current state penalties, 
the charges are much lower than marginal external damage caused by these 
                                                     
54 Thereby, the optimal taxation level revealed in this thesis is practically a long-run 
equilibrium level. Nevertheless, the appropriate pathways to achieve that level as well 
as other dynamic issues stay above the scope of this paper.  
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unlawful acts. Both types of acts were assumed to generate negative effects 
through traffic as well as through fiscal system. Therefore, a rise in penalties 
would enable the internalization of these alcohol externalities from the people 
responsible for these externalities. This would reduce the optimal level of 
alcohol taxation as well. For example, under mid estimates revealed in this 
thesis, the optimal level of alcohol tax could be reduced by 5–15% when both 
types of penalties would be simultaneously increased to the Pigouvian level. 
However, it should be noted that this thesis has not directly addressed the 
optimal penalty problem. Specifically, just like in case of tax policy, optimal 
penalty formulas could be obtained in a general equilibrium framework under 
which optimal penalty rates may differ from the Pigouvian level. 
 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations worth notice. The validity of assumptions 
concerning perfect competition and rational addiction as well as application of a 
representative agent framework has been discussed in the first chapter (see 
subchapter 1.3). An additional important limitation of the study concerns 
obtaining only average rate of excise on pure alcohol. In practice, however, 
there are different types of alcoholic beverages such as wines, vodkas, beers, 
ciders etc., with different alcohol content. These beverages may be consumed in 
very different manners and consequently their external costs must not be 
necessarily related to alcohol content. In addition, the demand elasticities across 
these beverages probably vary considerably. As was shown in the first chapter, 
beer price responsiveness has been often shown to be much lower than vodkaʼs, 
implying that alcohol unit in beer should be taxed more heavily than vodkaʼs on 
fiscal purposes. In practice, this is exactly the other way around in most 
countries. In Estonia, excise rate on vodka based on alcohol content is 
approximately two times higher than beers or wines55. As a result, alcohol tax 
represents more than half of vodkaʼs market price and less than 20% of beers 
and wines. Correspondingly, it probably would not be reasonable to raise 
excises uniformly for all beverages. For example, assuming 100% tax shifting, 
200% uniform increase in excise rates would cause only about 30% increase the 
beer market prices but more than 100% increase in vodkaʼs market prices. 
Therefore, it would be wise to somewhat smooth this difference. This, however, 
requires clarification by the future research.  
In interpreting the results of this paper, one must be aware that the model 
considers only indirectly or ignores completely several relevant effects that 
could substantially affect optimal level of alcohol taxation. At first, there are 
both legal and illegal channels that can be used to avoid the paying of higher 
                                                     
55 Specifically, while half liter vodka with 40% alcohol content is taxed by EUR 2.8, 
half liter beer with 4.5% alcohol content is taxed by EUR 0.1 (Alkoholi-, tubaka-, 
kütuse- ja elektriaktsiisi seadus, authors calculations). Therefore, while there is approxi-
mately 10 times more pure alcohol in a vodka bottle compared with beer, the tax 
amount is more than 20 times higher. 
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taxes. Illegal alcohol consumption, home production as well as acquiring 
alcohol via border trade were considered in the model parameterization. 
Specifically, one scenario was particularly designed to account for these 
aspects. However, this was purely indirect way to tackle the problem. For 
example, as concerns the potential border trade, for people living in the northern 
area, a trip to the other country just to buy alcohol may not be reasonable. It is 
also well known that northeastern and southern regions are the least developed 
areas in Estonia where a relatively small part of the population lives. Therefore, 
more sophisticated analysis, including transportation costs considerations, is 
needed to address this problem. In addition, massive changes in home 
production would probably also affect individualsʼ labor supply decisions as 
home production requires labor as an input. Therefore, the interactions of 
alcohol and labor markets induced by tax policy, which has played a central role 
in this thesis, could be strongly affected (see Aronsson and Sjögren, 2010). In 
addition, although the analysis is based on a general equilibrium model 
comprising the alcohol market, labor market, auto-insurance sector as well as 
the public sector; it excludes some relevant economic sectors, which could have 
considerable impact on the optimal policy. Essentially the whole tourism sector 
may shrink due to high alcohol prices. However, due to lower criminal activity 
and fewer drunken people on the streets, there may be positive effects on 
tourism as well. The net effect stays ambiguous, though.   
In addition to potential substitution between alternative purchasing sources, 
there may be also substitution between alcohol and other substances. This 
possibility was not considered in the model simulated in this thesis. Therefore, 
one could argue that the taxation level suggested by the simulations results 
could generate incentives for drinkers to switch to some different types of drugs 
such as heroin for instance. That could probably pose a much more serious harm 
to society than alcohol. Although acknowledging the problem, it was disclosed 
in the first chapter that often alcohol and alternative drugs are rather comple-
ments than substitutes. Therefore, the immediate substitution effect is not very 
likely. In addition, it should be stressed here that the results obtained in this 
thesis assume considerable increase in resources available for government to 
support this policy. Although it was assumed that these resources are employed 
to control the expansion of an illegal alcohol market, these could be also 
distributed to finance any other supportive activities, including hindering a 
potential increase in illegal substance use. Therefore, the success of an alcohol 
taxation policy depends directly on the implementation capability of public 
institutions and their ability to use resources effectively to control potential 
negative side effects.       
It must also be acknowledged that several alcohol-related cost categories 
have not been included. For instance, estimating economic costs of alcohol 
future research should attempt to include alcohol-attributed costs from fires, 
absenteeism, unemployment and transfer payments such as disability pensions. 
In addition, tax rates obtained in this paper are based on tangible costs only. In 
other words, intangible costs such as pain or psychological suffering have not 
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been considered. For instance, when one drives drunk and causes a traffic 
accident in which a victim is injured, only fiscal health care costs and 
productivity losses due to temporary disability were considered, in order to 
derive optimal tax. Psychological stress, as well as its impact on the relatives of 
the victims, was not considered. Alcohol-related domestic violence is also a 
well-known social problem, which often remains hidden and is therefore 
difficult to capture. What this means is that increases in alcohol taxes certainly 
entail substantial social benefits that are difficult to estimate in monetary terms. 
To conclude, it must be stressed that the results of this paper should be 
treated cautiously, as many empirically estimated parameters are based on very 
rough approximations or have rather weak scientific foundations. This 
especially concerns variables such as marginal administrative cost of alcohol 
tax, touristsʼ alcohol demand elasticity, marginal efficiency gain from public 
spending and drunk driving, public drinking and offense elasticities with respect 
to alcohol price. In addition, the value of alcohol demand elasticity in respect to 
which the optimal taxation level was very sensitive is drawn from international 
literature. Although there is no reason to believe that this could be completely 
different in Estonia, its central role in the model requires its estimate with 





























Excessive alcohol consumption is often considered to lay an enormous socio-
economic burden overall on society by causing several illnesses, injuries, 
fatalities and criminal behavior. The present thesis has addressed this problem 
from the perspective of taxation policy, which has been shown in prior literature 
to be one of the most effective as well as cost effective policy measures to 
control drinking consequences. Specifically, optimal average excise rate on 
alcohol was evaluated in order to correct alcohol externalities and raise reve-
nues for government in Estonia. To accomplish this aim, four research questions 
were raised concerning the definition of optimality criterion, building the 
appropriate model to assess this optimality, and the implications for alcohol 
taxation in general as well as specifically for Estonia. 
At first it was analyzed how the optimality with respect to these two goals 
could be defined. As prior literature on optimal alcohol taxation is rare, the 
optimality definition was borrowed from environmental policy literature. The 
approach applied there nicely delivers the solution required to accomplish the 
aim of the thesis. Specifically, well-known principles of externality correcting 
Pigouvian taxation, which in its simplest form equates a tax rate with marginal 
external cost and revenue-raising Ramsey taxation, which taxes more heavily 
leisure complements, have been integrated. Applying a static, general-equilib-
rium model with a representative consumer, the optimal tax is defined as the 
one, which maximizes the sum of efficiency gain obtained from both sources. 
To the authorʼs knowledge only Parry et al. (2009) have applied this approach 
to alcohol in the US. They showed empirically that fiscal rationales might be far 
stronger than an external one in determining the optimal level of alcohol 
taxation. 
In order to apply this approach to Estonia at first two empirical studies were 
carried out, as there are only few narrowly targeted studies concerning alcohol 
externalities in Estonia. Both studies are presented in the second chapter. The 
first one concerns alcohol-related traffic mortality and the second one estimated 
the level and the structure of economic costs of alcohol in Estonia. Three main 
findings from these studies are worth stressing. At first, the prevalence of a high 
degree of alcohol intoxication among pedestrians was disclosed implying that 
policy analysis concentrating only on drunk driving, which has been the 
common approach, also in the alcohol taxation literature, is incomplete. Second, 
while the economic costs to society resulting from alcohol misuse in Estonia in 
2006 amounted to EUR 230–329 million, over 75% of total costs were 
associated with the indirect burden of alcohol misuse, over 80% of which arose 
from premature mortality. Third, it was revealed that out of direct economic 
costs of alcohol, half of these were carried by the criminal justice system, one-
tenth by health care system and one third had arisen from traffic-related 
property damage. Therefore, all these areas must be somehow be included into 
the optimal taxation analysis. 
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The third chapter uses the results from second chapter as input and extends 
the Parry et al. model, parameterizes it and simulates optimal alcohol taxes for 
2009. As a result, the current thesis provides innovation to the optimal alcohol 
taxation literature in several ways. At first and most importantly, in addition to 
motives stemming from Pigouvian and Ramsey taxation principles, the third 
rationale for imposing higher taxes on alcoholic beverages compared with other 
commodities was suggested. Particularly, as alcohol is intensively consumed by 
tourists, some fiscal burden arising from production of public goods can be 
placed on tourists through alcohol taxation. This has been acknowledged in 
tourism taxation literature in general but has not been previously analyzed in the 
context of optimal alcohol taxation. Altogether, optimality of alcohol tax in this 
thesis is defined on an accounting efficiency basis for all three aspects. 
Compared with prior literature the model is extended also to account for 
offences against persons and public drinking incidences as externalities, 
implementation costs of tax policy arising from possible expansion of an illegal 
alcohol market and interactions between the quality of public medical services 
and labor supply.  
Based on this model, the optimal tax formula was derived. Parameterization 
was carried out by using empirical results from both the second chapter and 
international literature but also existing international and Estonian-based 
databases. Simulations were carried out for two different scenarios. The first 
one assumed that the government budget was held balanced by changing labor 
tax rate; the second one adjusted the level of public medical spending. For both 
scenarios three estimates were obtained – the low, the mid and the high. The 
middle estimate was expected to be the most accurate as under this estimate the 
most plausible parameter values were applied. It was estimated under 
alternative scenarios that the average optimal tax rate ranges from EUR 14.5 to 
EUR 70.7 per liter of pure alcohol in 2009. More specifically, mid-range 
estimates were EUR 27.9 with labor tax adjustment and EUR 35.2 with public 
spending adjustment. In addition, raising the current tax rate to EUR 27.9 or 
EUR 35.2 would improve peopleʼs welfare by EUR 45.3 or EUR 91.9 million, 
respectively. Considering the fact that the prevailing average tax rate in 2009 
was EUR 9.4 per liter of pure alcohol, a considerable raise is proposed 
(including both excise tax and VAT). The raise is warranted even under 
considerable growth of complexity in tax administration. For instance, when 
raising taxes by 200%, The Tax and Customs Board are assumed to increase its 
budget more than 50% or 23 million EUR to deal with increased activity in the 
illegal market. 
Similarly to Parry et al. (2009), it was shown that fiscal concerns dominate 
over Pigouvian rule affecting considerably optimal level of alcohol taxation.  
Compared with Parry et al., this paper has extended the role of fiscal 
consideration mainly in three ways. At first, it was demonstrated that 
considering alcohol as a commodity heavily consumed by tourists further 
strengthens revenue-raising rationale for an excise tax on alcohol. Therefore, 
existing intra-EU excise allowances, which favor border trade between 
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countries with considerable price differences, create strong incentives for 
individual governments to take advantage of this situation. Secondly, optimal 
taxation level could also be reduced if carrying out the tax raise requires more 
administrative costs. Fiscal effects can therefore move the optimal tax in both 
directions, resulting in additional uncertainty regarding appropriate alcohol 
policy. It is also noteworthy that in this setting the Pigouvian component was 
completely washed out, i.e. it turned out to be less than zero. Therefore, while 
alcohol taxation policies in practice have often utilized and warranted for harm 
controlling purposes, this thesis has shown that its revenue-raising ability could 
be also used as a strong argument. Thirdly, it was shown that the optimal level 
of taxation policy in certain circumstances could depend heavily on how tax 
revenues are spent. If they are spent efficiently, substantial welfare gain can be 
obtained from a raise in alcohol taxes. This obviously applies to any taxation 
policy in general as well.   
The present thesis has several limitations. At first, the model design fails to 
take into account the dynamic nature of addiction. Secondly, the alcohol market 
is assumed to behave as perfectly competitive which is not probably the case in 
practice. In addition, although the general equilibrium model applied in the 
thesis notifies the possibility of expansion of an illegal alcohol market through 
acknowledging administrative costs of alcohol taxation, it does not directly 
address neither expansion of illegal alcohol market or the possibility of massive 
border trade or home production. The effects of these phenomenon on the 
optimal taxation level were explored only indirectly by adjusting corresponding 
parameter values. The possibility of drinkers switching to substitute substances 
such as cannabis was completely ignored. Finally, although the model decom-
poses taxation of touristsʼ alcohol purchases in the optimal policy formula, the 
effect of alcohol taxation overall on the tourism sector is not considered. Future 
research could contribute to these topics by addressing all or some of these 
limitations  
In order to improve the applicability of this model to Estonia much more 
empirical research work is needed. Specifically, many parameter values in the 
present thesis are based on very rough approximations, have rather weak 
scientific foundations or are completely based on international literature. More 
solid empirical base would allow this model also to include much wider range 
of alcohol externalities, such as property damage and productivity losses 
attributable to alcohol-related fires as well as positive externalities which have 
probably unfairly earned much less attention. Accompanied by additional 
empirical research, the analysis could also be extended to estimate optimal taxes 
for individual alcoholic beverages as well as the optimal level for pecuniary and 








Appendix 1. Alcohol attributable fractions (internal causes) 
 
Disease (ICD–10 code) AAF 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral cavity and pharynx (C00-C14)3 0.40 
Malignant neoplasm of esophagus (C15)1 0.42 
Malignant neoplasm of stomach (C16)3 0.20 
Malignant neoplasm of colon (C18)2 0.12 
Malignant neoplasm of rectum (C20)2 0.04 
Malignant neoplasm of liver and intrahepatic bile ducts (C22)1 0.38 
Malignant neoplasm of pancreas (C25)2 0.14 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx (C32)1 0.51 
Malignant neoplasm of breast (C50)2 0.18 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's syndrome (E24.4) 1.00 
Mental and behavioural disorder due to use of alcohol (F10) 1.00 
Degeneration of nervous system due to alcohol (G31.2) 1.00 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy (G62.1) 1.00 
Alcoholic myopathy (G72.1) 1.00 
Hypertensive disease (I10-I15)1 0.11 
Hypertensive disease (I10-I15)1 – benefit –0.07 
Ischaemic heart disease (I 20–25)1 0.08 
Ischaemic heart disease (I 20–25)1 – benefit –0.08 
Cerebrovascular disease (I60-I69)2 0.11 
Diseases of esophagus, stomach and duodenum (K20-K31)3 0.10 
Alcoholic gastritis (K29.2) 1.00 
Alcoholic liver disease (K70) 1.00 
Cirrhosis (K74.3-K74.6)3 0.50 
Cholelithiasis (K80)1 – benefit –0.50 
Acute pancreatitis (K85)1 0.24 
Alcohol-induced chronic pancreatitis (K86.0)  
Fetal alcohol syndrome (Q86.0), maternal care for (suspected) damage to 
fetus from alcohol (O35.4), fetus and newborn affected by maternal use of 
alcohol (P04.3) 
1.00 
Source: Compiled by author 
Notes: 1AAF drawn from Lai et al. (2005). 2AAF drawn from Devlin et al. (1997). 









Appendix 2. Alcohol attributable fractions (external causes) 
 
External cause (ICD–10 code) 
AAF 
Transport accidents (V01-V99)1 0.42 
Falls (W00-W19)1 0.16 
Accidental drowning and submersion (W65-W74)1 0.31 
Exposure to smoke, fire and flames (X00-X09)1 0.44 
Accidental poisoning by and exposure to noxious 
substances (X40-X49)3 
0.10 
Accidental poisoning by and exposure to alcohol (X45) 1.00 
Intentional self-harm (X60-X84)1 0.23 
Assault (X85-Y09)1 0.47 
Source: Compiled by author 
Notes: 1AAF drawn from Harwood et al. (1998). 3AAF drawn from Lai et al. (2005). 
 
Appendix 3. Alcohol attributable fractions for costs to public 
institutions 
 
Police, Courts, Prosecutors and Prisons 
Type of crime or misdemeanor AAF 
Against life1 0.3 
Against health and freedom1 0.3 
Sexual assaults1 0.225 
Against property1 0.034 
Disturbances of the peace 2  0.15 
Driving under influence of alcohol 1 
Bureau of Forensic Medicine 
Cause of death AAF 
Homicide, assault3 0.47 
Suicide3 0.23 
Illness3 
Same as finding 
health care costs 
Traffic fatality3 0.42 
Fall3 0.16 
Other accidents4 0.1 
Rescue Board 
Type of call AAF 
Traffic accident3 0.42 
Fire, work and off-the-job accident, accident 
at body of water4 
0.1 
Source: Compiled by author 
Notes: 1AAF drawn from Harwood et al. (1998).2Two thirds of offences committed 
under influence of alcohol were attributed to alcohol misuse. 3AAF drawn from Lai et 
al. (2005). 4AAF drawn from Harwood et al. (1998), who used the same value for 
consequences of external causes. 
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Appendix 4. Estimates of marginal effects 
 
Meaning and parameter notation 
in formula 
BH Low Mid High 
Marginal medical case of alcohol 
consumption, M  0.0034 0.0046 0.0066 0.0089 
Marginal medical case of an 
offence against persons, M  3.16 2.21 3.16 4.11 
Marginal medical case of drunk 
driving, M  0.0222 0.0156 0.0222 0.0290 
Marginal medical case of 
misdemeanors, M  0.0037 0.0026 0.0037 0.0048 
Marginal on-the-job productivity 
of alcohol consumption (EUR), W H  1.80 2.53 3.61 4.69 
Marginal private cost of· health 
risks per unit change in drunk 
driving (EUR), mpc · H  31.3 21.91 31.3 40.70 
Marginal private cost of health 
risks per unit change in 
misdemeanors (EUR), mpc · H  0 0 0 0 
Marginal private cost of health 
risks per unit change in offenses 
against persons (EUR), mpc · H  8,853.15 6,197.20 8,853.15 11,509.09 
Source: Authorʼs calculations 
 
 
Appendix 5. Estimates of government resource costs 
 
Parameters BH Low Mid High 
Average costs to criminal justice 
system per offence against 
persons (in euros), r  4,166.59 2,916.61 4,166.59 5,416.57 
Average costs to criminal justice 
system per drunk driving incident 
(in euros), r  35.72 25.01 35.72 46.44 
Average costs to criminal justice 
system per violation of Alcohol 
Act (in euros), r  15.46 10.82 15.46 20.09 
Average cost to Tax Board per 
liter of pure alcohol (in euros), r  0.08 0.06 0.08 0.10 
Average cost to health care 
system per case (in euros), r  109.94 76.96 109.94 142.92 
Marginal cost of tax rate on 
alcohol, r  0.0003 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Source: Authorʼs calculations 
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Appendix 6. Applied elasticities 
 
Parameters BH Low Mid High 
Drinking with respect to alcohol price, η  –1.5 –1.0 –0.7 –0.4 
Alcohol purchases by foreigners with respect to 
alcohol price, η  –0.7 –0.4 –0.7 –1.0 
Drunk driving, public drinking or offenses 
against persons with respect to alcohol 
price, η , η  or η  –0.7 –1.0 –0.7 –0.4 
Drinking with respect to price of leisure 
(compensated), η  0 0.1 –0.1 –0.2 
Labor supply with respect to income, η  –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 
Labor supply with respect to wage rate, η  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
 
Appendix 7. Derivation of optimal policy formulas 
 
Deriving equation (3.6) with =   
 
From (1), (2) and (3) agents solve the following maximization problem: 
 ( , , , , , , ) =  (. ) + λ (1 − t )w(H)(T(H) − l) + G −− ( + ) − − −      (A.1) 
 
Totally differentiating (A.1) with respect to :  
 = − − + + (1 − )( + ) ++ (1 − )( + ) + + (1 − )( + ) ++ (1 − )( + ) + −     (A.2) 
 
Totally differentiating government budget constraint (5) with respect to : 
 + + ( + − ) + ( + − ) +( + ) + = + + + − − −− + t + W        (A.3) 
 
Substituting (A.3) in (A.2), while assuming that = +  due to 




Defining the following elasticities: 
 =     ( ) , =     ( )     (A.5) 
 
Noting that = ⁄  , = ⁄  , = ⁄  , =  , and denoting = +( + − ) + ( + − ) + ( + ) ++ ( + · ) +  ( + · ) + · +
 , (A.4) can be expressed as: 
 = ( − ) − + + t + 1 − +t − r             (A.6) 
 
In order to obtain marginal labor supply effects  , induced by the increase in 
alcohol tax, at first labor supply function from (A.1) is defined as =( , , , , , ). Noting that while consumer takes ,  and  as given, 
equilibrium values of these variables are the private choices of consumer herself 
or himself. Therefore, equilibrium labor supply is a function of only exogenous 
variables, which means that = ( , , ). Differentiating this function 
with respect to alcohol tax, while assuming = 0, it is obtained56, 57: 
                                                     
56 The first component in (A.7) reflects the fact that alcohol tax reduces health risks and 
consequently increases on-the-job productivity (it arises from the assumption < 0 
made in section 3.2.1). 
 = − − + − − + − −+ + + 1 − + t − r     − −+ t − + · − + · + ·+        (A.4) 
 
57 In order to keep the public budget balanced, this thesis assumes that government only 
adjust  or , while holding other variables, including , fixed. In reality, the raise 
in alcohol tax would probably cause  to decrease because reduced level of alcohol 
misuse reduces alcohol-related transfers (e.g. disability pensions) as well, meaning that < 0. However, this would not have any feedback effect on labor supply decisions 
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= + + +     (A.7) 
 
Differentiating government budget constraint (5) with respect to , allowing  
to vary while holding  fixed: 
 + ( − ) + ( − ) + + = + ++ − − − − + t + W   (A.8) 
 
Substituting (A.7) in (A.8) and solving for   (still holding  fixed), gives: 
 = −              (A.9) 
 
where = + ( + − ) + ( + − ) +( + ) + . Substituting (A.7) in (A.6): 
 = ( − ) − + + t + + ++ 1 − + t − r          (A.10) 
 
Substituting (A.9) into (A.10) and holding  fixed, gives: 
                                                                                                                                  
because the reduction in transfer payments rather reflects the fact that there are less 
injuries and illnesses than decrease in consumersʼ income level. Therefore it is 
reasonable to assume here that = 0. One could wonder that if  < 0 then it 
should at least someway be the part of optimal tax formula. For Pigouvian component 
this is not the case as this term cancels out (see the derivation of A.4 above). In other 
words, it is pure transfer being represented in both consumerʼs and government budgets. 
It could be the part of revenue-recycling component, though. For example, when one 
assumes that = < 0, alcohol-related transfers could be represented as   
in . However, considering the results and discussion presented in subchapter 3.2 and 
3.3, inclusion of the alcohol-related transfer would only strengthen the main arguments 
of the thesis to propose imposing higher taxes on alcohol mainly on fiscal purposes.  
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= ( − ) − + t + − t 1 − ( +) +     +     −     − + + / ++ 1 − + t − r          (A.11) 
 
Defining the following elasticity: 
 = (   ) (   )        (A.12) 
 
Rearranging the terms in (A.11) and denoting = − =  , 
gives: 
 = ( − ) − + 1 − +     − +1 + 1 − + ( − )     + 1 + +1 +        (A.13) 
 
From Slutsky equations: 
 = − , = − ( ) w −     (A.14) 
 
Slutsky symmetry property yields: 
 = − ( )        (A.15) 
 
Substituting (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.13): 
 = ( − ) − + 1 − +     − +1 + 1 − + ( − )     +1 + − ( ) − + 1 +   (A.16) 
 
Defining the following elasticities: 
 = ( ) ( ) ;  = ( )      (A.17) 
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Noting that − ( ) = − ( )  and − = − ( )  , it is 
obtained: 
 = ( − ) − + 1 − +     − +1 + 1 − + ( − )     − 1 + ( ) ( +) + 1 +        (A.18) 
 
Equating (A.18) to zero and rearranging: 
 − = − + 1 − +     −     +1 + 1 − + ( − )     − 1 + ( ) ( +) + 1 +        (A.19) 
 
Dividing both sides of the equation (A.19) by −  yields optimal tax 
formula (6) with =  .  
 
Deriving equation (3.6) with  =   
 
Differentiating government budget constraint (5) with respect to , holding  
fixed and allowing  to vary: 
 + + ( + − ) + ( + − ) +( + ) + = + + + − − −− + t   (A.20) 
 
Substituting (A.7) in (A.20) and solving for    (still holding  fixed), gives: 
 = −                     (A.21) 
 
Substituting (A.21) into (A.10), holding  fixed, gives: 
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= ( − ) − + 1 − ( + ) +     +
    −     − + + / − +t + + t 1 − ( + ) + ( − )     +
    − + + / − + 1 − +t − r              (A.22) 
 
Denoting = = − 1: 
 = ( − ) − + ( + 1) 1 − ( + ) +
    +     −     − + + + t ++ 1 − ( + ) + ( − )     +     − ++ + 1 − + t − r         (A.23) 
 
Noting that (1 + ) + = 1 + (1 + ) and (1 +) + + 1 = (1 + ) 1 + − 1, rearranging the terms, gives: 
 = ( − ) − + 1 + (1 + ) − 1 1 − +
    − + 1 + (1 + ) 1 − + ( − )     ++         (A.24)                                              
 
To obtain (6) with =  , a derivation process identical to deriving (6) with =   is followed. Specifically, see equations from (A.14) to (A.18) above. 
The only difference concerns multipliers reflecting marginal efficiency gain. 
 
Deriving equation (3.8) 
 




 − = − 1 + ∗ − 1 − − −1 + 1 − + ( − )     − 1 + −1 +        (A.26) 
 
When substituting (A.15) into (A.14), most of the terms cancel out and marginal 
welfare gain is expressed as follows: 
 = 1 + ( − ∗ )       (A.27) 
 
Using definition of price elasticity of alcohol from (A.5) and integrating over 
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Alkohoolsete jookide tarvitamine on saanud avalikkuses väga palju negatiivset 
tähelepanu, kuna alkoholi loetakse üheks oluliseks riskiteguriks erinevate kah-
julike tagajärgede tekkimisel. Sellest johtuvalt on väga paljud teadlased läbi 
viinud suurel hulgal erinevaid alkoholi mõjudega seotud analüüse. Valdavalt on 
leitud, et alkohol asetab ühiskonnale suure sotsiaalmajandusliku koormuse 
(Thavorncharoensap et al., 2009) ning valitsuse sekkumine teatud moel on 
põhjendatud. Ka Eesti pole selles suhtes erandlik. Mitmed autorid on näidanud 
alkoholi märkimisväärseid kahjulikke tagajärgi. Eesti uurijate peamine uurimis-
objekt on olnud eelkõige alkoholiga seotud haigestumus ja suremus (Lai et al., 
2003, Kaasik et al., 2004), aga ka liigtarbimise mõjud tervishoiusektorile 
(Reinap, 2009). Siiski, alkoholi väärkasutamise mõjud on palju laiaulatusliku-
mad, mõjutades ka teisi ühiskonna sfääre. Seega, üheks motivatsiooniks 
väitekirja kirjutamiseks oli täita see oluline lünk vastavas kirjanduses, et jõuda 
paremale arusaamisele antud probleemist ja võimalikest lahendustest Eesti 
jaoks. 
Rahvusvahelises kirjanduses on tehtud teatavaid üldiseid alkoholipoliitilisi 
soovitusi. Erinevate autorite poolt on korduvalt ja üsna veenvalt näidatud, et 
teiste alkoholipoliitiliste alternatiivide hulgas on alkoholi maksustamine nii üks 
kõige efektiivsemaid kui ka kulu-efektiivsemaid (nt Ludbrook et al., 2002). 
Isegi Eestis on ühes uuringus jõutud sarnasele järeldusele (Lai et al., 2007). 
Sedalaadi uuringud näitavad aga üksnes erinevate meetmete mõjusid, suutmata 
välja pakkuda vastavate meetmete optimaalset taset. Viimane eeldab põhjaliku 
teoreetilise raamistiku kujundamist. Sellised uuringud on rahvusvahelises 
kirjanduses suhteliselt harvaesinevad ja puuduvad Eesti kontekstis täielikult, 
mis oli peamiseks motivatsiooniks väitekirja eesmärgi määratlemisel. 
Nendest vähestest kirjanduses ilmunud optimaalse alkoholi maksustamise 
analüüsidest on enamik rakendanud osalise tasakaalu mudeleid, kus optimaalne 
maks kõige lihtsamas käsitluses on võrdne alkoholi tarvitamisega kaasneva 
marginaalse väliskuluga (Pogue ja Sgontz, 1989; Kenkel, 1996). Sedalaadi ana-
lüüsid ignoreerivad aga fiskaalseid aspekte, mis on Eesti kontekstis üliolulised. 
Näiteks moodustasid alkoholi aktsiisitulud 2009 aastal ligikaudu 4% riigi-
eelarve kogutuludest. Väliskulude korrigeerimise ja fiskaalsetel eesmärkidel 
kehtestatud makse hakati koos ühe mudeli raames analüüsima eelmise sajandi 
keskpaigas. Eriti levinuks sai see keskkonnapoliitika-alases kirjanduses alles 
1990ndatel. Autorile teadaolevalt on alkoholi maksustamist sedalaadi raamis-
tikus analüüsinud üksnes Parry et al. (2009). Kuid ka nimetatud töös on mit-
meid edasiarendamist vajavaid aspekte nii üldises plaanis kui ka eraldi Eesti 
jaoks. Näiteks pole seal arvestatud võimaliku salaturu osakaalu kasvuga 
aktsiisimaksude tõstmise tagajärjel ega ka võimalusega, et suure osa kohalikul 
turul müüdavast alkoholist ostavad turistid.  
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Seega, selleks et saaks anda mingit hinnangut hetkel rakendatava alkoholi 
aktsiisipoliitika kohta Eestis, on vaja täiendavalt analüüsida nii reaalset olu-
korda alkoholiturul kui ka välja arendada Eesti oludele kohandatud teoreetiline 
raamistik ühiskondlikult sobiva aktsiisipoliitika kujundamiseks. Järgnevalt 
selgitatakse täpsemalt, kuidas antud väitekirjas seda tehakse. 
 
 
Töö eesmärk, uurimisülesanded ja ülesehitus 
 
Töö eesmärk on hinnata alkoholile kehtestatud aktsiisimäärade optimaalset taset 
saavutamaks kahte avalikku eesmärki Eestis – korrigeerida välismõjusid ja 
koguda tulusid valitsusele. Eesmärgi saavutamiseks otsitakse vastuseid järgmis-
tele uurimisküsimustele: 
 Kuidas defineerida optimaalsust nende kahe eesmärgi suhtes? 
 Kas ingliskeelses kirjanduses rakendatud mudeleid optimaalse alkoholi- 
ja keskkonnapoliitika hindamiseks saab kasutada ka Eesti jaoks? 
 Kuidas peaks mudel olema formuleeritud Eesti jaoks? 
 Millised on mudeli rakendamise tulemused üldises plaanis ja konkreetselt 
Eesti jaoks? 
 
Uurimisküsimustele vastamiseks on püstitatud järgmised uurimisülesanded. 
Esimene nendest puudutab probleemist arusaamist: alkoholiga seotud problee-
mide sümptomite hindamine ja alternatiivsete sekkumismeetmete analüüs. 
Teiseks uurimisülesandeks on uurida kirjanduses optimaalse alkoholi maksus-
tamise analüüsiks kasutatud mudeleid, et hinnata nende sobivust Eesti jaoks. 
Kuna antud väitekiri baseerub eksisteerival optimaalse maksustamise alasel 
kirjandusel, siis võetakse vaatluse alla üksnes selle uurimissuuna nii osalise kui 
ka üldise tasakaalu mudelid.  
Kolmas uurimisülesanne on määratleda empiiriliselt liiklussuremuse ulatus 
ja selle seotus alkoholiga Eestis. Antud valdkonnale pööratakse väitekirjas 
erilist tähelepanu mitmel põhjusel. Esiteks, varasemates uuringutes on näidatud, 
et liiklusõnnetused, sh -suremus, moodustavad märkimisväärse osa alkoholi 
sotsiaalmajanduslikust koormusest (nt Varney ja Guest, 2002; Johansson et al., 
2006). Teiseks, paljud autorid on näidanud, et alkoholi maksustamine on efek-
tiivne meede liikluskahjude kontrollimiseks (Grossman ja Saffer, 1986; Wage-
naar, 2010). Mõlemad viitavad sellele, et alkoholi maksude optimaalne tase 
sõltub otseselt olukorrast liikluses. Varasemates optimaalse alkoholi maksus-
tamise kirjanduses ongi joobes juhtimist peetud üheks olulisemaks välismõjuks, 
mida maksupoliitika on kujundatud kontrollima (nt Kenkel, 1996; Parry et al., 
2009). Lisaks nendele kahele põhjusele pöörab antud väitekiri liiklussurmadele 
erilist tähelepanu selleks, et tuua eraldi välja jalakäijate roll alkoholiga seotud 
liiklusõnnetuste põhjustamisel. Täpsemalt, kuigi empiiriliselt on sageli 
näidatud, et hukkunud jalakäijate hulgas on joobes isikuid isegi rohkem kui 
hukkunud sõidukijuhtide hulgas, pole sellele faktile varasemad poliitika-
uuringud erilist tähelepanu pööranud. Kuna antud töös seda tehakse, ongi 
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liikluses toimuv vaja võtta spetsiaalse vaatluse alla. Lõpetuseks, kuna liiklus-
õnnetused ja nende tagajärjed on olnud üheks olulisemaks ühiskondlikuks 
probleemiks Eestis terve viimase aastakümne jooksul, on liiklussurmade 
analüüs sobiv lähtekoht väitekirja empiiriliseks analüüsiks. 
Neljandaks uurimisülesandeks on hinnata alkoholi sotsiaalsete kulude taset 
ja struktuuri Eestis. See on vajalik, kuna alkoholi väärkasutamise rahas väljen-
datud kuluhinnangud on peamised sisendid maksustamise optimaalse taseme 
hindamisel. Antud uurimisülesande raames hinnatakse alkoholi otseseid kulusid 
nii tervishoiusektorile, kriminaal-justiitssüsteemile, kindlustussektorile, aga ka 
kaudseid kulusid kaotatud produktiivsuse näol. Viies uurimisülesanne on välja 
arendada teoreetiline mudel, mille baasil tuletada valem optimaalse alkoholi 
maksutaseme hindamiseks Eestis. Selleks kasutatakse varasemalt kirjanduses 
rakendatud mudeleid, kuid kohandatakse neid Eesti tingimustele, võttes arvesse 
vastavaid eripärasid. Kuuenda uurimisülesandena parameteriseeritakse mudel 
ning simuleeritakse alkoholi maksustamise optimaalse taseme hinnangud. 
Olulise sisendina kasutatakse siinkohal antud väitekirjas läbiviidud empiirilisi 
uuringuid aga ka rahvusvahelisi empiirilisi uuringuid. 
Väitekiri koosneb kolmest peatükist. Esimeses antakse ülevaade teoreetili-
sest ja empiirilisest tagapõhjast, täites kahte esimest uurimisülesannet. Teises 
peatükis viiakse läbi kaks empiirilist uuringut, mis on seotud kolmanda ja 
neljanda uurimisülesande täitmisega. Kaks viimast uurimisülesannet täidetakse 
kolmandas peatükis.  
 
 
Teoreetiline ja empiiriline tagapõhi 
 
Akadeemilises kirjanduses on alkohol saanud oluliseks uurimisobjektiks eel-
kõige seoses alkoholiga seotud negatiivsete tagajärgedega. Alkoholi optimaalse 
maksustamise kontekstis, eelkõige maksupoliitika mõjude hindamise aspektist, 
on vaja need mõjud kvantifitseerida ja hinnata nende rahalist väärtust. Tervise-
mõjude kvantifitseerimiseks kasutatakse kõige sagedamini meetodit, mille 
korral kombineeritakse hinnanguid alkoholi suhtelisest mõjust tervisele ehk 
relatiivset riski alkoholi tarbimiskogustega, et tuletada koefitsient, mis näitab 
osakaalu tagajärgedest, mida saab lugeda alkoholist tingituks (ing k alcohol 
attributable fraction) (nt English et al., 1995). Erinevate akuutsete tagajärgede, 
aga ka kriminaalse käitumisega seotud tagajärgede kvantifitseerimisel lähtu-
takse enamasti joobes isikute osakaalust ohvrite või ründajate hulgas. Tehakse 
ka kliinilisi uuringuid, selgitamaks kas hukkunul olid maksakahjustused, ja 
kvalitatiivseid uuringuid nagu intervjuud kuritegude sooritajatega.      
Mõjudele rahalise väärtuse andmiseks on kõige sagedamini kasutatud 
haiguskulu (ing k cost-of-illness, edaspidi COI) lähenemist (vaata Single et al., 
2003). Selle raames hinnatakse sotsiaalsest vaatenurgast lähtudes kulusid 
võrreldes hüpoteetilise olukorraga, kui maailmas poleks alkoholi. COI raamis-
tikku rakendades on erinevates riikides läbiviidud uuringutega hinnatud, et 
alkoholiga seotud majanduslik koormus jääb suurusjärku, mis on võrreldav  
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1–2%-ga SKP-st (Thavorncharoensap et al., 2009). Eestis on varem hinnatud 
üksnes vigastussuremuse ja terviseriskidega seotud kulusid, mille ulatus jääb 
suurusjärku 1% SKP-st (Kaasik et al., 2004; Reinap, 2009). Lisaks on käesoleva 
väitekirja autori poolt läbiviidud uuring 2006. aasta kohta, mis on täiendatud 
kujul esitatud ka väitekirja teises peatükis (Saar, 2009). Kulude tasemeks 
hinnati seal 1,6–2,3% SKP-st. 
Olulised negatiivsed mõjud on olnud piisavaks põhjenduseks valitsusel 
rakendada alkoholipoliitikat. Samas seisab valitsus silmitsi väga erinevate 
alternatiivsete sekkumismeetmetega alates kättesaadavuse piiramisest ja lõpe-
tades meediakampaaniatega. Siiski, paljude uuringutega on üsna veenvalt 
tõestatud, et maksupoliitika on üks kõige efektiivsemaid ja ka kuluefektiivse-
maid meetmeid alkoholi tarvitamise piiramiseks. Sellele vaatamata on Eestis 
kuni aastani 2008 rakendatud alkoholi aktsiisipoliitika olnud suhteliselt passiiv-
ne. Selle tagajärjel on alkohoolsete jookide ostujõud mõõdetuna keskmise palga 
ja alkohoolsete jookide keskmise hinna suhtena kasvanud perioodil1998–2008 
rohkem kui kaks korda. Kuigi Eesti on Euroopa Liidu liige ja peab järgima 
Euroopa Komisjoni poolt kehtestatud alammäärasid, pole need mingit survet 
tekitanud, kuna aktsiiside tase Eestis ületab need pea et kahekordselt. Alates 
2008. aastast on Eesti valitsus siiski tõstnud aktsiismäärasid kokku rohkem 
50%, mis on peatanud ka inimeste alkohoolsete jookide ostujõu kasvu. Samas 
on ilmne, et valitsusel puudub põhjalikult läbikaalutud aktsiisipoliitika ja vii-
maste aastate maksutõusud on olnud rohkem seotud eelarvedefitsiidi vähenda-
misega kui mingi pikaajalise strateegia elluviimisega. 
Empiirilised uuringud kinnitavad aga, et aktsiisipoliitika abil võib saavutada 
märkimisväärseid tulemusi alkoholi väärkasutamise kontrollimisel. On kordu-
valt hinnatud, et alkoholi nõudluse hinnaelastsuse koefitsient on väiksem kui 
null ja jääb vahemikku –0.3 kuni –1.5 (nt Elder et al., 2010). Ka alkoholi hinna 
ja alkoholi tarvitamisega seotud tagajärgede vahelist negatiivse seose kohta on 
kirjanduses piisavalt empiirilist tõendusmaterjali. Tagajärgede all on siinkohal 
mõeldud liiklusõnnetusi (Wagenaar et al., 2010), vägivalda (Wagenaar et al., 
2010; Grossmann and Markowitz, 1999), tapmisi (Andreasson et al., 2006), 
isikuvastaseid ründeid, alkoholi sõltuvust (Farrell et al., 2003), maksatsirroos 
(Elder et al., 2010), alkoholist tingitud haigustega seotud suremust (Wagenaar et 
al., 2009). 
Eelpool esitatud empiiriliste uuringute tulemuste baasil ei saa aga midagi 
järeldada optimaalse alkoholi aktsiisipoliitik kohta. Viimane eeldab teoreetilise 
mudeli väljaarendamist, mis võimaldaks defineerida optimaalsust. Majandus-
kirjanduses rakendatakse optimaalsuse kriteeriumina kõige sagedamini Pareto 
efektiivsuse kontseptsiooni, mis kehtib ka optimaalse alkoholi maksustamise 
kirjanduse kohta. Ökonomistid on näidanud, et teatud tingimustel suudab turu-
majandus sellele kriteeriumile ka vastata. See eeldab järgmist: (a) palju ostjaid 
ja müüjaid, nii et keegi ei avalda turuhinnale olulist mõju; (b) homogeensed 
kaubad, mistõttu kõik müüjad on hinnavõtjad; (c) madalad turule sisenemis- ja 
väljumisbarjäärid, mistõttu firmad teenivad üksnes normaalkasumeid; (d) 
turuosalistel on täielik info hindade ja toodete kohta; (e) puuduvad välismõjud. 
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Alkoholiturud ei vasta eelkõige kahele viimasele tingimusele. Täpsemalt, 
kuna alkoholi tarvitamisega tekitatakse teistele isikutele mitmeid negatiivseid 
mõjusid, mida alkoholi hind ei peegelda, osutub turumajanduse tingimustes 
alkoholi tarbimine ebaefektiivselt suureks. Sama juhtub mittetäieliku informat-
siooni korral, kui tarbijad ei tea alkoholi tarvitamisega seotud riske. Näiteks ei 
pruugi neil olla infot selle kohta, millistesse haigustesse haigestumise riski 
alkoholi tarvitamine suurendab. Mõlemal juhul osutub turg ebaefektiivseks ja 
on põhjendatud valitsuse sekkumine turutõrgete korrigeerimiseks.  
Pigou (1920) pakkus juba pea et sada aastat tagasi välja lahenduse välis-
mõjude korrigeerimiseks, mis on kujunenud laialt aktsepteeritud põhimõtteks ka 
kaasaja majandusteaduses. Selle järgi on alkoholile kehtestatud optimaalne 
maksumäär võrdne alkoholi marginaalse väliskuluga. Sellega saavutatakse see, 
et alkoholi hind peegeldab alkoholi reaalset kulu ühiskonnale ning alkoholi 
tarbimine langeb efektiivsele tasemele, kus tema sotsiaalne piirkulu on võrdne 
sotsiaalse piirkasuga. Kui infotõrgete tõttu ei suuda inimesed arvesse võtta kõiki 
alkoholi tarbimisega seotud riske, siis tarbivad nad samuti liiga palju. Ka seda 
probleemi saab korrigeerida maksupoliitikaga – maksumäär peaks olema võrdne 
marginaalse väliskulu ja marginaalse intenaliseerimata sisemise kulu summaga. 
Pigou reeglit on kirjanduses edasi arendatud arvestamaks ka moonutustega, 
mida maks tekitab mõõdukalt alkoholi tarbijate käitumises. Sellest lähtuvat on 
arendatud mudeleid, kus on vähemalt kahte tüüpi tarbijaid – mõõdukalt 
tarvitajad ja liigtarvitajad – ning optimaalne maksumäär maksimeerib välis-
kuludes langusest saadavate efektiivsuskasude ja tarbimismoonutustest tekkiva 
efektiivsuskulu vahe. Kirjeldatud raamistikku on optimaalsete maksude 
empiiriliseks hindamiseks kasutanud mitmed uurijad USA-s (nt Kenkel,1996; 
Pogue ja Sgontz, 1989). Kasutades sisendina alkoholi sotsiaalsete kulude 
hinnanguid, on näidatud, et kehtivad maksumäärad USA-s on märkimisväärselt 
madalamad Pigou tasemest. 
Maksustamise põhieesmärgiks on tulude kogumine valitsusele, mis pakub 
täiendavaid aluseid ka alkoholi maksustamiseks. Nimelt, samuti klassikaliseks 
optimaalse maksustamise printsiibiks majanduskirjanduses on kujunenud 
Ramsey (1927) poolt pakutud reeglid kaupade maksustamisel. Nimelt näitasid 
Corlette ja Hague (1957) Ramsey (1927) analüüsile tuginedes, et võrreldes 
teiste kaupadega peaks vaba aja täiendkaupadele kehtestama kõrgemad 
maksumäärad. Loogika seisneb selles, et kui ühtlase määraga kaupade 
maksustamine tekitab moonutusi indiviidide valikutes vaba aja ja töötamise 
vahel, siis maksustades vaba aega läbi vabal ajal tarbitavate kaupade nagu 
alkohol, on võimalik seda moonutust korrigeerida.  
Suhteliselt uus uurimissuund optimaalse maksustamise kirjanduses on 
turismi maksustamine. Kuna alkoholi tarbivad suures koguses ka turistid, eriti 
riikides, kus alkoholi hind on suhteliselt madal, on võimalik valitsusel osa 
maksutuludest koguda turistidelt. Turismi maksudel on üks väga oluline 
omadus võrreldes tavapäraste maksudega, mille kehtestamine tekitab üldjuhul 
alati teatud ulatuses moonutuskulusid – valitsus saab maksutulusid ilma 
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turumoonutusi tekitamata, sest maksustamisest tingitud turistide käitumise 
moonutused ei avalda oma riigi kodanike heaolule mingit negatiivset mõju.    
Kuni 20. sajandi keskpaigani analüüsiti nii välismõjude maksustamist kui ka 
tulude eesmärgil tarbimise maksustamist eraldi. Samas praktikas eksisteerivad 
mõlemat tüüpi maksud üheaegselt. Lisaks tarbimismaksudele eksisteerivad ka 
veel teised maksud, näiteks erinevad tulumaksud. Esimestena andsid tõuke kahe 
uurimissuuna ühendamiseks Tullock (1967) ja Sandmo (1975). Kuid aktiivsem 
selleteemaline arutelu sai alguse alates 1980ndatest Nicholsi (1984), Terkla 
(1984), Lee ja Misioleki (1986) ja Pierce (1991) töödega keskkonnapoliitika 
alases kirjanduses. Põhiline väide nendes töödes seisnes selles, et kuna Pigou 
maksu rakendamisega kogutakse ka maksutulusid, mida autorid tõlgendasid 
lisakasuna välismõjude korrigeerimise kõrval, võimaldavad need vähendada 
teisi makse, eelkõige tööjõumakse, ja sel moel maksusüsteemi poolt tekitatud 
moonutuskulu vähendada. Sellest tulenevalt hakati seda lähenemist nimetama 
ka topeltdividendi teooriaks (ing k double dividend theory). Seega, optimaalne 
keskkonnamaks võib olla oluliselt kõrgem kui Pigouʼ reegel soovitab. 
Hilisemates töödes näitasid aga Bovenberg ja Ploeg (1992), Bovenberg ja 
Mooji (1994) ja Bovenberg ja Goulder (1994) üldise tasakaaluga mudelites, et 
varasemas kirjanduses, kus kasuti osalise tasakaaluga mudeleid, vaadati mööda 
ühest olulisest aspektist. Täpsemalt, maksustades välismõjusid tekitavaid kaupu 
ning kui need kaubad on sisendiks ka teistele kaupadele (mis keskkonnamõjusid 
tekitavate kaupadega sageli nii on), siis tõstavad sellised maksud ka teiste 
tarbimiskaupade hinnataset ja vähendavad seeläbi tarbijate reaalpalka. See aga 
võimendab eelnevalt kehtestatud tööjõumaksude poolt tekitatud moonutusi 
indiviidide valikutes töö ja vaba aja vahel. Sellest tulenevalt võib optimaalne 
maks osutuda hoopis madalamaks kui Pigouʼ maks ehk marginaalne väliskulu.  
Antud väitekirja kontekstis on oluline märkida, et Parry (1995) oli esimene, 
kes dekomponeeris varasemates töödes esitatud optimaalse maksu valemi eraldi 
kolmeks osaks – Pigou maks, tulu taas-ringluse komponent ja maksu vastas-
toime komponent. Esimene võrdub klassikalise Pigou maksumääraga ehk 
marginaalse välise piirkuluga. Teine näitab efektiivsuse kasvu, mis tuleneb 
kogutud maksutulude kasutamisest tulumaksu alandamiseks. Efektiivsuskasv 
tuleneb siin moonutuste vähenemisest tööjõuturul. Kolmas komponent näitab 
muutusi majanduslikus efektiivsuses tulenevalt sellest, kas maksustatav kaup on 
vaba aja täiend- või asenduskaup. Kui tegemist on täiendkaupadega, siis 
tööjõupakkumine maksustamise tagajärjel suureneb. Teisisõnu, keskkonnamaks 
vähendab moonutusi tööjõuturul, mida on põhjustanud eelnevalt kehtestatud 
tööjõumaks. Kui aga tegemist on asenduskaupadega, võivad tööturul eksis-
teerivad moonutused võimenduda, kuna tööjõupakkumine alaneb veelgi. Kui 
Pigou ja tulu-taasringluse komponendid leiti keskkonnapoliitika alases 
kirjanduses olevat positiivsed, siis maksu vastastoime komponent negatiivne ja 
absoluutväärtuselt suurem tulu-taasringluse komponendist (sest keskkonna-
maksude maksubaas on kitsam kui tööjõumaksul). Seega, optimaalne maks 
osutub väiksemaks kui Pigou maks. Samas, sellisele tulemusele viis järgmine 
eeldus: kõik kaubad on võrdselt asendatavad vaba ajaga. On ilmne, et sellisel 
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eeldusel pole Ramsey printsiipidel ühe kauba kõrgem maksustamine ots-
tarbekas.  
Alkoholi puhul on põhjust arvata, et ta on vaba aja täiendkaup. Seda on 
empiiriliselt hiljuti näidanud ka West ja Parry (2009). Sellisel juhul võib 
kirjeldatud mudeli baasil hinnatud optimaalne maksutase osutuda oluliselt 
kõrgemaks Pigou maksust. Parry et al. (2009) seda USA-s ka näitasid. Autorid 
võtsid aluseks keskkonnapoliitika alases kirjanduses välja arendatud mudeli, 
kuid tegid sinna mõned olulised täiendused. Esiteks eeldati, et alkoholi maksus-
tamine peaks tõstma alkoholi tarbijate produktiivsust töökohal, mis lisas 
optimaalse maksu valemisse täiendava komponendi – produktiivsuse kompo-
nendi. Teiseks, kuna alkoholi maksustamine vähendab lisaks tervishoiukuludele 
ka kriminaaljustiitssüsteemi kulusid, liiklusõnnetustega seotud varalist kahju, 
laiendati mudelis valitsuse eelarvet erinevate kulukomponentidega ning lisati ka 
kindlustussektor. Eeldades ka ratsionaalseid tarbijaid ja täielikku konkurentsi, 
hinnati, et samal ajal kui tegelik maksumäär USA-s on 24 dollarit ühe galloni 
puhta alkoholi kohta, jääb optimaalne maks erinevate stsenaariumite korral 
vahemikku 68 kuni 799 dollarit. 
Kuigi Parry et al. (2009) poolt väljaarendatud mudelil on teatavad piirangud, 
sobib selle baaskuju rakendamiseks ka antud väitekirjas püstitatud eesmärgi 
saavutamiseks. Esiteks, optimaalsus on defineeritud üksnes efektiivsus-põhiselt 
ning baseerub turutõrgete kontseptsioonil. Lisaks võtab see erinevalt osalise 
tasakaalu mudelitest arvesse ka alkoholi maksu fiskaalseid efekte. Täpsemalt, 
optimaalsuse kriteeriumi võiks defineerida järgmiselt: optimaalne maksutase 
saavutatakse, kui maksimeeritakse tarbija kasulikkus, maksimeerides alkoholi 
välismõjude korrigeerimisest ning alkoholi maksu kehtestamisest tingitud 
tööturumoonutuste vähenemisest saavutatud efektiivsuse juurdekasv. Kuna 
Eesti majandus on turumajanduspõhine ning ka valitsus viib ellu maksumoo-
nutusi minimeerivat maksupoliitikat, sobib see lähenemine nii Eesti majanduse 
üldise funktsioneerimise loogikast kui ka omab olulist poliitilist tähtsust. 
Mõnevõrra problemaatiline võib tunduda Parry et al. mudeli eeldus täieliku 
konkurentsi kohta, kuna alkoholi turg Eestis on suhteliselt kontsentreeritud. 
Samas on mitmeid põhjuseid, et uskuda konkurentsi toimimist olulises ulatuses 
ka Eesti alkoholisektoris. Täpsemalt, kuna Eesti on väike avatud majandus, 
pakuvad kohalikele suurtootjatele olulist konkuretsi importtootjad. Teiseks, 
Eestis on väga suur arv jaemüüjaid, mistõttu valitseb jaeturul tõenäoliselt 
täieliku konkurentsiga sarnane olukord. Kolmandaks, kuigi alkoholiturg 
meenutab pigem oligopoli, on teoreetilises kirjanduses näidatud, et ka selline 





Antud väitekirjas viidi läbi kaks empiirilist uuringut. Esimene nendest kesken-
dus liiklussuremusele Eestis, et teha kindlaks surmade seos alkoholiga erinevate 
liiklejate lõikes ning tuletada see osa surmadest, mida saab lugeda välisteks – st 
ohver polnud ise õnnetuses süüdi. Andmed saadi Eesti Kohtuarstliku 
Ekspertiisibüroo lahanguaruannetest perioodi 2000–2002 kohta. Uuring hõlmas 
512 hukkunu andmeid vanuses 15–64 aastat, mis moodustab 97% kõigist 
valitud vanusegrupi hukkunutest sellel perioodil. Analüüsimeetodina kasutati 
Student t-testi keskmiste ja hii-ruut testi proportsioonide erinevuste hinda-
miseks. Lisaks hinnati ka mitmeid binaarseid tingimuslikke logit mudeleid 
tuvastamaks tegureid, mis prognoosivad joobes seisundit hukkunute hulgas. 
Tulemustest väärivad kindlasti esiletoomist järgmised aspektid. Esiteks, 
perioodil 2000–2002 64% liikluses hukkunutest olid joobes. Teiseks, jalakäijate 
hulgas oli joobes hukkunute osakaal selgelt kõrgem kui sõidukijuhtide hulgas. 
Erinevad logit mudelid paljastasid täiendavalt, et kui hukkunu oli mees, 
hukkunud maanteel toimunud õnnetuses ja ei viibinud õnnetuse hetkel mootor-
sõidukis, on selgelt tõenäolisem, et ta oli joobes. Kasutades väga spekulatiivset 
ja intuitiivset meetodit, hinnati antud empiirilises uuringus ilmnenud empiirika 
baasil, et 13,5% kõigist liiklussurmadest saab pidada alkoholi välismõjudeks.  
Teises uuringus hinnati alkoholi liigtarvitamisest tingitud majanduslikku 
koormust ühiskonnale 2006 aastal. Selleks kasutati laialt aktsepteeritud 
niinimetatud haiguskulu (ing k cost-of-illness) lähenemist. See meetod baseerub 
alternatiivkulu kontseptsioonil – arvesse võetakse üksnes kulud, mis tekivad 
alkoholist tingitud ressursside kasutamisega, ignoreerides eri tüüpi alkoholiga 
seotud siirdeid ühiskonna sees. Lisaks, ka kulud, mida kompenseerivad alkoholi 
tarvitamisest saadavad kasud, jäävad arvestusest välja. Samas kulud, mis pole 
kasudega kompenseeritud, võetakse arvesse. Sellest põhimõttest lähtuvalt 
hinnatakse ka alkoholist tingitud suremuse kulusid, kuna eeldatakse, et isikud 
pole suutelised suremisriske arvesse võtma ja neid kasudega kõrvutama. Antud 
väitekirjas rakendatakse kulude hindamisel levimus-põhist metoodikat, võttes 
arvesse kõik 2006 aastal tekkinud kulud, sõltumata sellest millal vastava 
tagajärje põhjustanud alkoholi tarvitamine aset leidis. Mis puudutab osa-
kaalusid, mis näitavad, kui suur osa erinevatest negatiivsetest tagajärgedest 
omistatakse alkoholile, rakendati väga konservatiivset strateegiat – varasemas 
Eesti ja rahvusvahelises kirjanduses erinevatele vanuserühmadele ja soole 
rakendatud erinevatest osakaaludest kasutati antud uuringus ühte ja kõige 
madalamat osakaalu. Lisaks, arvesse on võetud ainult rahas mõõdetavad mõjud, 
ignoreerides mittemateriaalseid mõjusid nagu valu ja kannatus. Hinnati seitset 
kulukomponenti: otsesed kulud tervishoiu- ja kriminaaljustiitssüsteemile ning 
liiklusõnnetustega seotud varaline kahju ja kaudsed kulud enneaegsest 
suremusest, vangistusest, ajutisest ja püsivast töövõimetusest ning madalamast 
tööjõu produktiivsusest töökohal. Kulude hindamisel võetu arvesse ka kasusid, 
mis tekivad seoses sellega, et alkoholi tarvitamine vähendab teatud haiguste 
levikut. Seega kulud on väljendatud netokuludena. Siiski tuleb tõdeda, et kuna 
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paljusid alkoholiga seotud kasusid on keeruline rahasse ümber arvutada, on 
antud uuring orienteeritud eelkõige kulude hindamisele.   
Analüüsi käigus selgus, et majanduslik koormus alkoholi väärkasutamisest 
2006 aastal ulatub 230–329 miljoni euroni, mis võrdluses SKP-ga ulatub  
1,7–2,5%-ni SKP nominaalväärtusest. 75% nendest kuludest on kaudsed, 
millest omakorda 80% on seotud enneaegse suremusega. Mis puudutab otseseid 
kulusid, siis kriminaaljustiitssüsteem kannab nendest poole, tervishoiusüsteem 
kümnendiku ja kolmandik on seotud liiklusõnnetustest tingitud varalise 
kahjuga. Uuringu tulemusi kasutati ka selleks, et tuletada optimaalne alkoholi 
maksumäär rahvusvahelises kirjanduses rakendatud osalise tasakaalu mudeli 
baasil. Pogue ja Sgontzi (1989) mudelile sarnases analüüsiraamistikus hinnati, 
et Pigou maks alkoholile erinevate stsenaariumite korral jääb vahemikku 1,6 
eurot kuni 9,9 eurot ühe liitri puhta alkoholi kohta 2006 aastal. Stsenaarium, mis 
antud töös eeldati olevat kõige täpsem, andis tulemuseks 3,9 eurot liitri puhta 
alkoholi kohta, võrreldes 2006. aastal kehtiva 7,0 euroga liitri kohta.  
 
 
Teoreetiline mudel ja selle simulatsioon 
 
Optimaalsete alkoholi maksu taseme hindamiseks üldise tasakaalu raamistikus 
arendati edasi Parry et al. (2009) mudelit, milles tehti peamiselt neli täiendust. 
Esiteks, eristatakse kohalike ja turistide alkoholi tarbimist, kuna turistide 
tarbimine moodustab ligikaudu veerandi Eestis müüdavast alkoholist. Teiseks 
eeldatakse, et alkoholi maksumäära tõusuga vajab Maksu- ja Tolliamet rohkem 
ressursse maksusüsteemi administreerimiseks seoses võimaliku salaturu mahu 
kasvuga. Kolmandaks eeldatakse, et kui valitsus suurendab avalikke tervis-
hoiukulutusi, mõjutab see teatud määral indiviidide tööjõu pakkumise otsuseid. 
See võimaldab anda hinnangut aktsiisipoliitikale, mille korral täiendavate 
maksutuludega suurendatakse kulutusi, mitte ei alandata teisi makse. Neljan-
daks kaasatakse alkoholi välismõjudena mudelisse lisaks joobes juhtimisele ka 
avalik alkoholi tarvitamine ning isikuvastased ründed. Esimese puhul peetakse 
silmas nii Alkoholiseaduses kehtestatud alkoholi tarbimise keeldu avalikus 
kohas ja avalikku kohta ilmumist joobeseisundis inimväärikust solvaval viisil, 
aga ka Liiklusseaduses sätestatud liikluseeskirjade rikkumist joobes jalakäijate 
poolt. Mudelil on järgmised baaseeldused:  
 representatiivne tarbija esindab agregatsiooni kõigist majapidamistest;  
 tarbija on ratsionaalne, suutes muuhulgas arvesse võtta kõiki alkoholi 
tagajärgi (haigused, sõltuvus jne);  
 lisaks alkoholi tarbimisele saab tarbija kasulikkust ka vabast ajast, 
erinevatest ebaseaduslikest tegevustest; tema heaolu vähendavad mitte-
rahalised karistused ebaseaduslike tegevuste sooritamise eest ning 
erinevad terviseriskid (põhjustatud nii enda kui teiste alkoholi liigtarvita-
misest); 
 representatiivne tarbija saab tööjõutulusid ning rahalisi siirdeid valitsu-
selt, kulutused jagunevad viie kulukomponendi vahel – kulutused 
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alkoholile, teistele kaupadele, liikluskindlustusmaksetele, rahatrahvide 
maksmisele nii joobes mootorsõiduki juhtimise kui ka alkoholi avaliku 
tarbimise eest;   
 majanduses valitseb täielik konkurents, mis tähendab, et firmad teenivad 
üksnes normaalkasumit ja alkoholi maksud kanduvad 100%-liselt edasi 
alkoholi hindadesse; 
 fiskaalsüsteemi, läbi mille tehakse majapidamistele rahalisi siirdeid ning 
finantseeritakse tervishoiu- ja kriminaaljustiitssüsteeme,  finantseeritakse 
läbi tööjõu maksu, alkoholi maksu ja rahaliste trahvide ning valitsus 
hoiab oma eelarvet tasakaalus; 
 maksimeerides representatiivse tarbija kasulikkust, ignoreeritakse polii-
tika mõjusid väliskodanike (turistidele) heaolule.  
 
Seega, valitsuse eesmärgiks on kehtestada alkoholile maks, mis maksimeeriks 
tarbija kasulikkuse, hoides samal ajal oma eelarve tasakaalus ning maksu 
kehtestamisest tingitud muutused eelarvetuludes ja –kuludes neutraliseeritakse 
kas tööjõumaksude või tervishoiukulutuste muutmise kaudu. Selliste eelduste 
korral on alkoholi maksul järgmised mõjud representatiivse tarbija heaolule (vt 
joonis 1). Esiteks, kuna alkoholi maksu tõus alandab alkoholi tarbimist, 
vähenevad nii alkoholiga seotud haigused kui ka ebaseaduslikud tegevused 
(joobes juhtimine, avalikud joomised, ründed). Seoses viimasega vähenevad ka 
alkoholi tarvitajate poolt teiste indiviidide tervisele põhjustatud negatiivsed 
välismõjud, mida käsitletakse efektiivsuse kasvuna. Teist tüüpi efektiivsuskasv 
tuleneb eelnevalt tööturul eksisteerivatest tööjõumaksude poolt põhjustatud 
maksumoonutustest, mis alkoholi maksu tõttu vähenevad. See juhtub, kuna 
alkoholi maks vähendab vaba aja nõudlust (eeldusel, et alkohol ja vaba aeg on 
täiendkaubad), aga ka seetõttu, et valitsus kasutab täiendavaid maksutulusid ja 
kulusääste tööjõumaksu alandamiseks. Kui valitsus kasutab paranenud eelarve-
positsiooni avalike kulutuste suurendamiseks, siis paraneb efektiivsus selle 
kanali kaudu. Muidugi eksisteerib alati võimalus, et valitsus teeb kulutusi 
ebaefektiivselt ja majandusliku efektiivsuse kasv jääb saavutamata. Efektiivsus-
kasv kõrgemast tööproduktiivsusest tuleneb aga sellest, et kuna vähenenud 
alkoholi tarvitamine parandab inimeste tervislikku seisundit, siis on nad ka tööl 
efektiivsemad. 
Matemaatiliselt lahendatakse kirjeldatud mudel kaudse kasulikkuse funkt-
siooni maksimeerimise teel, mis annab viiest komponendist koosneva optimaalse 
alkoholimaksu võrrandi. Esimene on Pigou maks, mis võrdub marginaalse 
väliskuluga. Osalisele tasakaalule tuginevad mudelid üksnes seda komponenti 
hindavadki. Teine on tulu taasringluse komponent, mis väljendab efektiivsus-
kasvu, mis tuleneb nii suurenenud maksutulude kui ka vähenenud alkoholiga 
seotud eelarvekulude kasutamisest kas tulumaksu langetamiseks või tervishoiu-
kulutuste suurendamiseks. Kolmas on väliskasu komponent, mis peegeldab 
turistide ostudelt kogutud maksutulude kasutamisest saadavaid kasusid. Tulud 
turistidepoolsetelt ostudelt erinevad kohalike elanike poolt sooritatud ostudelt 
kogutud maksutuludest heaolukontekstis eelkõige selle poolest, et kui viimaste 
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puhul on tegemist lihtsalt tulusiiretega ühiskonna sees ja heaolu kasv tekib üksnes 
sellest, kui neid kasutatakse näiteks tööjõumaksude langetamiseks (mistõttu 
moonutused tööjõuturul vähenevad), siis turistidelt kogutud maksutulud ei 
koorma kohalikke elanikke absoluutselt ning suurendavad samas mahus ka 
kohalike elanike heaolu (kuna selle võrra peavad kohalikud elanikud vähem 




Joonis 1. Alkoholi maksustamise heaoluefektid 
Allikas: Autori koostatud 
 
 
Neljas on maksu vastastoime komponent, mis tuleneb sellest, et kõrgem alko-
holi hind vähendab nii alkoholi tarbimist kui ka vaba aja tarbimist, sest 
eeldatavalt on tegemist täiendkaupadega. Seega, tööjõu pakkumine kasvab ja 
tulumaksu poolt tekitatud moonutused tööturul vähenevad.  Viies ja viimane 
komponent peegeldab maksu põhjustatud produktiivsuskasvu töökohal, kuna 
langenud alkoholi tarbimine vähendab terviseriske, tõstes agendi produktiivsust. 
Alkoholi maksu tõus 
Vähem joobes juhte, 
avalikke joomisi ja 
ründeid isikute vastu 
















































Optimaalse maksu võrrandi simuleerimiseks hinnati kõigepealt empiiriliselt 
erinevaid mudeli parameetreid. Selleks kasutati tulemusi antud väitekirja 
raames läbi viidud kahest empiirilisest uuringust, Eesti Konjunktuuriinstituudi 
poolt läbi viidud alkoholituru uuringuid, riigieelarve näitajaid (Rahandus-
ministeerium), erinevaid statistilisi andmebaase (Statistikaamet, Eurostat) ja 
hinnanguid rahvusvahelisest kirjandusest (eelkõige erinevad elastsuskoefitsien-
did). Lisaks tehti päringuid vastavatesse asutustesse (Justiitsministeerium, 
Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet, Haigekassa). Kuna mitmete parameetrite väärtused 
olid väga spekulatiivsed, anti kolm erinevat hinnangut – madal, keskmine ja 
kõrge. Keskmise hinnangu saamiseks rakendati väärtusi, mis hinnati kõige 
täpsemaks, madala ja kõrge hinnangu saamiseks korrutati eeldatavalt kõige 
täpsemat väärtust vastavalt kas 0,7 või 1,3-ga. Väärtuste andmisel erinevatele 
elastsustele lähtuti varasematest Eestis ja mujal läbiviidud empiirilistest 
uuringutest. Näiteks alkoholi nõudluse hinnaelastsuste puhul rakendati sõltuvalt 
stsenaariumist vahemikku –0,4 kuni –1,5. Eraldi tuletati hinnang, mis võtab 
arvesse võimalust, et eestlased hakkavad tooma teistest riikidest kaasa odava-
maid alkohoolseid jooke, hakatakse oluliselt rohkem tarbima maksuvaba 
salaalkoholi või toodetakse rohkem alkoholi kodus. Selle stsenaariumi korral 
eeldati, et kui maksutõus langetab kodumaisel turul müüdava legaalse alkoholi 
tarbimist, siis sellest langusest ligikaudu pool asendatakse kas sala- või 
piiriülese kaubanduse kaudu hangitud või kodus toodetud alkoholi tarbimisega. 
Lisaks viidi mitmete parameetrite suhtes läbi ka tundlikkuse analüüs.  
 
 





Tööjõu maksu kohandamisega Avalike kulutuste kohandamisega 
SK Mad Kes Kõr SK Mad Kes Kõr 
Pigou  2.5 –1.2 –2.6 –11.3 2.7 –1.8 –3.7 –16.9 
Tulu taasringlus 1.5 2.6 5.0 14.3 2.2 4.4 9.1 30.7 
Maksu 
vastastoime 
1.6 0.0 9.0 32.9 3.9 0.0 11.1 46.5 
Produktiivsus 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.8 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.0 
Väline kasu 8.2 12.2 15.1 10.5 10.4 14.9 17.1 8.4 





Allikas: Autori arvutused 
Märkused: SK tähistab salaturu, piiriülese kaubanduse ja kodus tootmise stsenaariumi, 
Mad on madal hinnang, Kes on keskmine hinnang, Kõr on kõrge hinnang. 
 
 
Tulemused (vt tabel 1) näitasid, et optimaalne keskmine maksumäär alkoholile 
jääb erinevate hinnangute kohaselt vahemikku 14.5 kuni 70.7 eurot ühe liitri 
puhta alkoholi kohta. Keskmine hinnang andis tulemuseks 27.9 eurot neutraalse 
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eelarvepoliitika (st kui alandati tulumaksu) ja 35.2 eurot eelarvekulutusi 
suurendava eelarvepoliitika korral. Isegi kui eeldada ulatuslikku kasvu salaturult 
või piiriülese kaubanduse teel hangitud alkoholi tarbimises, kinnitavad 
tulemused, et optimaalne maksustamise tase on 14.6 eurot ühe liitri puhta 
alkoholi kohta. Optimaalse maksu struktuuris moodustavad suurima osa just 
erinevad fiskaalse iseloomuga komponendid, millest väga olulist rolli mängib 
just välise kasu komponent, moodustades keskmise hinnangu korral ligikaudu 
pool optimaalsest maksumäärast. Üllataval kombel on Pigou maks negatiivne. 
See tuleneb sellest, et optimaalse maksu võrrand sisaldab ka komponenti, mis 
peegeldab maksu tõusust tingitud administratiivkulude kasvu. Kuna nii madala, 
keskmise kui ka kõrge hinnangu korral on optimaalne määr suhteliselt kõrge, 
siis ületab alkoholi maksu marginaalne administratiivkulu marginaalse väliskulu 
ning Pigou komponent osutubki negatiivseks.   
Optimaalse maksutaseme suur varieeruvus erinevate parameetrite suhtes 
tuleneb fiskaalsete komponentide tundlikkusest, seda eriti nõudluse hinna-
elastsuse suhtes. Täpsemalt, mida elastsem on nõudlus, seda madalam on 
optimaalne maks, kuna sel juhul maksu tõus ei suurenda nii palju tulusid, 
mistõttu pole võimalik ka tulumaksu väga palju alandada või tervishoiukulutusi 
tõsta. Esile tuleb tuua ka seda, et tulemused on väga tundlikud selle suhtes, kui 
suurt täiendavat ressurssi vajab Maksu- ja Tolliamet maksude administreeri-
misel. Antud töös näidati, et võrreldes olukorda, kus täiendavaid ressursse üldse 
ei vajata, olukorraga, kus maksumäära tõstmisel ühiku võrra eraldatakse Maksu- 
ja Tolliametile täiendavalt 40 senti iga turul müüdava ühe liitri alkoholi kohta, 





Kuna 2009 aastal kehtiv keskmine maksumäär hinnati tasemele 9.4 eurot ühe 
liitri puhta alkoholi kohta, siis parameetrite keskmiste väärtuste baasil saadud 
analüüsitulemused viitavad, et otstarbekas oleks kaaluda 200%-list maksu-
määrade tõusu Eestis. Samas tuleb tähele panna, et alkoholimaks Eestis sisaldab 
ka käibemaksu, kuna alkoholi aktsiis on käibemaksu baasiks. Seega, kui 
soovida alkoholi maksustamise taset suurendada 200%, tähendaks see aktsiiside 
tõstmist ligikaudu 150%, eeldusel et kogu maksukoormus kandub 100% edasi 
hindadesse. 
Sarnaselt Parry et al. (2009) uuringuga leidis kinnitust fakt, et fiskaalsete 
aspektidega arvestamine avaldab alkoholi maksu optimaalsele taseme 
märkimisväärset mõju. Kuna optimaalse maksutaseme hindamisel eeldati, et 
eelarve tasakaalus hoidmiseks muudetakse tööjõumakse58, viitavad tulemused 
sisuliselt sellele, et valitsusel oleks efektiivsem mõnevõrra rohkem tulusid 
                                                     
58 Kuigi osade stsenaariumite korral eeldati ka seda, et alkoholi maksustamisest tulenev 
positiivne mõju eelarvele kasutatakse meditsiinikulutuste suurendamiseks, on sellest tulenev 
efektiivsuskasv siiski empiiriliselt väga nõrgalt põhjendatud. Seetõttu nende stsenaariumite 
alusel tuletatud hinnangud on pigem teoreetilise kui empiirilise väärtusega. 
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koguda alkoholi maksustamisest ja vähem tööjõu maksustamisest. Võrreldes 
Parry et al. (2009) analüüsiga arendati antud väitekirjas fiskaalsete tegurite rolli 
edasi peamiselt kahel moel. Esiteks, kui arvestada eraldi ka turistide alkoholi 
oste, tugevneb fiskaalse iseloomuga komponentide osakaal optimaalse maksu 
struktuuris veelgi. Teiseks, optimaalne tase võib oluliselt alaneda, kui valitsus 
vajab suurel hulgal ressursse salaturu kasvu kontrollimiseks. Näiteks käeolevas 
analüüsis elimineerisid administratiivkulud Pigou komponendi sootuks, muutes 
selle negatiivseks. Seega fiskaalsed tegurid mõjutavad optimaalset taset 
mõlemas suunas.  
Oluline on tähele panna, et arvulised tulemused antud väitekirjas olid väga 
tundlikud nii turistide kui ka kohalike elanike alkoholi nõudluse elastsuste 
suhtes. Mida suurem on elastsus, seda madalam on optimaalne tase. 2009. aastal 
oli keskmine alkohoolsete jookide hinnataseme erinevus Eesti ja Soome vahel 
ligikaudu kahekordne. Kui tõsta makse 200%, siis tähendaks see ligikaudu 
55%-list hinnatõusu, eeldades 100%-list maksude edasikandumist. Selle 
tagajärjel moodustaksid hinnad Eestis endiselt ligikaudu neli viiendikku 
hindadest Soomes ja võiks eeldada, et soomlastel jääb motivatsioon Eestist 
alkoholi osta alles ja nende elastsus hinna suhtes võib küll olla märkimisväärne, 
kuid mitte ka ülisuur. Samas, 200% on hetkel ka ilmselt ülemine piir, millest 
suurem maksude tõus poleks reaalselt teostatav. Seega, antud väitekirjas 
läbiviidud analüüsi baasil saab öelda, et reaalselt rakendatav optimaalne 
alkoholi maksustamise tase on 50%–200% kõrgem hetkel kehtivast. Samas, 
viies ellu märkimisväärset maksutõusu, oleks seda mõistlik teha pikema 
perioodi vältel, et saaks jälgida, kuidas turud sellisele poliitikale reageerivad. 
Käesolev väitekiri kinnitas ka seda, et Euroopa Liidus kehtivad regulat-
sioonid, mille kohaselt on võimalik ühest liikmesriigist teise viia oluline kogus 
alkoholi aktsiisimaksuvabalt, tekitavad madalama hinnatasemega riikide 
valitsustele olulise motivatsiooni seda olukorda enda kodanike hüvanguks ära 
kasutada. Tekib suhteliselt intrigeeriv olukord, kus ühe riigi valitsusel on moti-
vatsioon meelitada teise riigi kodanikke alkoholi ostma. Kuigi selline maksu-
poliitika võib olla optimaalne ühe riigi seisukohast, ei pruugi see olla optimaal-
ne Euroopa Liidu kui terviku jaoks, kuna paljudel riikidel võib alkoholi 
liigtarvitamise piiramine osutuda väga keeruliseks.  
 
 
Piirangud ja edasiarendamise soovitused 
 
Töös läbiviidud analüüsil on mitmed piirangud. Esiteks, analüüsi lihtsusta-
miseks on rakendatud mudelit representatiivse tarbijaga ning on eeldatud 
ideaalset konkurentsi. Reaalse majanduse imiteerimisel võivad need osutuda 
ebareaalseteks. Teiseks, kuigi käesolevas töös eeldati, et tarbijad suudavad 
internaliseerida ka potentsiaalselt väljaareneva sõltuvusega seotud kulud, on 
mudel oma olemuselt staatiline, samas kui alkoholi sõltuvusega seotud küsimusi 
on kohasem analüüsida dünaamilise mudeliga. Lisaks on väitekirjas hinnatud 
üksnes keskmist maksumäära ühe liitri puhta alkoholi kohta. Reaalselt 
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eksisteerib aga erinevaid alkohoolseid jooke, mille nõudluse elastsused ja 
alkoholisisaldused on erinevad. Eestis on hetkel näiteks viinas sisalduv alkohol 
oluliselt kõrgemalt maksustatud kui teistes jookides sisalduv alkohol, mistõttu 
ilmselt oleks praktikas otstarbekas edaspidi rohkem tõsta maksumäärasid 
lahjematele jookidele kui kangetele. Seda toetavad ka empiirilised uuringud, 
mis viitavad sellele, et viina nõudluse elastsus on kõrgem kui näiteks õllel. 
Samas, erinevate jookide maksustamine vajab eraldi analüüsi ja jääb käesoleva 
väitekirja analüüsist välja.   
Töö tulemusi tõlgendades tuleb täiendavalt arvestada, et kasutatud teoree-
tiline mudel ei võta otseselt arvesse mitmeid olulisi efekte, mida alkoholi 
maksustamine võib kaasa tuua. Täpsemalt, kuigi mudelis oli arvestatud 
võimaliku salaturu laienemisega ja lubatud selle tõkestamiseks valitsusasutustel 
suurendada administratiivkulutusi, eeldati, et salaturu kasvu suudetakse sel 
moel vältida. Ilmselt praktikas võib osaline kasv siis aset leida. Lisaks pole 
mudelisse otseselt sisse kirjutatud võimalusi, et eestlased võivad maksutõusu 
tagajärjel hakata ostma odavamat alkoholi näiteks Venemaalt ja Lätist või isegi 
tootma alkohoolseid jooke kodumajapidamistes. Sellest tulenevalt võib valitsus 
kaotada suure osa maksutuludest ja alkoholi optimaalne tase osutub madala-
maks. Välismaalt toodud alkoholi tarbimine tekitab ka mitmeid negatiivseid 
mõjusid, sh täiendava koormuse fiskaalsüsteemile. Kuigi mudeli parameterisee-
rimisel kohandati ühele neljast põhistsenaariumist parameetrite väärtuseid 
selliselt, et need peegeldaksid ka salaturu laienemise, piiriülese kaubanduse ja 
kodumajapidamistes alkoholi tootmise mõju optimaalse maksustamise tasemele, 
siis on tegemist siiski suhteliselt kaudse viisiga nimetatud ilmingute analüüsi-
miseks. Näiteks võib majapidamiste endi poolt alkoholi tootmine oluliselt 
mõjutada ka majapidamiste valikuid töö ja vaba aja vahel, mille implikatsioonid 
vajaksid eraldi analüüs. Lisaks tuleb arvestada võimalusega, et alkoholi 
maksutõus suurendab mitmete teiste illegaalsete narkootiliste ainete tarbimist, 
mida antud analüüsis sisuliselt ignoreeriti. Ka maksutõusu mõju turismisektorile 
tervikuna ei käsitletud, mudel võttis arvesse üksnes turistide alkoholi ostudest 
laekuvat maksutulu.   
Tuleb ka tähele panna, et keskmine maksumäär on antud töös leitud 
sedalaadi alkoholi väliskulude baasil, mida on lihtne rahas väljendada. Arvesse 
pole võetud mitmeid teisi mõjusid nagu näiteks alkoholist tingitud koduvägivald 
või psühholoogilised mõjud alkoholi „ohvrite“ lähedastele. Samuti pole hin-
natud mitmeid rahaliselt väljendatavaid kulusid (nt alkoholiga seotud tule-
õnnetuste varalised tagajärjed või alkoholi liigtarvitamisega seotud töö-
võimetuspensionite maksmisest tekkiv fiskaalkoormus). Kuna eeldati tarbijate 
ratsionaalsust, siis ei arvestatud ka erinevaid sisemisi kulusid, nagu alkoholi 
tarvitamisest tingitud haigustega seotud suremus või isikute endi poolt põhjus-
tatud liiklusõnnetustes saadud vigastused ja nende juhtumite tagajärjel kaotatud 
maksudejärgne sissetulek. Ka paljudele alkoholi tarvitamisest tõusetuvate 
kasudega, nagu näiteks stressi leevendus, pole arvestatud, kuna sedalaadi 
mõjude kvantifitseerimine on problemaatiline ja eeldaks eraldi uuringut. 
Kokkuvõttes tuleb analüüsi tulemustesse suhtuda teatud ettevaatlikkusega ka 
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seepärast, et mitmed parameetrite väärtused on kas väga kaudselt tuletatud või 
siis neil puudub üleüldse mingi teaduslik alus.  
Edaspidised uuringud võiksidki panustada mõne eespool nimetatud puuduse 
kõrvaldamisse. Spetsiifiliselt Eesti kontekstis peaksid need eelkõige panustama 
erinevate parameetrite empiirilisse hindamisse, et suurendada antud töös 
kasutatud mudeli praktilist väärtust. See võimaldaks kaasata samasse analüüsi-
raamistikku täiendavaid alkoholi välismõjusid, aga rakendada seda mudelit ka 
nii erinevatele alkohoolsetele jookidele kehtestatud maksude kui ka õigus-
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